POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

Edited for the Academy of Political Science by the Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University

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Volume LXXIII *September 1958* *Number 3*

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

THE TRUMAN AND EISENHOWER DOCTRINES IN THE LIGHT OF THE DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERVENTION

The Right to Intervene to Halt Communism

ON MARCH 12, 1947, President Truman told Congress and the American public that "totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States." For this reason "it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." [1] This sweeping declaration was intended primarily as a warning to the Soviet Union that the United States was prepared to intervene in the relations between Communist and non-Communist states on behalf of any non-Communist country which was being attacked, overtly or covertly, by Communist forces. Later, Secretary of State Dean Acheson and other State Department officials explained to an apprehensive Congress and public that the Truman doctrine would not lead the United States into an ideological crusade to stamp out incipient communism everywhere. Intervention against communist expansion would take place only if and when it could be justified in terms of the national interest and international commitments of the United States. The broad terms of the Truman doctrine merely claimed a broad right to intervene, even though there was no intention to exercise this right in full.

Ten years later, President Eisenhower declared that it was

[1] United States, Department of State, *Bulletin*, vol. XVI, Supplement, May 4, 1947, pp. 829-832.

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essential to American safety to keep the Middle East non-Communist. The United States would give economic and military aid to Middle Eastern nations to lessen their susceptibility to Communist blandishments. This aid was to "include the employment of the armed forces of the United States to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism." [2]

The Eisenhower doctrine was more limited in scope than the Truman doctrine, and more carefully worded to avoid any semblance of unsolicited meddling with the sovereign prerogatives of other nations, which might be excoriated as illegal intervention. The specific purpose of the Eisenhower doctrine was to inform the Soviet Union that the Middle East would be one of the areas where the United States would exercise its right claimed under the Truman doctrine to halt the forcible import of communism. Where Truman had promised aid to stop the subversion of free nations by both "direct and indirect aggression," Eisenhower limited military assistance by American troops to instances involving "overt armed aggression" by "any nation controlled by International Communism." The Truman doctrine, though it was admittedly intended as a blow against communism, had spoken more generally about countering the imposition of "totalitarian regimes." Moreover, the Eisenhower doctrine stressed the need for formal consent by the nation which was to be helped to resist communism. The Truman doctrine did not mention such consent, though it obviously, if not entirely correctly, assumed that peoples who were "resisting attempted subjugation" would welcome assistance in their fight.

The substance of the Truman and Eisenhower doctrines is the assertion that the spread of communism to free countries is a sufficiently grave menace to the safety of the United States to permit it, under international law and in the light of traditional American policy objectives, to intervene on behalf of non-Communist forces contending with Commu-

[2] United States, Department of State, *Bulletin*, vol. XXXVI, January 21, 1957, pp. 86-87.

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nist forces for the control of a given nation. This claim rests on the assumption that full acceptance of Communist doctrines pledges nations to work diligently for the ultimate violent destruction of non-Communist governments everywhere. Moreover, creation of a Communist government is rarely the result of free popular choice. In most instances, it is brought about as the result of machinations emanating from other Communist countries, primarily the Soviet Union, which by force, intimidation, fraud and deceit secure control of the government, and then proceed to eliminate popular opposition. Hence acceptance of Communist rule is not a purely "domestic" affair which is not properly the concern of other nations. It is not an exercise of the sovereign right of a people to choose any government it likes. Rather, it is a matter closely intertwined with foreign policy and affects the right of third parties who cannot be indifferent to the subversion of national independence of any state by foreign and foreign-dominated agents for the benefit of an aggressive foreign Power.

That the United States should claim a right to intervene against the spread of communism in the world has received the endorsement of a large number of the American media of public expression, and has been implemented by Congress. President Truman's request for $400,000,000 for military and economic aid for Communist-threatened Greece and Turkey was approved by a vote of 67 to 23 in the Senate and 287 to 107 in the House in May 1947. The Eisenhower doctrine was underwritten with even greater majorities in March 1957 by a joint Congressional resolution which passed the Senate 72 to 19 and the House 350 to 60.

Assuming the validity of their basic premises about the nature of communism, the Truman and Eisenhower doctrines are within the scope of modern international law which permits intervention as a last resort to save a nation from irreparable harm. But they seem patently contrary to our popular conception of the non-intervention doctrine of the United States which, ever since the inception of the Republic, has allegedly pledged the United States to complete abstention from intervention, even when one of the parties to a dispute has solicited American aid.

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Is the popular notion of the meaning of the American non-intervention doctrine really correct? Is there, in fact, a contradiction between the policy of limited interventionism proclaimed by the Truman and Eisenhower doctrines, and the traditional non-intervention policy and doctrine of the United States? To answer these questions, one must examine the history of the theory as well as the practice of intervention and non-intervention by the United States to discover what the non-intervention pledge has meant in the past and means now to American political leaders.

The Origins of the Non-Intervention Doctrine

The principle that the United States must not interfere with the sovereign prerogatives of other nations was adopted by the founding fathers for one simple, compelling reason: it seemed politically advantageous. The fact that the principle had a sound legal basis in the concept of state sovereignty, which entitles each state to manage its affairs without foreign interference, was not stressed, if it was perceived at all in an age when international law condoned a broad right of intervention. To the founding fathers the rule of non-intervention and of non-entanglement meant that a young and weak nation like the United States must strictly mind its own business, if it was to survive. The United States must concentrate on establishing control over its own domain, without becoming involved in the political intrigues and incessant wars of Europe. At a time when the major European Powers had pledged themselves to intervene in the internal and foreign affairs of other countries to assure the blessings of good government to them—with the intervening nation or nations determining what constituted "good" government—the United States would devote its energies to creating a good government for itself, hoping that its example might be copied elsewhere, and praying that its hands-off attitude would be reciprocated by European Powers which might wish to restore the blessings of monarchical government, whether British, French, Russian or Spanish, to the United States or other parts of the Western hemisphere.

But the United States adhered to its hands-off pledge only in so far as this furthered the national interest. To do

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otherwise would have defeated the very purpose of the doctrine. For this was conceived as an aid to a foreign policy which would permit the United States to grow strong and become master of its destiny in the Western hemisphere, and not as an unconditional, idealistic pledge of total abstinence from intervention. Despite the promise not to meddle with the foreign and domestic affairs of other nations, American political leaders weighed the advisability of intervention as a policy alternative for the achievement of such vital goals as the acquisition of Florida, Texas and California, and the exclusion of further European colonial settlements in the Western hemisphere. As a rule, intervention was found inadvisable either because it was likely to provoke war with a strong European Power, or because American objectives could be obtained within a reasonable length of time by other means. This lent credence to the popular belief that the rule was an absolute one. But there are enough examples of the actual use of intervention—such as American intervention to foment unrest in Florida and California, and intervention in the relations between European and Latin-American states—to belie the assertion that the United States, in its early years, refrained completely from the use of intervention as a tool of foreign policy. Nor were such interventions a violation of international law which, in the nineteenth century, imposed practically no restraints on the right of intervention.

Despite the use of intervention, the non-intervention doctrine was expressed in absolute terms which made it appear that the United States would never intervene under any circumstances—a misconception which has persisted to this day. This misconception was deliberately fostered by American political leaders because the doctrine served a purpose of its own, over and above being a guide for restraint in the use of intervention. The non-intervention doctrine was deemed a valuable political credo to deter European intervention directed against the United States, and it was used to deter American citizens from urging their government to intervene in the affairs of foreign states at a time when indiscriminate intervention would have been disastrous. For either purpose, an absolute doctrine prohibiting all inter-

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ventions was more effective than a conditional one whose conditions could be interpreted to permit a particular intervention. To reconcile theory and practice, the practice of intervention was either ignored or dissembled under names such as " interposition ", " police-action ", or " self-defense ".

Nineteenth-Century Evolution

As the nation grew stronger and more able to intervene in the affairs of other countries with impunity, and when such intervention became more desirable, especially from the point of view of expansionists, the doctrine of absolute non-intervention was reformulated periodically—though it invariably reverted to its original, absolute form—to indicate that interventions necessary for the preservation of the national interest were permissible. Adherence to the rule of non-intervention meant, to quote from President Buchanan's inaugural address in 1857, that the United States " ought to cherish a sacred regard for the independence of all nations, and never attempt to interfere in the domestic concerns of any unless this shall be imperatively required by the great law of self-preservation." [3] This assertion of a limited right of intervention still was self-restraint, beyond the requirements of contemporary international law, in an age when other Powers, given the opportunity and the necessary strength, meddled freely in the affairs of their weaker neighbors, often for trivial gains, or personal benefit of the politicians involved.

While this conditional doctrine of non-intervention accorded with the practice of the United States—the use of intervention as a last resort only for the accomplishment of vital objectives not otherwise attainable—it did not provide a firm guide for specific foreign policies. There was no definition of what constituted " vital " objectives which might be pursued by intervention, or what amounted to an exhaustion of all other reasonable means short of intervention to protect vital interests. This left room for honest—and, at times, not so honest—differences of opinion among political leaders about the requirements of the " great law of self-

[3] James D. Richardson, ed., *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1902* (Washington, 1902), vol. V, p. 78.

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preservation." When, for example, President Grant wished to annex Santo Domingo to secure a naval base which he considered essential to American safety and believed that intervention should be used to bring the island speedily under American control, some of his opponents in Congress opposed intervention on the grounds that no vital interests were involved, or that these interests were not vital enough to justify intervention. Some considered the addition of Caribbean island possessions positively detrimental to American interests. Others agreed that the base was vital but felt that patient negotiations over a period of years, rather than immediate intervention, would be a sounder approach to obtain an annexation treaty. Grant thought that such negotiations stood little chance of success. Delay would fritter away a propitious moment for easy intervention. Grant's supporters argued that his contemplated action was sanctioned by the doctrine, his opponents charged that it was forbidden.

Then, as now, the application of the doctrine in specific circumstances was frequently in dispute. But its general requirements were always clear to the men in charge of American foreign policy: intervention must be used with utmost restraint only to rectify an obvious danger to the territorial integrity and political independence of the United States.

The Climax and Decline of Interventionism

Then came the "imperial years" following the Spanish-American War in which manifest destiny seemed to beckon the American eagle to spread its wings over its weaker neighbors and become an active participant in the game of power politics. It would have been advantageous to jettison the non-intervention doctrine entirely and embark on an unhampered spree of interventionism to further American interests. Many expansionists would undoubtedly have liked to do so.

But since restraint in intervention was a hallowed concept, encrusted with moral and legal values, it was more politic to reinterpret the non-intervention doctrine than to deny its validity entirely. This was done by broadening the category of objectives for which intervention would be per-

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missible to include economic benefits for American citizens, stoppage and prevention of atrocities, and the defense of the "interests of collective civilization." Moreover, it was no longer deemed imperative to ascertain the necessity for intervention in each individual case. Certain conditions, such as political unrest in Caribbean countries, or attempts by foreign Powers to close the Open Door in China, were *ipso facto* deemed grounds for intervention. Even if the danger to the safety of the United States was not immediate in these cases, the fact that there was a potential of grave danger was thought sufficient to justify intervention. If such reasoning could be held valid, then the non-intervention doctrine could be reconciled with widespread, large-scale interventionism in the Caribbean, in China, and in other strategic locations.

That this sort of interpretation of the non-intervention rule was to be a short-lived aberration soon became apparent. Vociferous public protests against the misuse of the principle to justify meddling in the affairs of other nations to secure future benefits, rather than defend existing vital rights in actual, immediate jeopardy, found a champion in President Woodrow Wilson. He declaimed against a policy of unbridled and unprincipled power and deplored advancing American welfare wantonly at the expense of other nations. He returned to a concept of a severely limited right of intervention in which the definition of "vital" interests which might be defended by intervention was even narrower than in the days of the founding fathers. By this time, the concept of a limited right of intervention had gained wide international acceptance, especially among small nations. Intervention was considered justifiable only to forestall immediate serious harm to the intervening nation. Intervention to secure vital objectives, such as acquisition of strategically important territories, was no longer permissible. In conformity with this doctrine, Wilson resorted to intervention only when, in his opinion, the military security of the United States made a less drastic course impossible. It was one of the ironies of fate that serious political turbulence in the strategically vital Caribbean region forced Wilson, the champion of the rights of small nations and sworn foe to in-

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terventionism, to become one of its foremost practitioners in order to quell a malady which he considered invariably fatal to peace in the Americas.

After World War I, the need for intervention to protect America's vital interests declined because wartime exhaustion had reduced potential rivals and enemies to temporary impotence. It was possible and desirable, in the eyes of a public reconverted to isolationism, to practice a strict policy of non-intervention. With no immediate threat of European intervention in the Caribbean, regardless of the political chaos which might prevail there, and with the lesson of the failure of intervention as a tool of foreign political reform all too recent, the United States was willing to call the marines home for keeps. There was a return to the belief that non-intervention had been and should be an absolute rule, and that interventionism had been a temporary aberration practiced only in the turbulent era of the turn of the century. The pressure by Latin-American nations to adopt absolute non-intervention as the international law of the Americas served to heighten popular antipathy to intervention, which was equated only with brutal coercion of small nations by selfish Great Powers. The fact that the right of intervention was an essential right to protect vital interests in a community of sovereign nations, without resorting to war, was generally ignored.

The Menace of Militant Totalitarianism

The feeling of national security which had followed World War I evaporated in the middle thirties of the twentieth century when hostile, aggressive, authoritarian states emerged in Europe and Asia. A nation in peril once more looked to means short of war, including intervention, to escape its predicament. The qualms of declared foes of interventionism were once more assuaged, as they had been in the formative years of the Republic, by calling intervention by different names. While the right to intervene was not generally challenged, the wisdom of using it was in dispute. The Roosevelt administration believed that the domination of Europe and Asia by two aggressive, totalitarian, expansionist nations was a sufficiently serious menace to the ter-

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ritorial integrity and political independence of the United States to justify the use of intervention in the struggle against the Axis. Others argued that the United States was not strong enough to intervene to stop this menace in Asia and in Europe. As in the early days of the Monroe Doctrine, it would be best to pledge non-intervention in the affairs of Europe and Asia, in return for a pledge on their part to keep out of the Western hemisphere. In the opinion of these "isolationists", European and Asiatic conquerors would be willing to abide by their pledges because their abstinence from conquest in the Western hemisphere would be rewarded with a free hand within their spheres of interest, and because Fortress America would be too strong to be attacked.

As more and more territory fell under the sway of the banners of the rising sun and the crooked cross, the majority of the public adhered to Roosevelt's view that Fortress America would be doomed if it allowed the tide of aggression to lap the very shores of its protecting oceans. Intervention must be used to stem this tide, even at the risk that it might lead to war. On this assumption, the United States intervened on an ever increasing scale on behalf of those who were resisting Japan and Germany. China was strengthened with loans and military assistance. The Powers fighting Germany received civilian and military supplies. And neutral countries in Asia and Europe, but particularly in Latin America, were pressed to break their ties with the Axis nations. Ultimately, the United States went beyond intervention and became an active belligerent in the war against the Axis.

After the Axis menace had been subdued, and before postwar isolationism could gain much ground, the United States found itself pitted against aggressive communism. Again, intervention was weighed as a policy to protect the survival of the nation. Though the United States had taken long strides toward abandoning its right of individual intervention within the Western hemisphere by accepting treaties pledging non-intervention, and though it had hoped that collective intervention under the aegis of the United Nations would obviate the need for individual intervention in

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the rest of the world, few questioned the right of the United States to think once more in terms of individual intervention, as long as the prohibitions of the United Nations Charter against the use of armed force were obeyed.

As in the case of Axis aggression, there were those who counseled the Fortress America approach. Their reasoning was that the United States would dissipate its strength without dealing a death blow to communism, if it intervened all along the huge periphery of Soviet power to keep it from spilling into troubled non-Communist areas. It would be better to let world events take their course, in the hope that somehow communism would defeat itself or be defeated by its immediate victims, without American intervention. Should these hopes prove idle, then America, with her strength unsapped, would be prepared to fight communism whenever it made a direct assault on the Western hemisphere.

Opposed to this approach were the internationalists who argued that it was too late to fight communism once it had engulfed most of the free world. The time to prevent the demise of Western democracy was at hand, and intervention must be used to halt communism wherever it was on the march. In fact, it was hoped that a mere declaration of intentions by the United States that it would intervene to stop further Communist advances would deter Communist aggression. The Truman doctrine was such a declaration of intention. But, without implementation everywhere, it could not stop all further advances of communism. For the Communists knew, as well as did America's political and military leaders, that the United States lacked the power to enforce this declaration to the fullest. It would have to pick and choose among Communist aggressions and subversions those against which it would intervene, and those which it would have to ignore, or condemn by words only.

Because it was clear to all that the Truman doctrine could only be implemented selectively, President Eisenhower considered it necessary in 1957 to tell the Soviet Union specifically that the Middle East was one area in which the Soviets could definitely expect American resistance to their encroachments. But the criteria which he stressed as determining the American decision to enter the fray were not in

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accordance with previous American practice. If, as Congress had declared, it was vital to the United States to keep communism out of the Middle East, the United States could hardly be expected to watch passively while communism engulfed the region by subversion or direct aggression, merely because one of the preconditions for assistance to Middle Eastern states—a specific invitation for American aid to fight communism—might be lacking. Middle Eastern rulers, for a variety of cogent reasons mostly relating to Arab nationalism, might be unable to issue such an invitation, even though they might desire American aid. It stands to reason that the United States should not hesitate to intervene, in the absence of an invitation, whenever such an intervention would be justifiable under international law and the United Nations Charter because of the existence of a situation fraught with immediate, catastrophic danger for the United States. Conversely, any request by Middle Eastern states for American assistance to resist communism should not be granted automatically, as implied by the Eisenhower doctrine. Such a request should be weighed in the light of America's appraisal of the situation. Except in a clear-cut case of direct Communist aggression—in which the United States would undoubtedly wish to aid the victims—the vagueness of the doctrine makes it possible for the United States to declare, in the light of political circumstances, that the conditions making it operative have or have not yet arisen. This country should not permit itself to be dragged into Middle Eastern conflicts any time a country waves the Red flag of communism to get American aid.

The Value of the Truman and Eisenhower Doctrines

Returning to the initial question, whether the Truman doctrine and the Eisenhower doctrine can be reconciled with America's traditional non-intervention doctrine and practice, the answer is that their practice has thus far been consistent with American tradition, but that the wording of the doctrines implies in part a wider and in part a narrower use of the right of intervention than ordained by the traditional non-intervention doctrine. Except for a short span at the turn of the twentieth century, the United States has tradi-

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tionally couched its non-intervention doctrine in cautious, conservative phrases, to the point, at times, of renouncing intervention as a policy alternative at a time when it was being practiced, albeit under a camouflage name. The assertion made in the Truman doctrine that the United States claims the right to intervene wherever free governments are overthrown by totalitarian groups, because the demise of free governments anywhere *ipso facto* menaces the safety of the United States, is too sweeping in the light of past American doctrine and practice. To pick an extreme example: if, in the tribal wars of Central Africa, a democratically ruled tribe is conquered by a totalitarian one, surely this would not be detrimental enough to the United States to warrant it to intervene, even if the intervention could be legally justified on the grounds that a nation has a legal right to intervene when it is adversely affected by illegal intervention conducted against a third state.

It seems ill-advised at the present time to assert an unnecessarily broad right of intervention for several reasons. The justification that it serves as a deterrent to Communist aggression and encourages endangered nations to resist communism has proved false. The Communists are not deterred by what appears to be a bluff, and their prospective victims are little inclined to risk resistance solely on the strength of prospective American aid which they know is not automatically forthcoming. On the other hand, America's friends who fear, probably unduly, that tough language and sabre rattling increase the chance of war with the Soviet Union, in which Western Powers face atomic annihilation, would be much heartened by American verbal restraint. As long as it is obviously impossible to halt all Communist advances, and unwise to broadcast a blueprint of America's exact strategy of resistance, it would be best to reaffirm the traditional rule—which is being applied in practice—that intervention will remain a last resort to be used when the United States considers itself seriously endangered. This more modest claim might to some extent ease the nervous tension in the foreign offices of the free world.

The traditional rule would also serve the United States better than the Eisenhower doctrine which, though more re-

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strictive than the Truman pronouncement, is too broad in claiming unconditionally that the loss of independence and political integrity of any of the Middle Eastern nations would seriously impair the vital interests of the United States, and too narrow in promising to make American interposition dependent on the consent of Middle Eastern sovereigns, in derogation of existing rights to intervene whenever the safety of the United States demands it.

There is historical precedent for expressing the non-intervention doctrine in terms different from its application, if such expression can serve a sound political purpose. The formulation of the doctrine as a political absolute in the early days of the Republic is one example. But just as that formulation changed when it was no longer valuable, so the Eisenhower and Truman doctrines should be clearly brought into conformity with, or rescinded in favor of, the traditional non-intervention doctrine because, as policy expressions, they have failed to deter Soviet aggression, failed to boost the morale of pro-Western Powers, and, in the case of the consent provisions of the Eisenhower doctrine, failed to clear the United States of the charge of imposing its policies on unwilling non-Communist countries. Instead, the excessive claims, even though they have not been put into practice, have been misunderstood and distorted as evidence of bellicose intentions, and the sincerity of the consent provisions of the Eisenhower doctrine has been questioned when it seems obvious that there may be implied reservations.

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MARXISM AND EARLY INDONESIAN ISLAMIC NATIONALISM

A STUDY of the influence of Marxism upon the Islamic nationalist movement in Indonesia during the critical years following the First World War provides a number of insights into the contemporary conflicts in Moslem areas under similar pressures. The Indonesian situation illustrates two essential ingredients in the present Communist attempts to establish hegemony over Moslem states, that is, the ability of communism to exploit colonial peoples' twin hates, imperialism and capitalism, and the capacity of Islam to synthesize its beliefs with elements of Marxism when such a synthesis is politically advisable. An examination of that period would, therefore, appear valuable for an understanding of contemporary trends.

The critical years immediately following the First World War found the major Moslem political organization, Sarekat Islam, embroiled in a series of internecine conflicts over the nature of Islam and Marxism. S.I. congresses, the *Volksraad* and local meetings were the scenes of bitter debates which overshadowed every other aspect of the movement's program. The preoccupation of the élite with this battle for ideological and organizational predominance dangerously weakened the Islamic movement at a time when social, economic and political changes demanded well-planned aggressive leadership. The net result was a Pyrrhic victory for the pro-Moslem groups and the virtual destruction of Sarekat Islam as a mass party.

In order to assess the character of the dispute, a short historical summary is necessary. Founded in 1912 as the result of a number of factors including antagonism toward the Chinese, a resurgent Islamic nationalism and economic desires, Sarekat Islam expanded from a small association based in Solo to a mass movement with divisions throughout the islands. This increase in popularity and power was due to an intermingling of a number of fortuitous circumstances.

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As its leader it had H. O. S. Tjokroaminoto, a man with charismatic qualities, who was ably abetted by a more practical politician, Agus Salim. In organization it was loose and without any tightly controlled program, thus enabling local units to rise for a multitude of reasons under religious, political and business leaders who were able to rally under the banner of Sarekat Islam. Events in the Indies and the world also conspired to build S.I. power. In Indonesia a clerically dominated administration antagonized the Moslem population and brought new adherents. In the world the first great war somewhat diminished Holland's position in the Indies, resulted in political and economic changes, and increased the importance of the islands. Finally, the revolutions brought on by the global conflict inspired many Indonesians and frightened the administration into making a number of concessions.

As the S.I. developed its mass following and expanded its organization, policy changes also became apparent. On an initial Moslem-based anti-Chinese foundation it began to build a more modern nationalist and socialist platform. By 1918 Sarekat Islam had developed an independence-minded, politically and economically oriented program with definite secular overtones. The leadership, while not completely eschewing its earlier religious basis, found it necessary to compete with secular and particularly with Marxist elements both within its own ranks and in other nationalist parties.

Marxism had developed in the same fertile ground which had led to the growth of nationalism. Several factors in the Indies and the world were particularly propitious to the expansion of Marxism. The advent of a socialist state in Russia tended to lend prestige to the movement, particularly when it was the only Western state to attack colonialism unreservedly. It was also possible to play upon the unrest resulting from the faltering economy of the war and post-war years. The difficulties which came with the disruption of normal channels of trade during the war were followed by a world-wide post-war depression which was especially injurious to areas concentrating on primary products such as the Netherlands Indies. The result was a lowering of wages, industrial and agrarian strife, and the giving of a new im-

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petus to those pressing for radical economic and political reforms. This situation found the more radical Marxists in a strong position, because of their leadership in a number of labor unions and their ability to outbid the élite of Sarekat Islam which often found it necessary to appease conservative groups within its membership.

Finally, this was a period of flux in the Indies in which a relatively large number of individuals gained education and employment outside the village at a time when the colonial society did not have enough opportunities for social and economic advancement. The consequence was a dissident class which found itself educated beyond the village yet unable to attain the status and prestige it desired. Marxist propaganda unreservedly attacking capitalism and colonialism in all its forms found a ready audience in this group which helped to provide a large part of the rank and file of the radical socialist movement.[1]

These factors help to account for the considerable progress made by Marxism in the Indies in the second decade of this century. During those years Marxist-oriented individuals had found havens in the *Nationaal Indische Partij* (later *Insulinde*) and the *Indische Sociaal Democratische Vereeniging* (Indonesian Social Democratic Union or I.S.D.V.). The latter was established in May 1914 and during its early years reflected the diversified views of socialist thought in the Indies. With the outbreak of the Russian Revolution the schism between the evolutionary and revolutionary factions in the organization became pronounced and the moderates seceded, leaving the radical wing in the control of H.J.F.M. Sneevliet and a young Indonesian, Semaun.

1 Support for this may be found in a fascinating study by W. M. F. Mansvelt of the inmates of Digul prison camp, most of whom had been interned following the abortive Communist-led revolt against the Dutch in 1926-27. In studying one thousand internees he discovered that, at a time when official statistics showed Javanese literacy to be under 6 per cent, his sample was over 75 per cent literate. However, what is interesting is that none had gone to an institution of higher learning and only 2.4 per cent had received middle school training (only one graduated). The vast majority were from the lowest educational institutions in which they were unable to obtain sufficient training to place them in professional or technical fields where prestige and security were to be found. Mansvelt appears to bear this out when he places the vast majority in "inferior occupations". W. M. F. Mansvelt, "Onderwijs en Communisme", *Koloniale Studien*, vol. 12 (1928), pp. 202-225.

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The revolutionary faction proceeded to follow a policy of infiltration into Sarekat Islam similar to one it had previously used with *Insulinde*. The major center of activity was the Semarang division of the S.I., a group known to be receptive to revolutionary ideas. The members of this radical kernel of the nationalist movement were in agreement on their distrust of the Dutch, intense hatred of capitalism, and desire to eliminate colonial control, but were without any real systemization of ideas. It was the Semarang S.I. and its fellow travelers elsewhere in the islands that undermined the leadership and organization of the Islamic movement in the years following the war. The struggle which developed between the various groups in the nationalist circle because of this infiltration is the primary interest of this paper.

Prior to discussing this conflict, it is necessary to delineate the beliefs of the *dramatis personae* in the play of ideas and power which held the attention of the Indonesian world between 1918 and 1922. The struggle which so convulsed the nationalist scene was not bipolar but took place between several attitude groups. For the sake of discussion, these may be divided into four separate clusters: local *Hadjis* and merchants who supported a type of national socialism as a weapon against foreign capitalism; the religious Communists who used the Koran to support radical Marxist dogma; those Communists who looked upon Islam as a means to an end and were either neutral or antagonistic toward religion; the leadership of Sarekat Islam which accepted many of the tenets of Marxism but at the same time reshaped socialism to the local scene.

The first group, local Moslem merchants and religious leaders, held too many vested interests to be true socialists, but they were more than willing to agitate against foreign capitalism and imperialism. Caught in the financial squeeze between Dutch entrepreneurs and Chinese middlemen, they were willing, with reservations, to utilize Marxist slogans for their own needs. Thus, the merchant element of Sarekat Islam could accept Tjokroaminoto's declaration at the second National Congress of "an implacable war against criminal [or sinful] capitalism," particularly when he defined sinful capitalism as foreign capitalism and implied that the indige-

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nous type was proper.[2] Obviously this reshaping of Marxism was necessary for self-preservation, but at the same time this group could see no likely compromise with the Communist policies of religious neutrality and pure class war. Tjokroaminoto sought a nationalist interpretation of class war by equating the class struggle with a conflict between downtrodden Moslems and Christian, European oppressors. By stating that " Here the dominator is another people, made of a wholly foreign race," he probably hoped to assuage fears of an internal class war although the compromise was never acceptable to the Communists.[3]

The religious Communists had few such qualms and found it perfectly possible to interpret the Koran to fit their own beliefs. The most notorious member of this relatively small group was *Hadji* Misbach, who made use of his religious prestige and control of the *Medan Moesliman* and *Islam Bergerak* to attract a number of young Indonesians. After a bombing in Solo in 1924 Misbach was exiled but not before he and some of his fellow Islamic Communists had made some of the most imaginative rationalizations of the Koran ever to appear in the Indies.

In West Sumatra, where communism became entangled in conflicts involving Islamic Modernism and *Adat* (customary) law, it had a longer and deeper penetration than elsewhere. Under the leadership of *Hadji* Datoek Batoeh and Natar Zainoeddin an attempt was made to synthesize Modernist demands for social welfare with Marxist dogma. Thus, under the guidance of men who restated Islam and communism in terms of social progress and the destruction of traditional *Adat* barriers, many young men turned to religious communism. In spite of counterrevolutionary activities by S.I. leaders, a number of this group took part in the Communist revolt of 1926-27. It was partially due to the desire of the Communist party to keep these individuals within its ranks that it was unwilling to oppose Islam vigorously.

Communists such as Tan Malaka, Darsono and Semaun did not base their social or personal philosophy on Islam al-

2 Paul Eyquem, " Bolchevisme aux Indes Néerlandaises ", *Revue du Monde Musulman*, LII (1922), 60.

3 Dutch East Indies, *Volksraad*, 2nd sitting, 1920, p. 213.

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though they often saw the necessity of maintaining an outward appearance of religious conviction. This was explicitly asserted by Tan Malaka in regard to the situation in Menangkabau when he stated that the area's "Islamic fanaticism" demanded that the Communists display a belief in the purity and grandeur of Islam.[4] The opportunism of this position resulted in little continuity in outward policy and, as the force of events intensified the conflict between Sarekat Islam and the Communist élite, there was a shift from perfunctory obeisance to Islam to neutrality toward religion. At the same time, there were members of the Semarang division who were anxious to bridge the gap between Islam and secular nationalism.

The inner élite of the party, however, although apparently willing to maintain an outward neutrality toward Islam for the sake of political expediency, found religion incompatible with Marxist dogma. On the one hand, Semaun and Tan Malaka could not accept Sarekat Islam's fundamental belief in Islam as the basis for the people's movement and an Indonesian state. Nor could they see in Islam a means of achieving the goals they had set. The idea of the unity of the faithful as forwarded by Tjokroaminoto and Salim destroyed a fundamental Marxist precept, class war. Semaun complained: "Religion gives no clear criterion; Christians and Mohammedans live in the same land and have the same interests."[5] Caught between the countervailing winds of association with Sarekat Islam, the opinions of the religious Communists within their own ranks, directions from the Comintern, and their own aversion to a confessional movement, the Communists displayed anything but a united policy toward Islam.

The leadership of Sarekat Islam found itself in a similar position of warding off crosscurrents. In the period after the First World War the S.I. élite was buffeted by conservative merchants, Marxist-dominated divisions led by Semarang,

[4] Dutch East Indies, "Official Report of the Dutch Government on the Communist Revolt in November, 1926", *Annuaire Documenté Comparé Coloniale*, 1927, p. 199.

[5] J. P. Blumberger, "Sarekat Islam", *Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-Indië* (Leiden, 1924), p. 197.

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Dutch officials and regulations, indiscretions by local divisions, and a welter of social, economic and political grievances to which it was supposed to discover solutions. Two obvious common enemies could be attacked, thus relieving pressure on the élite—capitalism and imperialism. Thus, it was not surprising to hear cries against capitalism in almost every post-war meeting. Whereas speeches of condemnation were usually expressed in terms of a general aversion to capitalism or in specific grievances against discriminatory practices in the sugar industry, on large plantations, among money lenders, etc., in the early years little Marxist dogma was delineated. In fact, it is doubtful if many S.I. spokesmen had ever read Marx or been closely associated with Marxist thinking and when accused of repeating European ideas they often denied that they were influenced by ought but Islam and utility. As late as December 5, 1918, Tjokroaminoto declared in the *Volksraad* that just because he led a mass organization, it did not follow that he had to be a Marxist or in favor of the class struggle. To underscore his position he insisted that " to my own regret I have still not made any study of Marxism," maintaining that his ideas were based upon reality and not theory.[6] At the same time, there were those in the top élite who were in close contact with both indigenous and European Marxists.

Nevertheless, the S.I. leaders usually pointed to the Koran as their teacher and guide to socialist progress. " The Prophet is the father of socialism and the way-shower of democracy ", said one speaker at the 1916 congress.[7] This acknowledgement of the faith as the originator of socialism usually took two forms: a general obeisance toward Islam as the fountainhead of all social progress and the use of specific Koranic texts to support ideas and practices. " Islam is the cornerstone of the structure of the solidarity of socialism ", said the afore-mentioned speaker who further declared that socialist ideas of equality were conveyed by the Prophet. Salim took the stand that the application of Marxism could be found in the Koran, that historical materialism could be learned from

[6] Dutch East Indies, *Volksraad*, 2nd sitting, 1918-1919, p. 178.

[7] H. Bouman, *Enige Beschouwingen over de Ontwikkeling van het Indonesisch Nationalisme op Sumatra's Westkust* (Groningen, 1949), pp. 54-55.

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the Holy Book, and that Mohammed had taught Marxism more than twelve centuries before Marx.

Specific commands could also be ascertained from the Koran. At the first S.I. congress, a speaker declared that the "Koran is a work of the greatest importance to socialism," [8] and succeeding speakers through the years attempted to prove him correct. Koranic exhortations prohibiting interest, commanding aid to the poor, commending charity and brotherhood, and damning the accumulation of excess wealth were constantly being brought forth by religious socialists.

It should be noted that socialism did not arise in Sarekat Islam purely from perusing the Koran or listening to intellectual arguments by European and Indonesian Marxists. The rationalization of Islam to fit twentieth-century Marxism was to a large extent due to the fact that socialism provided a ready explanation and plan of action for Indonesia's plight, and, what was probably more important, political pressure from Left-wing groups forced continual revisions of S.I. policy in order to survive. Under the pressure of its radical divisions, the élite was forced to seek compromises between Islam and Marxism. As J. M. van der Kroef has remarked:

> Left-wingers began to see in the Sarekat Islam their weapon in the class struggle with non-Islamic colonial capitalist groups, and Marxism and nationalism rather than Islam became for them the chief motive forces. But the Moslem bourgeoisie regarded the Islamic movement primarily as the expression of group solidarity, integrated along the religious-cultural lines of Modern Islam.[9]

The details of the abortive attempts to synthesize these two opposing views will be discussed in the succeeding pages in which an effort will be made to exhibit how the philosophy and power of an organization were decimated by a political and ideological struggle.

The dissension which developed in the ranks of Sarekat Islam was spotlighted annually by the national congresses.

[8] *Ibid.*

[9] J. M. van der Kroef, *Indonesia in the Modern World,* Part I (Bandung, 1954), pp. 74-75.

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However, prior to each gathering, the participants used whatever means were available to publicize their position and to undermine the policies and prestige of their rivals. Thus, before one conference the Semarang division had maneuvered the S.I. élite into accepting Semaun on the central committee under the threat of secession, while at other times the S.I. leadership was accused of "selling out to the capitalists." On the other hand, the three S.I. representatives on the *Volksraad* used that organ as a platform for their views.

The third congress of Sarekat Islam, held in Surabaja from September 29 to October 6, 1918, marked a significant movement to the left. Independence, revolution and socialism were so widely emphasized as to make one Dutch writer remark that with this gathering the old S.I. was dead.[10] Religion was temporarily driven into the background and social and economic problems became paramount. Instead of Islam, class war became the accepted basis of propaganda and evolutionary Marxism was firmly incorporated into the movement's program. Specific complaints were lodged in regard to wage rates, child labor, working hours, sickness insurance, taxes and forced labor. Tjokroaminoto showed the tenor of the congress by implying that nonparliamentary means might be used if demands were not met.

Following the third congress the old S.I. leadership apparently began to see the dangers inherent in the leftward drift of the organization and Islam was revived as a propaganda weapon against the radical socialists. Three apparent reasons for this development were (a) a renewed realization by the élite of the vitality of Islam among the populace as evidenced by the reaction of the people against contemporary attacks upon Islam and the Prophet, (b) recognition of the importance of Islam as a weapon against its secular internal foes, the radical socialists, and (c) the attack upon Moslems by Left-wing groups.

The first reason for the élite's renewed interest in Islam reflected a recognition of both the power of religion in Indonesian society and the losses which were being sustained in

[10] J. P. Blumberger, "Stemmingen en Stroomingen in de Sarekat Islam", *Moederland en Kolonien*, XIX (1920), 25.

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S.I. membership. The diminution of followers was associated with a series of risings in the archipelago and the impact of the radicals upon the more conservative Moslems. In the first case, agitation associated with the S.I. had caused serious trouble in Toli Toli, Garoet and the Preanger Regency. Some members had left earlier because of the secularist views of the radical socialists, but the exodus was quickened when the agitations of 1919 appeared to give the S.I. a revolutionary tinge.

Secondly, the danger from the secular Left had become more evident in the months before the fourth congress. The radical socialists attempted to undermine the old leadership through attacks upon the S.I. élite and infiltration into local divisions. In their assaults upon Sarekat Islam they chose to attack frontally its Islamic foundations. In an open letter entitled "Let Us Purify Ourselves", Alimin, later a prominent Communist leader, wrote: "Now that Sarekat Islam has become great and strong it is not any more Sarekat Islam, it has become Sarekat India. The best method to obtain a new degree of growth is to open its ranks to all willing to fight, without distinction to race or religion."[11] The radical socialists further antagonized Moslem elements by disagreeing with Sarekat Islam's entanglement in internal Islamic affairs and by voicing disapproval of S.I. interest in the Caliphate Question and Pan-Islam.

The conflict which was evolving began to divide the S.I. membership into those considering Islam as the basis for political action and the "Semarangers" who were against mixing religion with politics. At the height of the struggle the difference was described as more extreme by Salim who stated at the sixth congress, "the one wants the strengthening of Islam . . . while the other the annihilation of religion and the emphasis lies on tactics."[12] Of interest is the fact that during this period there existed few real disagreements over the economic aspects of Marxism.

As for the radical socialists, by 1920 completely allied to communism and organized into the *Perserikatan Kommunist di India* or P.K.I., their stand began to become more than a

[11] Eyquem, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

[12] Blumberger, "Sarekat Islam", p. 196.

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tactical maneuver. Their association with the Comintern necessitated both agreement with that organ's policies and public approval of Russian activities. As the years passed, this became increasingly difficult in the light of Comintern attacks upon Pan-Islam and Russia's insults to her own Moslem population. The resolutions of the Second Comintern Congress of 1920 were particularly embarrassing to the Indonesian Communists who were attempting to gain control of Sarekat Islam. The most distasteful paragraph read:

> It is necessary to struggle against the Pan-Islam and Pan-Asiatic movements and similar tendencies, which are trying to combine the liberation struggle against European and American imperialism with the strengthening of the power of the Turkish and Japanese imperialism and of the nobility, the large landlords, the priests. . . .[13]

The P.K.I. leadership reluctantly agreed with the resolution and started to campaign against Pan-Islam. The difficulties which this position forced upon the communist cause were enunciated by Tan Malaka at the Fourth Comintern Congress in 1922 when he confirmed the fact that the hostility toward Islam expressed by the Second Congress had hurt his organization.

The Indonesian Communists were also embarrassed by the treatment of Moslems in the Soviet Union where attacks were launched against the mullahs, the marriage ceremony, the pilgrimage, the customs and the history of Islam. Offensives were opened by Associations of Atheists and extremely derogatory statements were made against Islamic theology and philosophy. The fact that some information on these activities reached Indonesia was proved by Communist complaints that the leaders of Sarekat Islam were falsely translating Soviet documents to show that the Communists wished to destroy the Moslem religion.

The pressures upon both the religious and secular elements within the nationalist movement increased tension and resulted in offensive activities on both sides. To assist in the generation of social reforms and to challenge radical socialist power the S.I. vigorously entered into trade-union

[13] Jane Degras, *The Communist International, 1919-1943*, I (London, 1956), p. 143.

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activity. To strengthen Islam a religious committee was installed to elucidate the true teachings of the Prophet and to further the studying of "socialism and religion and other necessary cases for him who follows Islam." [14] Meanwhile, the Communists attempted to discredit Tjokroaminoto who was recognized as the key to the conquest of Sarekat Islam. This was no mean task, for, as one French writer has remarked, "His diplomatic air, his eloquence, his attachment to the political and religious traditions of his race made him a difficult adversary to combat outwardly." [15] When Darsono, a young Communist leader, did openly attack him, he was forced to admit failure publicly and ask the forgiveness of Sarekat Islam for activity contrary to the brotherly practices of the organization.

One last attempt at compromise was made in 1921 when Semaun and Salim worked out a carefully formed set of principles which were accepted by the annual S.I. congress. This declaration, while attacking Dutch capitalism, lauding the socialist popular front, and supporting autonomy, also stressed Islamic ideology and party discipline. On the surface this new "Declaration of Principles" appeared to present a workable synthesis of Islamic and Marxist aspirations. The socialist views of the document were in the vein of statements by S.I. leaders who had previously demanded nationalization of the means of production, greater freedom for labor-union activity, and social reform in general. At the same time, the "Declaration" had firmly reinstated Islam as the foundation of the movement. For its part, the P.K.I. could find a large part of its program elucidated in the document.

The compromise reached in 1921 was only tentative, however, and the fundamental differences between the two groups could be pacified only temporarily. The schism between the secular and religious elements always existed. On the one hand, a report to the congress declared that "The S.I. shall always stand ready with all its power to ward off the eventual blows, whether from within or without, on the

[14] Dutch East Indies, "Mededeelingen der Regeering omtrent enkele Onderwerpen van algemeen Belang", *Koloniaal Verslag, 1920,* p. 10.

[15] Eyquem, *op. cit.,* p. 69.

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Mohammedan religion." [16] In rebuttal, Semaun replied that he favored the elimination of religion from practical politics, although he paid his respects to Islam as "the means of life's explanation." [17] A second cause for friction was the question of party discipline which was raised by the Moslem leaders of the S.I. who sought stricter control over the local divisions and the elimination of ties with other organizations which were maintained by local associations. This was directed against divisions such as Semarang which were allied with the P.K.I.

The tenuousness of the compromise was exhibited to all in the newspaper battle which followed the congress. The Dutch and Communist press declared that the "Declaration" had recognized communism in Islam. The P.K.I. press boasted that "The S.I. has recognized communism in Islam"; "The Communists, of whom it was first said that they are not Mohammedans and were shown as enemies of Islam, are now recognized as brothers"; and *Sinar Hindia* pronounced, "Long live Sarekat Islam and the Indonesian Communist Party."

Seeing the danger in admitting that it had succumbed to communism, Sarekat Islam's Moslem leadership struck back. Declaring, "Long live Sarekat Islam and nothing else," its official newspaper, *Oetoesan Hindia*, replied that it was true that communism was recognized in Islam but that did not mean the basing of the organization's thoughts and life on communism, much less the Semarang philosophy which denied Pan-Islam. The newspaper reported that the S.I. had accepted only the Indonesian part of the Communist party under its hood.[18]

The Communists found themselves in a losing battle and seven months later at the sixth congress they met with defeat. The Moslem portion of Sarekat Islam had come to fear that the radical socialists would push Islam into the background

16 "Nu het vijfde Congres van de S.I.", *Indische Gids*, vol. XLIII, No. 2 (1921), p. 642.

17 Dutch East Indies, "Mededeelingen . . .", *Koloniaal Verslag, 1924-1925*, p. 2.

18 For information on newspaper reactions see Blumberger, "Sarekat Islam", p. 21, and Eyquem, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

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while the latter could not accept the Moslem faith as the foundation of the movement. The historic debates which took place at the sixth congress centered upon the problems of party unity and the place of Islam within the philosophy of the organization. The clearest explanation of the schism which had formed in the ranks of the nationalist movement was developed by Salim and Semaun in a debate which held the attention of the entire gathering.

In articulating the Communist position Semaun, with the help of Tan Malaka, vigorously attacked the Moslem base of the movement, stressing the idea that Islam was not a justifiable foundation for a nationalist and socialist organization. He asserted that the S.I. founder, Samanhoedi, had been a capitalist, that the *Hadjis* had made capitalism a "capitalist ideology", and that the 1917 policy against "sinful capitalism" was in error. He insisted that religion should not affect class war which he considered to be the true basis of the nationalist movement. Salim, while upholding socialism, proceeded to give it a Moslem foundation. He went back to Mohammed and the Koran to prove the existence of socialist ideas long before Marx. He strongly supported the principle of the "Brotherhood of Islam" but at the same time described his faith as nationalist within an international setting. The final decision of the gathering was the acceptance of Islam as the movement's basis of action and the agreement, in principle, to establish party discipline, thereby ousting the Semarang Communist group.[19] The following congress completed the schism.

The Surabaja congress of 1921 resulted in more than the severance of the radical socialists from the movement. It also signaled the end of an era for Sarekat Islam and the demise of the organization as a mass movement. The years to follow were to see the evolution of a much smaller party with a strongly Islamic character. The Communists were not solely responsible for the disastrous loss of power, prestige and membership which the S.I. sustained; for poor organization, revolts in which the S.I. was involved, and Dutch re-

[19] For an explanation of this congress and its ramifications see Blumberger, "Sarekat Islam", pp. 196-201 and Dutch East Indies, "Mededeelingen . . .", *Koloniaal Verslag, 1922*, pp. 13-17.

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pression were also to blame. At the same time, the influence of varying facets of Marxism was part of the process which led to the organization's decline.

Sarekat Islam had been established originally to cater to the religious, commercial and national desires of the Indonesian community. As the movement moved away from those aspirations and sought new aims from Marxism, a cleavage began to emerge between the leadership and the masses. The élite commenced to express ideas which it had gained from its contacts with the West, and the aims which were forwarded were often those of a small group rather than the mass of followers. There is some question as to the significance, to the large mass of village members, of problems such as sickness benefits, nationalization of the means of production, and labor politics.

Sarekat Islam also started to lose its early religious membership as the organization shifted away from Islam and toward secular Marxism. Although the élite later altered its position and, in fact, never completely divorced religion from politics, the S.I. irreparably lost a large number of followers, many of whom entered educational associations such as the *Muhammadiyah*. Losses were particularly noticeable among those who desired to achieve their religious goals without political and economic entanglements. The socialist views expressed by the leadership also tended to antagonize many middle-class merchants and Arabs who had joined Sarekat Islam as a reaction against Chinese and European capitalist encroachments. They were not interested in the Marxist philosophy of proletariat versus capitalist but were vitally concerned with the conflict between the small and large capitalist. The Arabs were particularly distrustful of the reasoning behind attacks upon foreign capitalism and feared for their own businesses. The loss of these members was particularly injurious to Sarekat Islam because they had often been of aid during its frequent financial troubles.

The conflict which took place between the old élite and the Communists resulted in the further dissolution of Sarekat Islam when the latter were ousted from the organization. Withdrawing with Semarang were some of the most vigorous divisions in the S.I. These at first organized into the *Per-*

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satuan Sarekat Islam and participated in Communist meetings but later they termed themselves *Sarekat Rajats* (People's Unions) and were an integral part of the Communist organization. In 1923 these "Red" Sarekat Islamic associations numbered sixteen.[20] The loss of them was extremely harmful to the whole movement, and the expulsion of the Communists in the sixth and seventh congresses has been called a "Pyrrhic victory" by more than one author.

In the opening paragraph of this paper it was asserted that the Indonesian situation illustrates the capacity of Islam to incorporate certain Marxist tenets and the ability of communism to play upon the antipathy of colonial peoples for capitalism and imperialism. Both points would appear well documented by the Indonesian national movement. The ease with which the radical socialists were able to enter the S.I. and the initial acceptability of their doctrine to a people who equated capitalism with imperialism are history. Almost any part of Marxist-Leninist dogma could be fitted into the ideology of an awakening colonial nationalist movement. Nor was Islam the initial obstacle to communist expansion that many hoped. As long as Marxism was expressed in terms of social progress and anti-colonialism, it found acceptance among the Moslem nationalists. Where Marxism did not find a ready audience it could often be reinterpreted to meet the local situation, as was done by Tjokroaminoto regarding "sinful capitalism" and class war.

The conflict which developed can be laid to two not totally unconnected factors: pressures on the Communists leading to an unwillingness to compromise on certain doctrinal issues such as religion and class war, and the growing fear within the old S.I. élite of the rising power of the Left-wing groups. Whether the tightening of its doctrinal stand by the P.K.I. was due to pressure from the Comintern or to an overly optimistic assessment of its position remains a matter of speculation. It can be stated that a formal acceptance of Islam would not have hurt the position of the party while the decision of the P.K.I. to obey the Comintern demands for an attack upon Pan-Islam could only lead to a cleavage within the nationalist ranks.

[20] See S. Dingley, *The Peasants' Movement in Indonesia* (Berlin, 1927).

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There remains the question as to the success of any compromise with the élite of the old S.I. once it saw the danger to its position and the loss of its followers resulting from Communist infiltration. It should be noted that the conflict in this instance was not basically over Marxism. There were periods when the S.I. leadership was willing to accept almost the entire radical socialist program, including the downgrading of Islam, and hesitated only after the activities of Semaun and his followers became too heavy-handed.

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THE COUGHLIN MOVEMENT AND THE NEW DEAL

AMONG the movements that challenged the New Deal during the 1936 political campaign, Father Charles E. Coughlin's Union for Social Justice, first organized in the autumn of 1934, illustrates the nature and effectiveness of dissident protest against the New Deal. Its history is particularly intriguing as it provides a portrait of the dissident personality who is attracted by such movements, a chance to examine the New Deal's response to dissidence, and a penetrating insight into the relationship of the Roman Catholic hierarchy to the New Deal. The materials for this evaluation have been taken largely from the papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt and Monsignor John A. Ryan, both of whom drew to themselves the wrath of the Union for Social Justice.

The Union had its origin in the desire of Father Charles E. Coughlin to create an organization through which public opinion ostensibly would influence policies of the Roosevelt administration. With its formation, Coughlin, who had begun his public career as a passionate supporter of Roosevelt, was well on his way to becoming an avowed enemy of the President. His transition from friend to foe created a certain uneasiness among New Dealers. They were acutely aware that Coughlin commanded each week a radio audience of millions. No one could know how devoted these listeners might prove to be. Some intellectuals saw in the Union for Social Justice a forerunner of American Fascism; the politicians saw a possible avalanche of votes. One politician who had survived the Union's opposition during the Massachusetts primary of September 1936 warned Roosevelt that Coughlin's supporters were "sullen, discontented and bitter, using any argument that they think will appeal to the hearer." [1]

[1] Rep. John W. McCormack to FDR, Boston, Sept. 26, 1936, makes the further point that forty thousand voters had seen fit to paste in the name of the Coughlinite candidate in the senatorial primary; FDR to McCormack,

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Few asked how a priest unknown except in a small region of Michigan six years before had achieved his threatening power; nor did anyone question how a passionate supporter of Roosevelt in 1933 had been converted into an implacable enemy by 1936. In the first instance, by identifying himself originally with Roosevelt, Coughlin had been able to tap much of the public's adulation of the new President. But this identification had been with Roosevelt's personality rather than with the policies of the New Deal.[2] Coughlin's

Oct. 23, 1936. Roosevelt Papers, Columbia University Microfilm, hereafter RP. Except in instances which deal with recognizable public figures, the correspondents quoted are abbreviated to initials. Mayor James M. Curley of Boston's frequent expressions of admiration for Coughlin were a politic recognition that "Boston was the strongest Coughlinite city in America." Curley became embittered subsequently when Coughlin failed to support him in the 1936 senatorial race. Curley believed that the candidacy of Thomas C. O'Brien, an avowed supporter of Coughlin, resulted in his defeat by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. J. M. Curley, *I'd Do It Again!* (Englewood Cliffs, 1957), pp. 296-299. See also RP, P.O'B to Louis B. Ward, Detroit, Oct. 1, 1936; M. H. McIntyre to O'B., Oct. 12, 1936; Daniel J. Tobin to James Farley, Indianapolis, April 23, 1935, whose receipt of a deluge of protests against his (Tobin's) attacks upon Coughlin had convinced him that the Union for Social Justice was "not a thing to be sneezed at."

[2] RP, Coughlin to McIntyre, Nov. 14, 1933, commenting on Roosevelt's achievements, concluded, "He is magnificent!" Coughlin also stated that his plea for letters supporting the President had brought "just one long litany of renewal of faith in Franklin D. Roosevelt." His most frequent description of Roosevelt was "the Boss". Also Coughlin to FDR, telegram, June 14, 1933, stating that Roosevelt had done most in American history to "break down the barriers of prejudice"; Coughlin to FDR, Nov. 24, 1933, urging Roosevelt to ignore "the [Alfred E.] Smith letter" which attacked Roosevelt. Note also memo for McIntyre, Nov. 24, 1933, reporting phone call from Coughlin on New York rally planned in support of "the boss".

Coughlin's lukewarm support of the New Deal is evidenced in his ambiguous stand on the NRA. Coughlin to FDR, Aug. 5, 1933; Coughlin to McIntyre, Aug. 12, 1933, commenting on the proposed slaughter of six million pigs, concluded, "I am truly chagrined at these foolish proposals aimed at starving us into prosperity." Coughlin to F.J.A., Sept. 1934, demanding, "do you want me to oppose both reactionary politicians as well as the new type of rubber stamp sycophants who prefer to follow the dictates of the 'Drain Trust' . . . ?" Coughlin to FDR, Sept. 24, 1933, accused Henry Wallace and Rexford Tugwell of defiling "the countryside and the Mississippi River with their malodorous rottenness." Coughlin to McIntyre, New York, Sept. 22, 1933, warning that without "immediate inflation . . . the NIRA program will be a colossal failure"; Coughlin to FDR, Sept. 24, 1933, noting that most of his correspondents "have not much faith in the National Recovery Act."

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support had been expressed in a Bryanesque rhetoric spoken with an Irish brogue. The priest made frequent reference to the "money powers", "international bankers", "Wall Street", and "crosses of gold".[3]

No thinking Democrat could ignore the possibility that Coughlin might bridge the gulf between the rural fundamentalist Protestants and the urban Irish Catholics, groups whose antagonism had disrupted the party in 1924. The priest's ability to compress into sharp slogans his criticisms of the American social scene appealed to an audience which preferred brevity to detail, simplicity to complexity. An almost childlike pride radiates through Coughlin's frequent references to his mail which totaled "upwards of twenty thousand letters a day."[4] Political good sense dictated that the Roosevelt administration avoid a deliberate break with Coughlin.

The administration had early learned that it was dangerous to allow Coughlin to believe he had been given permission to speak as its unofficial spokesman. During the banking crisis of March 1933 in Detroit, when the Union Guardian

[3] The effectiveness of this rhetoric is amply demonstrated by even a cursory examination of the letters relating to Coughlin in the Roosevelt Papers. See H.G.P. to FDR, Winchester, Ill., Nov. 20, 1933, denouncing Senator Carter Glass "for backing the Wall Street gang" and praising Coughlin for his talks "against Wall Street." Also J.S.B. to Coughlin, Champaign, Nov. 13, 1933, who hoped the American people could "understand [that] the crucifixion of the masses on the cross of gold" need "never have occurred"; P.D.B. to FDR, East Cleveland, Nov. 14, 1933, who reported that a Coughlin address "set my American blue blood on fire when I hear how they [the International Bankers] tried to break the government"; P.W.K. to FDR, Sleepy Eye, Minn., March 29, 1932 (an obvious misdate), saying, "Father Coughlin certainly has a way of expressing the wide open American opinion."

[4] On the size of his mail, Coughlin to McIntyre, New York, Sept. 22, 1933; Coughlin to FDR, Sept. 24, 1933, reporting the receipt of 198,000 letters the previous week. When it became obvious that Coughlin had come to the parting of the ways with the New Deal, the Roosevelt administration tried to estimate the accuracy of Coughlin's description of his mail's size and to obtain an idea of how much money he was receiving. An examination of postal records revealed some startling facts. W.L.S., Comptroller, Royal Oak Post Office, to Farley, March 17, 1935, stating that in the twenty months from July 1933 to February 1935, his post office had cashed 65,937 money orders worth $404,145 for Coughlin. He further reported that he had on hand 6,000 money orders worth $14,005.63 as the result of a recent Coughlin appeal for funds.

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Trust Company's failure endangered the city's entire banking community, Coughlin had vehemently opposed an RFC loan to the still solvent banks. He charged that the banks seeking the loan were under the direction of men who had approved fraudulent loans to themselves in order to protect their investments after the 1929 crash. Secretary of the Treasury William H. Woodin had appointed, subsequent to this and other attacks, federal conservators to take charge of the resources of the Guardian National Bank of Commerce and the First National Bank of Detroit despite the protests of the affected bankers. Coughlin had concluded that a defense of the administration's action was necessary. When he approached Hal McIntyre, the presidential appointments secretary, to inquire whether the administration wished to be defended, Coughlin received a noncommittal answer, but was referred to Woodin who was "handling the entire situation." Evidently, Woodin proved equally reticent. Coughlin then concluded that he had been given permission to imply that he spoke for the administration. The result was a savage broadcast on March 27, 1933, in which he assailed members of the Detroit banking community as guilty of "criminal behavior". Reaction to the speech was instantaneous. Outraged protests came from those opposed to Coughlin's inflationary doctrines and from individuals branded as guilty of criminal offences. The result, as McIntyre described it, was "embarrassing".[5]

[5] RP, McIntyre memo to Louis Howe, March 27, 1933. Also memo for McIntyre, March 23, 1933, reporting that Ed Donovan had called, requesting that an effort be made to get in touch with Coughlin on whether the administration desired him to go on the air defending its plans to bail out the Detroit banks. This memo contains a written notation, "Phoned & had him [Coughlin] talk with Sec. *Woodin*." Evidence of indignation is found in E.D.S. to FDR, Detroit, March 27, 1933; W.J.P. to FDR, March 27, 1933, who warned, "Use of Father C. E. Coughlin as Administration mouthpiece sad mistake as his views nationally broadcast not those of Detroit's best citizens." M.W.B. to Manager of WCAU, Philadelphia, undated, threatened a suit for "slander" as a result of Coughlin's broadcast. Coughlin to McIntyre, Royal Oak, March 27, 1933, dismissed the objections of E.D.S. and M.W.B. as their reaction to his support of federal efforts to reorganize the Detroit banks.

That some uncertainty existed within the White House staff as to Coughlin's relationship with the White House at this time is curiously illustrated in some White House correspondence of 1942. Pfc. E.S. to Stephen Early, Charleston, S.C., April 14, 1942, requested information on whether

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This unpleasant experience encouraged the administration to ignore subsequent Coughlin communications except with the most perfunctory acknowledgements, and even this courtesy was on occasion neglected. When Coughlin forwarded a letter of the Public Ownership League of America protesting against the efforts of private power companies to administer the public utilities code of the NIRA, no effort was made to act upon his charge. A letter from Coughlin to Hal McIntyre containing his letters of Jesse Jones and W. A. Julian, the Treasurer of the United States, both of which outlined the Detroit Bank situation, received "no acknowledgement". In fact, when the administration was confronted with a hostile Coughlin, it was fearful that its previous snubs to Coughlin "might act as a boomerang if information contained" in his letters became public knowledge.[6]

Administration efforts to shunt Coughlin aside were impaired by the unwillingness of congressmen to provoke Coughlin's hostility. In June 1933 six senators and fifty-nine representatives signed a request that Coughlin be designated an economic adviser to the London Economic Conference. The congressmen justified their signature with the observation that Coughlin "has the confidence of millions of Ameri-

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Coughlin was "economic adviser to the President in 1933." Early's memo to McIntyre, April 20, 1942, stated: "I suggest . . . that someone do a research job and ascertain definitely whether the alleged statement is true. If it is false, I would reply to attached letter; if the statement is true, I would suggest you file it." There is no indication that the research job was done or that a reply was sent.

For a general coverage of the Detroit banking crisis, see Keith Sward, *The Legend of Henry Ford* (New York, 1948), pp. 249-256; Ferdinand Pecora, *Wall Street Under Oath* (New York, 1939), pp. 243-246; Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *The Crisis of the Old Order, 1919-1933* (Boston, 1957), pp. 474-476.

[6] RP: L.F. to Miss LeHand, March 23, 1934; Coughlin to McIntyre, June 30, 1933; Coughlin to Jones, June 30, 1933, saying, "I am so deeply interested in this . . . because I fought the battle for Mr. Roosevelt upon the frontier of Detroit to establish a decent Government bank when the two old structures had crumbled to the ground"; Coughlin to Julian, June 30, 1933, charging that the Detroit bankers failed to mention that four million dollars in checks were illegally cleared by the Detroit Clearing House conducted by the First National and Guardian group after Michigan's Governor Comstock had issued an order closing the banks. Also Coughlin to Howe, June 25, 1933; C.D.T. to Coughlin, June 23, 1933; Howe to Coughlin, July 5, 1933; undated memo of LeHand to McIntyre.

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can citizens." [7] One may wonder if the administration by not appointing Coughlin did not miss its chance to complete the confusion that surrounded American participation at the Conference.

The administration's policy toward Coughlin appears to have had a double purpose: to delay as long as possible an open break, and to make the break, when it came, the decision of Coughlin. This policy demanded that Coughlin be granted small favors. When a fellow priest desired an appointment as naval chaplain, Coughlin's testimony in his behalf received the attention of Roosevelt whose letter to the Navy Department asking if the appointment could be arranged concluded: "In many ways it might be helpful." [8]

Since the administration clearly refused to allow Coughlin an active rôle in shaping its policy, the alternatives left to him were two. He could continue to support Roosevelt with only an occasional crumb for a reward, or he could choose to break with the President and attempt to use his influence with the public to bring him to heel. The latter choice involved a calculated risk. However, a continued effort to differentiate between Roosevelt and the New Deal policies approached absurdity.

Coughlin and the New Deal were now plainly irreconcilable. The New Deal sought to preserve American capital-

[7] RP, undated petition, signed by Senators Elmer Thomas, "Cotton" Ed Smith, W. G. McAdoo, Huey C. Long, Thomas D. Schell, and Henrick Shipstead. The names of the above suggest how real the possibility was that Coughlin might serve to unite the Bryan democracy, which in 1924 had supported the candidacy of McAdoo, and the Irish Catholic voter. See also the House letter signed by fifty-three Democrats and six Republicans. Such different persons as Emanuel Celler and Everett M. Dirksen saw fit to sign. Twenty-eight of the representatives were from mid-western districts; sixteen represented southern or border districts; the remainder were scattered. A striking fact is that seventeen were individuals with German or Scandinavian names whose districts had large German populations. This seems to bear out Samuel Lubell's findings on the ethnic basis of this movement, in *The Future of American Politics* (New York, 1951), p. 152. The fact that the only eastern urban congressmen who chose to sign were Celler of New York and Arthur Healey of Massachusetts may have reflected the unwillingness of other eastern congressmen to antagonize the Catholic prelates of the region who were generally opposed to Coughlin.

[8] RP: FDR memo to Ass't Sec'y of the Navy, Hyde Park, Sept. 10, 1934; Coughlin to Moley, Sept. 1, 1934; McIntyre to Moley, Poughkeepsie, Sept. 22, 1934; Coughlin to McIntyre, Sept. 10, 1934.

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ism by novel methods. Coughlin spoke both for an agrarian America that had never fully accepted modern capitalism and for urban groups that were still not satisfied by New Deal reforms. There was one other unavoidable problem: to hold the interest of his radio audience, Coughlin had to seek out the novel. As Roosevelt astutely observed, in a letter to Ray Stannard Baker in the spring of 1935:

> In this country there is a free and sensational Press, people tire of seeing the same name day after day in the important headlines of the papers, and the same voice night after night over the radio. . . . If since last November I had tried to keep up the pace of 1933 and 1934, the inevitable histrionics of the new actors, Long and Coughlin and Johnson, would have turned the eyes of the audience away from the main drama itself.[9]

Having waxed fat in the reflected glory of Roosevelt, Coughlin now chose to continue using the presidential limelight; but his rôle was now that of antagonist, not supporter.

The shift from friend to foe appeared to add to Coughlin's prestige. A fearful publisher warned Roosevelt:

> A power has arisen in this country greater than that of government itself. . . . I would describe this power as a demagogue with a foundation of discontent to stand on, and a radio to talk through. . . . They are turning the usual patience of the people into impatience that merely awaits a strong enough leader to break out into direct action.

The immediate power of Coughlin's attacks upon Roosevelt was vividly demonstrated when the St. Louis *Star-Times* suppressed its own editorial attacking Coughlin because "thousands of his followers among our readers are so

[9] RP, FDR to Baker, March 20, 1935. For a contrary view, see G.M.H. to FDR, Lakewood, Ohio, May 9, 1935, who pleaded: "do not alienate the masses from you, they want to love you and have you lead them. . . . Talk to us oftener, that was too bad that lapse of seven months and you lost prestige." It is worth noting that as late as Jan. 28, 1936, Coughlin through "his right hand man, Mr. [Louis] Ward," was attempting to use his influence with McIntyre to persuade the administration to relax its opposition to the Frazier-Lemke petition. When McIntyre insisted the matter was in the hands of the congressional leadership, Ward had warned, "he was able to keep 'him' [Coughlin] in line last Sunday night but would not answer for him next Sunday." McIntyre described the interview as an attempt at "blackmail". Memo for McIntyre, Jan. 28, 1936.

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emotionally worked up that an appeal to reason seems vain." [10]

The attacks themselves took on an ominous tone. No longer was the objective only "to drive the money changers out" but also "to drive out of Public Office" those who support and abet the "money changers". The way in which this was to be accomplished would be told to the faithful "some Sunday . . . over the air." Until the signal was given, the devoted were to remain alert and wait until the Reverend Father was "sure that I am right and that our concerted action will bear fruit." [11] A warm supporter of the administration warned that Coughlin was "using the President's popularity to build up his own leadership with the rabble," and if and when he felt that he was strong enough he would "attempt to lead the unthinking mass, away from the President." [12]

The testing of strength had begun in earnest. Coughlin directed an open letter to Congressman Martin L. Sweeney (D., Ohio), a devoted Coughlinite, suggesting that the time had come for the senators and representatives to be reminded that Roosevelt did not expect them to be "sublimated rubber stamps." They further needed reminding that Roosevelt was not "a dictator". Shrewdly, Coughlin attempted to exploit congressional fear of presidential efforts to infringe upon the prerogatives of Congress. He made the issue nothing less than "the preservation of the American constitution," and "the integrity of our senators and congressmen." [13]

[10] RP: Elzey Roberts (publisher of the St. Louis *Star-Times*) to FDR, St. Louis, March 16, 1935; also Roberts to FDR, St. Louis, March 21, 1935. Roosevelt's letter to Baker suggests that he was not unaware of the challenge, for he had concluded that "the time is soon at hand, for a new stimulation of united American action. I am proposing that very thing before the year is out."

[11] RP, Roberts to FDR, St. Louis, March 21, 1935. See also Coughlin to A.D., Royal Oak, March 6, 1935; Coughlin to F.J.A., Sept. 1934.

[12] RP: E.S.B. to Howe, Cleveland, Jan. 8, 1934; Howe to E.S.B., Jan. 15, 1934, requesting that B. keep the administration informed of Coughlin's activities in the Cleveland area; Howe to E.S.B., Jan. 30, 1934, inviting B. to visit him when he goes to Washington.

[13] *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, Jan. 20, 1934. See also RP: E.S.B. to Howe, Jan. 20, 1934, describing Sweeney as a "bad actor" who had organized

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As Coughlin became more and more explicit in his denunciations of Roosevelt, it became apparent that he was subjecting his own influence to its crucial test. When he chose in late 1934 and early 1935 to attack the World Court, an avalanche of telegrams and letters denouncing American participation in the proposed organization poured in upon startled congressmen who decided the better part of valor was rejection.

During his interlude of friendship with Roosevelt, Coughlin had been instrumental in directing a considerable volume of mail toward the White House on various issues, particularly in support of Roosevelt. These letters are the source from which the decline of Coughlin can be traced. An examination of 202 letters received at the White House between 1933 and 1935 expressing support of both Coughlin and Roosevelt reveals some distinctive characteristics of the people who were most attracted by Coughlin's early rhetoric. One notes that 132 of the subscribers had either Irish or German names, and that a surprisingly large number of the letters were written by fairly well-educated people, small entrepreneurs or professional men. Since most of the writers also identified themselves as Roman Catholic, it is strongly suggested that the most active Coughlinites were of old immigrant, Roman Catholic, lower-middle-class origins.[14]

Before his break with Roosevelt, Coughlin made frequent appeals to his audience to support Roosevelt whose " morale "

Sunday meetings at a Cleveland hall where, after a fifteen-minute " inflammatory speech ", the audience listened to Coughlin's radio address; E.S.B. to Howe, Cleveland, Jan. 22, 1934, accusing Sweeney of helping to elect a Republican mayor in Cleveland.

[14] This breakdown does not allow for the impact of inter-ethnic marriages. It is possible, although doubtful, that these might have been enough to make the surname meaningless. However, a striking characteristic of these letters is that several individuals or family groups signed them. Evidently the practice was for families and friends to gather together on a Sunday afternoon to listen to Coughlin. This would fit into the observations on " Political Homogeneity in Primary Groups ", noted in B. R. Berelson, P. F. Lazarsfeld and W. N. McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago, 1954), pp. 88-104. Invariably these groups all had surnames of a single ethnic derivation. Of the 70 remaining names, a reasonable doubt exists as to their ethnic origin. Of 33 individuals who indicated their occupation, 18 were engaged in either private entrepreneurship or a managerial occupation. The remainder were members of the clergy or professions. Only one was a farmer.

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was "being sniped at by the international banker." [15] The letters that came forth were often pathetic in their recitation of human suffering. One man who lamented his inability to manage on a county grant of $2.00 a week concluded, "And when one is out of employment so long that they have to see their aged mother go to the poorhouse . . . that is heartbreaking." The same man had earlier assured Roosevelt, "If you could only have started this wonderful programme say 4 years ago, things would probably have been back to normalcy by this time. . . ." [16]

Roosevelt received assurances that "the masses . . . are willing to do anything you ask of us, even if it means having the old army uniform dusted off and the old gat oiled up again." [17] He was promised that "money changers, newspapers, and other propagandists cannot alter our faith in your courage, skill and statesmanship." Opposition to Roosevelt and his program was denounced as "un-American". [18] This failure of most correspondents to draw a distinction between Roosevelt and his program boded ill for Coughlin. Despite Coughlin's careful and oft-repeated distinction between the two, a good part of his audience appears to have heard only that he supported Roosevelt and wished them to do the same. Many of these correspondents thought it appropriate to describe Roosevelt as "the greatest President since Lincoln." Others went further, declaring, "We believe in you as in a second Christ." [19]

15 RP: Coughlin to A.L.O., Dec. 1933; A.L.O. to FDR, St. Paul, Dec. 16, 1933.

16 RP, C.R.E. to FDR, Wyomissing, Pa., Nov. 6, 1933. Also M.O'M. to FDR, Valparaiso, Ind., Nov. 6, 1933, who observed, "As for us, my husband and I nearing sixty don't really belong to the 'forgotten millions'. . . . We are the left behinds. And have we been left behind!"; G.R.F., M.D., to FDR, Milwaukee, Nov. 6, 1933, who concluded, "The doctor must surely be the forgotten man"; Mrs. W.J.M. to FDR, Chicago, Nov. 12, 1933, who demanded, "restore to us an honest dollar"; V.L. to FDR, Canton, Ohio, Nov. '33, backing both FDR and Coughlin because "It would mean a job for me and millions others"; W.A. to FDR, Nov. 11, 1935, urging FDR to "use the Big Stick your predecessor took up!"

17 RP, E.J.L. to FDR, Milwaukee, Nov. 5, 1933.

18 RP, S.C. to FDR, Chicago, Nov. 5, 1933. Also telegram, J.F.Q. to FDR, Nov. 5, 1933; F.J.S. to FDR, Kenmore, N.Y., Nov. 5, 1933, warning him against his many enemies "caused by your honesty and true Americanism."

19 RP: D.C. to FDR, Toledo, Nov. 5, 1933; Mr. and Mrs. J.J.V. to FDR,

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Once Coughlin began to denounce Roosevelt it soon became apparent how tenuous a hold he had upon much of his audience. One writer denounced him as "vindictive", and warned that he could lose most of his influence overnight.[20] Others wrote asking if Roosevelt wished them to join Coughlin's Union for Social Justice. Where once Coughlin had mobilized the faithful to support Roosevelt, the President was now assured that they would support Coughlin only "if Roosevelt wanted them to." [21] Some of the attacks upon Coughlin demanded, "When are you [Roosevelt] going to muzzle this ecclesiast who broadcasts from Royal Oak?" Some correspondents continued to admire both men, but they warned Coughlin, "you could talk for the rest of your life and you could never turn me against our president." [22]

Others saw in Coughlin's new departure an outlet for their deep antagonisms against both Roosevelt and the New Deal. Their letters were a recitation of grievances against "a jumping jack dollar," "starving in the midst of plenty," and being "kicked from pillar to post by a Hooverized system of charity and bureaucratic national unemployment agent bent on destroying spirit." They looked forward to the day "when you become dictator of our land Father—as indeed you must because you are the only *virulent* leader

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Norwalk, Nov. 5, 1933. Also F.H.O'B. and family to FDR, Newark, Nov. 5, 1933; F.J.O'B. and family to FDR, Phila., Nov. 5, 1933; Mr. and Mrs. F.S. to FDR, Brooklyn, Nov. 5, 1933; G.W.H. to FDR, Kansas City, Mo., Nov. 5, 1933, stating that Coughlin only increases his faith "in our good President."

[20] RP, T.A.S. to Coughlin, Phila., Oct. 6, 1934. Also M.B. to Coughlin, Cleveland, Sept. 21, 1934, warning, "I am sorry to say I couldn't under any consideration continue to support you if you feel it your duty to criticize him [Roosevelt]"; J.J.B. to FDR, Milwaukee, Oct. 3, 1934; W.A.S. to Coughlin, Phila., Nov. 1934, who feared that Coughlin would "sink into oblivium" if he continued to attack Roosevelt.

[21] RP: Mrs. O.D.L. to FDR, Lansing, Nov. 27, 1934; Mrs. J.B. to Howe, Westmont, Dec. 5, 1934, stating that "Writer, husband & 'host of friends' wait for" Howe's reply before "joining Union for Social Justice."

[22] RP: J.T.S. to FDR, telegram, Chicago, undated; F.H.T. to Coughlin, Brooklyn, Oct. 11, 1936. For other demands that Coughlin be denied use of the airways, see L.C.B. to Howe, telegram, Indianapolis, Dec. 23, 1934; J.D.M. to FDR, Phila., Dec. 31, 1934, who also asked that Coughlin's naturalization papers be revoked.

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standing between us and communism." At long last something—not specified—was being given to "the people who are forgotten", and this was worth fighting for. All that was needed was a leader; otherwise "We might better be dead, than living as we are. . . ." From one who had once written Roosevelt, "You are a Christian Gentleman, and . . . you abhor and despise Corruption, and the wealth of the Nation in the Hands of the Few, who strangle the Poor even unto Starvation," there came now only the lament, "I loved you, and you betrayed me." [23] Coughlin had found his final audience, the congregation of despair.

It was not an audience that would settle for temperate words. It got what it demanded. No longer restrained, Coughlin would bellow, "it is time for us to throw out of Congress bodily everyone who says 'support Roosevelt.'" [24] Before a steaming Cleveland audience in late June 1936, gathered together to launch the new Union Party, Coughlin had denounced Roosevelt as a "liar" and had cast his clerical collar to the floor.[25] In the last act there was an indication that Coughlin was fast approaching the moment when

[23] RP: W.M.O'N. to FDR, Neptune, N.J., Nov. 5, 1933; W.M.O'N. to FDR, March 3, 1935; J.D. to Coughlin, Fulton, N.Y., Oct. 15, 1934; C.L.H. to FDR, Flushing, March 3, 1935. Also R.A.L. to FDR, Kansas City, March 3, 1935, who warned, "I, like many others, of the poorer classes are becoming restless and want to see some real results"; W.K. to FDR, Bloomfield, N.J., Jan. 30, 1935, who also warned, "All you have to do is lose the support of . . . Coughlin to insure your defeat in 1936."

For earlier examples of disenchantment with the Roosevelt administration, see L.G. to FDR, Orange, N.J., Nov. 6, 1933, inviting FDR to attend the December meeting of the Corinthian Lodge F. & A.M. where he would "see a couple of hundred of the bourgeoisie suspended for non payment of dues"; also L.G. to Coughlin, Orange, Nov. 6, 1933, stating, "For months I held implicit faith in President Roosevelt but lately I have seen human misery increasing . . . and I came to the conclusion he was sending the 'forgotten man' remembrance cards [when] what he needs is bread."

[24] RP, Rep. B. F. Welty to FDR, Lima, Sept. 16, 1936; *New York Times*, Sept. 15, 1936.

[25] Coughlin's behavior at this time brought a sharp rebuke from the Vatican newspaper, *L'Osservatore Romano*. There were indications that not only Coughlin but his superior, Bishop Gallagher of Detroit, were provoking considerable Vatican annoyance. *New York Herald Tribune*, Sept. 9, 1936; also RP, C.O. to FDR, New York, Sept. 10, 1936, reporting that the correspondent, a prominent New York lawyer, had employed his intimate contacts with the Papal nobility and other Vatican circles to indicate that Coughlin's attacks upon FDR were "doing harm to the Catholic Church in America."

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his vows of Holy Orders would be subjected to the test of ecclesiastical authority.

Slowly the ponderous machinery of the hierarchy began to work toward checking Coughlin's excesses. Cardinal O'Connell of Boston, who had never been impressed with Coughlin's rhetoric, had frequently denounced him. When the Union for Social Justice had been launched, O'Connell had denied that Coughlin spoke for the Church in America. Coughlin had reacted with characteristic bluntness, accusing the Cardinal of a failure to preach the doctrines of the Church. Bishop John F. Noll of Fort Wayne rejected the idea that he was "a supporter of Father Coughlin." [26]

Cardinal Hayes of New York privately expressed fears that the Church had another McGlynn affair on its hands. In 1886, Archbishop Corrigan of New York had tried to silence Father McGlynn's support of Henry George and of radical land-reform movements. These efforts resulted first in McGlynn's excommunication by Corrigan in 1887, and his subsequent restoration to the priesthood in 1892 by direct intervention of the Vatican. The principle was then established that so long as a priest was merely expressing his private political views, efforts at discipline would not be sustained. Furthermore, so long as Coughlin had the support of his immediate superior, Detroit's Bishop Michael Corrigan, who alone could exercise disciplinary authority within his diocese, nothing could be done. At best, Roosevelt supporters within the hierarchy could only employ indirect pressure and range themselves in support of the administration.[27]

[26] RP, Bishop Noll to James McMullin (in care of McClure Syndicate), Ft. Wayne, Oct. 26, 1936. See also Noll to FDR, Ft. Wayne, Feb. 26, 1937; Raymond Gram Swing, *Forerunners of American Fascism* (New York, 1935), p. 27. So intense was O'Connell's distaste for Coughlin that he forebade priests under his jurisdiction to listen to Coughlin's radio talks. Curley, *op. cit.*, p. 296.

[27] Hayes's fears on this subject were conveyed to me in a letter from a member of the academic Catholic clergy. A fuller development of the McGlynn affair is given in Frederick J. Zwierlein, *The Life and Letters of Bishop McQuaid* (Rochester, 1927), vol. III, pp. 1-83. On efforts of the hierarchy to aid Roosevelt, see Roosevelt Papers, memo of FDR to McIntyre, July 5, 1934, giving details of Coughlin's proposed radio network for an autumn series of addresses to help "Mac" in his "talk with Father Burke," who was Secretary-General of the National Catholic Welfare Conference

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As the intensity of Coughlin's attacks upon the administration increased, fears were expressed about his adverse influence among Roman Catholics. Supporters of the New Deal, convinced that the threat Coughlin posed came from the fact that he was a Roman Catholic priest, sought ways to obtain an "authoritative declaration" from the Church that he was "speaking only for himself." [28] But for many Catholics the issue had delicate implications. One writer, witnessing Coughlin's free wheeling attacks upon Irish politicians such as James A. Farley and Congressmen McCormack and O'Connor of New York, wondered "How any Catholic could stomach this . . . knight of the cloth [*sic*] who knocks over Catholics of Irish descent in order to make us think he is so broadminded is more than one of my generation, who knows how hard we had to battle for recognition . . . can imagine." [29] The spectacle of a Catholic priest allied with Gerald L. K. Smith brought about a further crumbling away of Coughlin support. Catholics were be-

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which is the hierarchy's instrument for social reform. Also Msgr. R. F. Keegan (sec'y to Cardinal Hayes) to FDR, Nov. 5, 1936; Bishop James H. Ryan to FDR, Omaha, Sept. 25, 1936.

Probably no member of the hierarchy was closer or more devoted to Roosevelt than Cardinal Mundelein of Chicago. Edward J. Kelly to FDR, Chicago, Sept. 16, 1936, saying: "It was my privilege yesterday to accompany His Eminence, George Cardinal Mundelein to the election Commissioners' office where he registered under our new registration law. At the time, His Eminence gave an interview to the newspaper reporters . . . showing the Cardinal's faith in you and your administration. In this area, millions of Catholics revere him as their leader, and many thousands of non-Catholics hold him in the highest esteem. Even the slightest comment, either direct or indirect, is accepted as a standard by his followers and admirers. The few meaningful words which he spoke yesterday will . . . be highly productive in your favor at the proper time." Also undated memo titled The White House, reporting that "Bishop Bernard J. Sheil . . . is the individual who publicly raked Coughlin over the coals for Cardinal Mundelein."

[28] RP, Dean Alfange to Farley, Sept. 25, 1936.

[29] RP, F.J.O'B. to Farley, Caledonia, Aug. 4, 1936. Also W.J.M. to FDR, Aug. 5, 1936, asking that "some prominent Catholic laymen . . . organize the intelligent thinking Catholics to offset the horrible statements Coughlin has made"; Farley to Early, Aug. 12, 1936; J.P.E. to Coughlin, July 28, 1936: "I—as a professing Catholic—think you have done the men of our Faith incalculable harm. The strong prejudice that has always kept us from high office has been intensified"; L.G.K. to Coughlin, Oct. 13, 1936; a memo of Early to McIntyre reporting the "rapidly diminishing influence of Coughlin."

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ginning to question whether a Bryanesque rhetoric and Catholicism were compatible.

Catholic antagonism toward Coughlin now coincided with administration needs. Efforts to meet Coughlin's criticisms of the New Deal had always been forestalled by the argument that his social and economic program conformed essentially to the teachings of Popes Leo XIII and Pius XI. It was appropriate that an answer should come from a respected cleric who was widely regarded as the American expert on the *Rerum Novarum* and the *Quadragesime Anno*. Msgr. John Ryan, a member of the faculty of The Catholic University of America, had attained prominence as an outspoken proponent of liberal reform. It was arranged that he was to provide the answer in a nationwide radio broadcast early in October 1936. In his address he rejected the Coughlin program as opposed to the spirit of the Papal encyclicals, which were designed to prevent precisely the class antagonism that Coughlin sought to excite.[30]

Within a few days of his speech, Ryan began to receive letters in which Coughlin's followers volunteered their opinion of Ryan. The letters are valuable for the portrait they yield of the Coughlinites whose allegiance to their "leader" survived the break with Roosevelt. An examination of the correspondence shows that among 78 letters denouncing Ryan's position, 36 were written by correspondents with Irish names and 39 by persons with German names. In several instances more than one correspondent signed, and in each case the names were all Irish or German. Though his hard-core supporters came from these groups it must not be concluded that Coughlin had majority support among the Irish and Germans at large, for the bulk of the letters in the Roosevelt Papers denouncing Coughlin were also signed by Irish or German Catholics.[31]

[30] RP: J.J.H. to Farley, New York, Oct. 25, 1936; Farley to FDR, New York, Oct. 31, 1936; FDR to Ryan, Nov. 1, 1936, thanking Ryan for a "magnificent" speech. For a curious exchange of letters on the *Quadragesime Anno*, see Coughlin to McIntyre, March 21, 1934; Coughlin to FDR, March 21, 1934, which accompanied gift copies of the encyclical.

[31] This bears out Samuel Lubell who emphasizes in *The Future of American Politics*, pp. 150-153, the concentration of the Union Party vote among Irish and German Catholics. Of interest is the fact that the two members of the hierarchy who most strongly supported Coughlin were Archbishop

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A second striking characteristic of the letters is their stark bitterness. Their authors were alienated not only from American society, and from the New Deal and its leader, but also from their own church and its priesthood. The letters expressed a populistic identification with the underdog, and the conviction that the underdog had been betrayed by the New Deal and left with no true spokesman but Coughlin. Again and again the theme is repeated: "Remember Rev. Chas. E. Coughlin has been fighting the battle for the *Poor* against the wealthy." With equal regularity the demand is made that Ryan debate the issue further with Coughlin. One correspondent urged that he do so "In the name of the New Deal, which seems to be like the new religion that has come to America to save not the poor but the rich." Even as the writers denounce communism they express anti-clerical feelings and suggest that a luxurious and indifferent priesthood is aggravating a class struggle. One says: "You are one of those priests who upheld the sins of the rich, you are one of the causes of communism in America, you do not deserve the position you hold. You are upholding the destruction of God's gifts by those in power, while the poor are hungry." Another writes: "Father Coughlin as a priestly priest has performed his sacred vows. Not catering to the wealthy and neglecting the poor, which have been the tendencies many

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Francis Beckman of Dubuque, Iowa—subsequently a strong American Firster—and Bishop Gallagher. However, since the hierarchy was predominantly Irish, with a sizable German minority, this is of small significance other than to suggest, as in the Beckman instance, that the road to isolation was one a Coughlinite could take. RP, Rev. M.S.S. to LeHand, April 10, 1937, stating, "I think of the 106 Bishops at least 103 voted for . . . [Roosevelt], although some may have disagreed with this or that particular policy." See also Lawrence H. Fuchs, *The Political Behavior of American Jews* (Glencoe, Ill., 1956), pp. 137-138 and 154.

Even those instances where Irish Democrats remained loyal to the Democratic ticket in 1936 did not necessarily result in a break with Coughlin. RP, B.N. to Early, Boston, Mass., Aug. 16, 1936, described an interview with Joseph Kennedy, soon to be Ambassador to Great Britain, who, despite his close association with FDR, proudly claimed, "Two of the most rabid anti-New Dealers are my friends, W.R. Hearst and Fr. Coughlin." See also Kennedy speech on communism delivered on Saturday, Oct. 24, 1936, in which he cited Msgr. Ryan's speech as evidence that the New Deal was not communistic. The full text of Ryan's speech is given in John Ryan Papers, Columbia University Microfilm, hereafter indicated by JRP.

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times of our clergy." Another declares: "Your church is making a racket of politics. You must have got your hand greased either by Farley or the W.P.A. President. The likes of O'Connell of Boston a Cardinal unfit for such high office a money mad Cardinal owns about half of Boston. Father Coughlin hurt him because he was in with the bankers. . . ." One correspondent expresses the judgment of the writers in brief when she says of the clergy: "They are nothing but a bunch of racketeers with the exceptions of a few." [32]

An assumption that appeared with some frequency was that the Church was hurt by evidence of internal division within its priesthood. Coughlin's supporters seemed to believe that other members of the priesthood were somehow obliged to agree with him. "If Father Coughlin had been wrong in anything he said over the air there would be some one of the democratic party to deny it. But not one dare to deny him. Only one. And you Monsignor did. One of his faith. That's what hurts me the most." "You have a perfect right", declares another, "to disagree with him, but you have overstepped your bounds and [are] very much out of order when you get on the air, under the auspices of the Democratic Committee, to brand him a liar. How do you think that will react with non-Catholics. In my mind it will put religion on the 'spot' and in the 'racket' class." Clearly the Coughlinite movement represented a potential break from hierarchical authority. So far as the Coughlinite was concerned, the essential truth was not that of the Church, but of a solitary priest. Repeatedly Coughlin was compared with Christ and attacks on him were identified with Judas. "Judas betrayed Our Lord for thirty pieces of silver", wrote a woman from Wisconsin. "How much

[32] No effort is made generally to correct errors in grammar or spelling in this series of letters. JRP: P.J.B. to Ryan, Cornvell Hgts., Pa., undated; E.S. to Ryan, Catskill, N.Y., Nov. 26, 1936; Mrs. L.K. to Ryan, Silverton, Nov. 8, 1936; Mrs. J.G. to Ryan, Oct. 12, 1936; Mrs. A.B. to Ryan, Pawtucket, Nov. 8, 1936; Mrs. J.F. to Ryan, Cleveland, Nov. 30, 1936. Also L.B. to Ryan, Milwaukee, Nov. 8, 1936, asking if Ryan was prepared to wear Coughlin's "crown of worry and anxiety"; J.H. to Ryan, Ohio, Oct. 26, 1936, and Mrs. F.L. to Ryan, Yorkville, N.Y., Nov. 9, 1936, both of whom objected to opposition to "a saintly Priest like our own good Father Coughlin who" works "night and day, when he is sick and well for . . . the poor people of this country."

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did you get from the money changers for misleading and deceiving the people?" The extent of the personal dependence of Coughlin's supporters is revealed in the pitiful lament of a woman who asked:

> I wonder if you are happy in having given a few politicians the satisfaction of sneering at Father Coughlin. It is no wonder that we poor bewildered people lose our faith in everything in Heaven and Earth. Many of us have been writing to him for at least six years, and I for one can truly say his voice over the air on Sunday afternoon often changed my mind about ending my life and also my families.[33]

The note of personal distress found in the letters is so acute that one realizes that the Coughlinites were writing out of grave personal anguish—and this lends weight to Coughlin's own contentions that his letters enabled him to perceive what many regarded as the inadequacies of the New Deal: that they were people who had been seriously hurt by the depression, and who felt that the New Deal was at once too radical and yet insufficient to meet their needs. What Coughlin gave them was a leader connected with a familiar institution, and therefore endowed with respectability, but offering the promise of a far more sweeping remedy for their discontent than anything they found in the New Deal. A correspondent wrote from Toledo:

> Don't it stand to reason that you, nor I, nor anybody else can live decently and pay rent, Gas, lights, Insurance, Dr.

[33] JRP: Mrs. A.R. to Ryan, Springfield, Mass., Nov. 19, 1936; Mrs. G.S. to Ryan, Minneapolis, Oct. 26, 1936; Mrs. A.S. to Ryan, Wisconsin, Nov. 25, 1936; Mrs. R.H. to Ryan, Oct. 12, 1936. Also A.R. to Ryan, Chicago, Oct. 25, 1936, compared Ryan to a "thief in the night" who had sold his "soul for thirty pieces of silver." He demanded: "Do you realize the enormity of your sin???? You have split the Catholic world in twain. Of what intrinsic value is it to you now?" M.B. to Ryan, Elmhurst, L.I., Nov. 8, 1936, concluded, "You hypocritical priests may fool the people but you can't fool Our Lord." M.T. to Ryan, Spencerport, N.Y., Nov. 23, 1936, expressed shock that "a brother priest" could "let a dirty contemptible rabble of catholics assail him." L.B. to Ryan, Milwaukee, Nov. 8, 1936, demanded to know if Ryan would endure as Coughlin had "the many lashes of criticism from news writers and columnists (even from the Catholic press)". J.H.McC. to Ryan, Phila., Nov. 21, 1936, asserted that if Coughlin was wrong, "then 'Jesus Christ' and our Holy Father the 'Pope' were also wrong." F.W. to Ryan, Willow Grove, Pa., Nov. 27, 1936, suggested that Ryan follow "the example of Judas Iscariot."

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> bills, buy cloths, food, and numerous other things on the few measly dollars they will get [from Social Security]. Rosvelt should have to try it out first for about 3 years. Give him . . . just what us poor devels would have and let him as any ordinary person would have to live on what they get from the Old Age pension . . . and see how quick he would change his mind. You, nor he couldent do it but he expects us poor devils to do it and like it.[34]

The tone of many of the letters is that of people whose distress is too urgent to permit them to have any sympathy for experiment or half-measures. New Deal efforts at recovery provoked one Coughlinite to wonder whether "A pick and shovel job under Landon would not be any worse than under Roosevelt, so why the bunk about sympathy and understanding." [35]

On occasion the President was viewed as having been too thoroughly corrupted by one influence or another to be a reliable source of relief. "President Roosevelt may have had good intentions when he took the oath of office, but after he took a trip on Vinson Astor's yacht, and after his mother took 'tea' with the mighty King and Queen of England, he forgot his promises to the people of the U.S. except that bankers and profiteers." "Mr. Roosevelt himself", writes another, "is all right or was when he took office but the Communistic inclined Cabinet and advisors he has around him simply ruined him and we don't have to be told that by Father Coughlin or anyone else." Their final indictment of Roosevelt was that no one could tell what "school of thought" claimed his support. "He aims to be all things to all men." [36]

[34] JRP, Mrs. A.J.L. to Ryan, Toledo, Nov. 12, 1936. Also Mrs. C.O.A. to Ryan, Nov. 9, 1936, who wrote, "in every City in this country children are under nurshed and half naked and you know the Rotten Bankers Politician are the cause and what are you Priests doing about it nothing a good many of you are in the Money-Racket."

[35] JRP, Mrs. G.D.S. to Ryan, Minneapolis, Oct. 26, 1936. F., and H., and A. to Ryan, Erie, Pa., Nov. 26, 1936, doubted if Ryan had the "faintest idea of what suffering and want there is in this land of plenty." M.R.H. to Ryan, Oct. 12, 1936, reported the loss of a small business.

[36] JRP: M.M.S. to Ryan, Springfield, Ohio, Oct. 12, 1936; M.A.F. to Ryan, Oct. 31, 1936; Mr. G. to Ryan, Cincinnati, Oct. 31, 1936; Mrs. C.W. to Ryan, Brooklyn, Nov. 22, 1936.

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As the overwhelming result of November 1936 revealed the slightness of Coughlin's influence at the polls, he temporarily withdrew from the air. The faithful set up a claque for his return.[37] But Coughlin as a genuine political threat had been exposed as false. His returns and departures from the air waves reflected a progressive decline in the income that had once poured in to support his efforts. His influence at the White House was gone, and he had lost his major supporter within the hierarchy when Bishop Gallagher died. His superior was now the hostile Archbishop Mooney. All that remained were the embittered faithful.

The conspiracy of the international, communistic, capitalistic Jew now occupied Coughlin's attention. Outraged protests came into both the White House and the Federal Communications Commission. Many were from uneasy Jews who feared an American counterpart of Hitler's experiment; fully as many were from Catholics who wondered if his "Roman collar" were not invisible. Archbishop Murray of St. Paul pointedly appealed to his parishioners to give aid to the Jewish refugees of Nazi terror. Privately, Cardinal Dougherty of Philadelphia urged the President to use the influence of his office to safeguard "the right of the Jews in various countries and to attempt to find new homes for those who are being driven from their homelands." The Coughlinites protested that their "leader" was not anti-Semitic, for he differentiated between "American and un-American Jews." [38]

When radio stations refused air time to Coughlin, he

[37] JRP, Mrs. D.McQ. to Ryan, Toledo, Ohio, 1936, accused him, "It was thru our Catholic people, that our beloved *leader,* Fr. Chas. Coughlin was usered from off the air and why, because he told the truth." S.K. to Ryan, Cincinnati, Nov. 9, 1936, wept: "With a heart torn with anguish I listened to Father Coughlin's closing address Saturday evening, and since then I feel lost in a wilderness. Who, on earth, is there for us poor people to look to for guidance?"

[38] Anti-Semitism and a populistic rhetoric seem to be synonymous. There is a curious parallel between the career of the nineteenth-century Populist, Ignatius Donnelly, an apostate Catholic, and Coughlin. The rhetoric is the same and both ended by preaching anti-Semitism. RP: M.H.A. to Early, Pittsburgh, Jan. 7, 1942; Early to M.H.A., Jan. 13, 1942; E.R. to Early, Pittsburgh, April 4, 1938. On Dougherty, see the State Department reply, Oct. 27, 1938; on differentiation in types of Jews, Rev. R.C.T. to Elliot Roosevelt, Amboy, Ill., July 19, 1939.

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would threaten to fight "in Franco's way if necessary." Coughlin then switched his attention to the magazine, *Social Justice*. Here he praised Hitler for allowing the French "to carry on in part of their nation and thereby retain part of their self-respect." He described the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere as "Asia for Asiatics—an expression of our own Monroe Doctrine." Germany, he declared, was the "innocent victim" of a "sacred war declared against her 9 years ago by the Jews." Others might rally around the flag when Pearl Harbor plunged the United States into war, but Coughlin charged that the war was a Jewish-Communistic plot intent upon "the liquidation of Americanism at home." [39]

Justice Frank Murphy, who had been assigned by Roosevelt in the spring of 1935 to bring Coughlin into a more favorable disposition toward his administration, now concluded that "Father Coughlin is trying to work himself into jail, as [he] is giving aid and comfort to the enemy." [40] The

[39] RP: H.M.K. to FDR, Brooklyn, Nov. 28, 1938; Dr. J.F.O'N. to FDR, Phila., Sep. 15, 1938; L.C.D. to FDR, Phila., Dec. 1, 1938; J.McC. to FDR, Bronx, Dec. 4, 1938; M.McH. to FDR, Brooklyn, Dec. 8, 1938; K.T. to FDR, Fort Lee, N.J., Dec. 26, 1938; J.A.L. to FDR, New York, Dec. 16, 1938; G.J.G. to FDR, Phila., Oct. 2, 1940—all are examples of Coughlinite protests against Coughlin being denied use of radio. The majority still have Irish or German surnames, although, after 1940, Italian and Hungarian names often appear on Coughlinite petitions. See especially the telegram of Rev. C. to FDR, Flint, Mich., April 24, 1939, which was sent on behalf of the Hungarian Churches and Lodges of Flint. He concluded: "We consider you [FDR] a traitor to the American interest, a tool of international bankers and a menace to Christian Civilization. We will not be doped to fight with atheistic Soviet Russia. Until 1937 we were staunch Democrats. You made good American Republicans out of us." *Detroit News*, August 17, 1939, for Spanish quotation. Also JRP: E.C. to Ryan, undated, warning, "If you have an upheavel like what is going on in Spain it can be laid at the door of the Heads of the Catholic Church"; E.M.S. to Ryan, Waterbury, Nov. 8, 1936; J.L.F. and H.L.A. to Ryan, Norwalk, Conn., praising Franco for accomplishing in Spain "what Chas. E. Coughlin is doing here." For *Social Justice*, see especially March 22, 29, 1942, and *passim*, 1938-42. Also *Cincinnati Post*, March 17, 1942, and *Life Magazine*, April 13, 1942.

[40] On early Murphy rôle, see James A. Farley, *Jim Farley's Story* (New York, 1948), p. 52; also *Detroit Evening News*, March 4, 1935, reporting a meeting between Coughlin and Murphy, then Governor-General of the Philippines, at Detroit's Hotel Book-Cadillac on Feb. 22, 1935. Murphy stated, "I am a close friend and ardent admirer of Coughlin." This comment may have been partially the result of Murphy's desire to ensure Coughlin's support of himself in the Michigan 1936 gubernatorial race. On comment quoted, see RP, memo to FDR from E.M. Watson, March 30, 1942.

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Post Office denied *Social Justice* use of the mails. Attorney-General Francis Biddle launched a federal investigation of Coughlin. In mid-April 1942, Archbishop Mooney had had an off-the-record conference with Franklin D. Roosevelt. Shortly afterwards Coughlin informed that faithful that he had " bowed to orders from superiors and disassociated myself completely, personally and morally from *Social Justice* magazine." The golden brogue was finally stilled. His followers growled, " Why not establish the Four Freedoms at home first? ", and then rejoined the ranks " of internal exiles ", still seeking the leader of lost hope.[41]

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41 RP: transcript of White House appointments, April 1942; Coughlin to G., undated; M.J.C. to FDR, Chicago, March 27, 1942. See Czeslow Milosz, *The Captive Mind* (New York, 1951), p. 6, for reference to " internal exiles ".

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PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH: A CONTRIBUTION TO HISTORICAL METHOD *

I

THE investigation and evaluation of the character and influence of public opinion represent one of the most crucial tasks of the historian. In more ways than one, what are perhaps the two most basic questions of any philosophy of history, the causation and predictability of historical events, are inextricably connected with this problem. It now seems appropriate that the historical method should take cognizance of the techniques of public opinion research, a discipline which has penetrated and permeated political science and social psychology, and more recently economics as well, to a degree hardly thought conceivable less than twenty years ago.

It is a most difficult logical problem to define public opinion correctly. In the specific context of this paper on historical method, it may be permissible to by-pass this question and to accept the simplest workable formulation of its meaning as a convenient starting point. James Bryce has provided us with such a formula. Public opinion is the "aggregate of the views men hold regarding matters that affect or interest the community." [1] In so far as the historian looks at the

* I am indebted to my friend Mr. Paul K. Perry of Audience Research Institute, Princeton, N.J., for valuable advice in regard to technical questions of opinion research. The responsibility for any errors in this paper is, of course, mine.

1 Quoted from George Gallup, *A Guide to Public Opinion Polls* (Princeton, 1948), p. 84. The definition of Wilhelm Bauer is more specific but it is not essentially in disagreement with that of Bryce: "Public opinion represents the formulation of a certain group will. Without being rationally thought through in detail, it confers on the judgment and expression of will of most individuals a certain equal coloring." Wilhelm Bauer, *Die öffentliche Meinung in der Weltgeschichte* (Potsdam, 1930), p. 19. See, further, William Albig in his *Public Opinion* (New York, 1939), p. 3: "Public opinion results from the interaction of persons upon one another in any type of group."

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present as a continuous development of the past, it should be permissible, for our specific purpose, to extend this statement as follows: Public opinion is the aggregate of the views men have held regarding the evolution of their social institutions and the current matters that affect or interest the community.

In dealing with a discipline based on a tremendous body of research and a complex set of statistical rules two points should be made very clear at the outset.

The first is that this confrontation of historical method and public opinion research within the frame of this study cannot go beyond the analysis of the most elementary points of the new techniques of social measurements. Nothing would be more desirable than continued research into the finer points of this association as well as its extension into wider areas of social relations in general. One of the main objectives of this study would indeed be achieved if the suggestions sketched here were to be followed up with greater thoroughness by others.

The second is—it should be emphatically stated here—that no method of public opinion research or motivation research as applied to social measurements, market research, political forecasts or other social objectives, as the case may be, could ever be substituted for the individual evaluation and the individual judgment of the historian. Consequently the techniques of public opinion research can be applied only in a limited way to the recognition and evaluation of public opinion in the past. Their function would be merely to supplement and control historical research.

This, then, should be the third introductory point: Where established historical methods can conceivably be helped by support from those of other disciplines, it is important to learn to use them according to the rules of the game. As will be shown in the following, this does not mean the mechanical transfer of rules and principles from one discipline to another. It does mean, however, that they should be un-

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See finally the illuminating paper by Paul F. Lazarsfeld, "Public Opinion and the Classical Tradition", *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. XXI, No. 1, Spring 1957, pp. 41-53, and the literature quoted there.

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derstood, practiced and adjusted to the specific requirements of historical problems.

II

The question with which this study is concerned has been raised in general, though not fully explored, several times.[2] The essence of previous comment may be roughly stated as follows. Stress has been laid on the value, for current and future historical research, of data ascertained by methods of public opinion research—as for instance data collected by the American Institute of Public Opinion and by various government agencies. Moreover, the importance of such types of source material as the records of parliamentary elections, plebiscites and parliamentary roll calls has been emphasized.

These comments, however, do not bear directly on the problem raised here. In the first instance we are dealing with findings established only within the last two decades, that is, the very recent past since techniques of public opinion research have begun to be developed. Furthermore, in both cases we are dealing with data devised with the express purpose of measuring public opinion in however imperfect form.[3] It is quite obvious that the historian will avail himself of such records whenever the opportunity presents itself. There is no need here for specific techniques of public opinion research.

[2] For instance, papers read by Professors J. H. Hexter, Karl Polanyi and J. R. Strayer, at the Meeting of the American Association for Public Opinion Research, Princeton, N. J., 1951; and papers read by Professors Lee Benson and Paul F. Lazarsfeld at the meeting of the American Historical Association, New York, 1954; Robert T. Bower, "Opinion Research and Historical Interpretation of Elections", *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. XII, No. 3, Fall 1948, pp. 455-464.

[3] Obviously—to note only two points—the vote in parliamentary elections is largely representative of the electorate only under conditions of universal, equal and secret franchise as well as an unrestricted freedom of choice for the voter. Condition two is naturally lacking in all contemporary dictatorial and pseudo-dictatorial régimes; condition one in practically all franchise laws before the twentieth century.

As to the representative character of parliamentary roll calls, it is equally obvious that the members of any legislature form a kind of élite and not an exact replica of the "statistical universe". Furthermore their freedom of voting even in many democratic countries is limited by rules of party caucuses, parliamentary clubs, etc. On the concept of the statistical universe see Mildred Parten, *Surveys, Polls and Samples* (New York, 1950), pp. 116-17. Also M. S. Heidingsfield and A. B. Blankenship, *Market and Marketing Analysis* (New York, 1947), pp. 136-37.

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The necessity to adjust the modern devices of public opinion research to the needs of the historian arises, however, whenever he is faced by the far more intricate problem of gauging public opinion from sources not designed for that specific purpose. This will generally mean the sources of a more distant past. In a sense this difficulty exists, of course, even in regard to modern parliamentary elections, in so far as elections—unlike the rarer specimens of plebiscites and public referenda—do not measure the reactions of voters to specific issues, however important, but to a multitude of issues. To abstract the reaction of a voter to an individual issue from his reaction to the general ones would be then a real problem of modern techniques of public opinion research.[4] Still it would be relatively simpler than the afore-mentioned problem, the analysis of records drawn up originally for purposes not at all related to the measurement of public opinion.

III

At this point it may be convenient to trace the major steps in the conducting of an average public opinion survey. Next we shall formulate the basic differences between public opinion research where it is concerned with the present, or with predictions for the future, and where it is focused on the past. After this, we shall examine the various steps taken in the average survey in the light of the requirements of our specific problem and shall attempt to adapt them to these specific requirements.

[4] In this respect a unique historical source in a class of its own is the famous *cahiers de doleances*, preceding the French Revolution of 1789, in which the representatives of the Estates to be assembled at Versailles in May 1789 record their instructions from the voters. In spite of obvious shortcomings in the electoral process, the following facts stand out. The *cahiers* are fairly representative, not of election results, but of genuine public opinion trends not necessarily tested in the elections. These instructions to the representatives do not deal with their general attitudes but with specific issues to be raised at the meeting of the Estates General. Thus answers to questions are given here which elections fail to provide. If we agree that this is one of the foremost tasks of public opinion research in the field of politics, one has to admit that the *cahiers* introduce a basic concept of public opinion research into the world of historical facts. On the nature of the *cahiers* see particularly Beatrice Hyslop, *A Guide to the General Cahiers* (New York, 1936).

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The following may be considered as typical steps in a simple survey operation in public opinion research.

a) the clear formulation and definition of the given research problem which are also, or should be, the first steps in approaching a problem of historical research;

b) the planning of the survey operation, that is, of the particular techniques to be employed;

c) the drafting of the questionnaire;

d) the planning and setting up of the actual sample, the cross section of the population from which information is to be gathered;

e) the actual collection of the data;

f) and g)—here combined for the sake of convenience—the statistical tabulation, interpretation and presentation of the data to the public.

An outside observer, when asked for his opinion as to the basic differences between regular public opinion research and public opinion research concerned with the past, would in all likelihood point to two facts: The historian is exclusively concerned with the past, the public opinion researcher with the future. The historian interested in public opinion of the past has to deal with extremely imperfect records which are subject to the grace and caprice of historical providence, while the professional public opinion researcher deals with nearly perfect records, a complete statistical universe from which he elicits his samples and his subsequent prediction.

Actually this seemingly basic difference is one of degree rather than of kind. The public opinion researcher's objectives and predictions, it is true, are primarily concerned with the future. In the selection of his material, however, in setting up the statistical sample of the population and the estimated attitudes on which the questionnaires and the computation of future action are based, he deals with the past and, in the case of research concerned with general social problems of mores, he will have to cover the ground of an individual's accumulated experiences over a good number of years if he wants to do his job well.

The historian has to deal with far greater distances of time and, in all likelihood, with far more extensive physical

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and social changes in his data than does the average public opinion analyst of today. In kind, however, the problems of the historian are the same as those of his colleague in the field of social psychological measurement.

Seemingly more obvious is another distinction. One cannot confront bygone people with a questionnaire. Apart from such individual statements as diaries, letters, autobiographies, which do not belong in this context, of course it is true that dead ancestors cannot be interviewed either in depth or otherwise. Yet, in terms of public opinion research, this only means that they are not subject to one group of research techniques, those of direct or indirect questioning, the most common but by no means the only conceivable techniques at the disposal of the discipline of public opinion research.

It should be helpful to turn for a moment to a basic concept of law, more specifically of Roman law, namely, the concept of tacit expression of will or so-called concludent action. This means simply the conclusion of a legally valid transaction by an action the intent of which is so obvious that written or even oral confirmation can be dispensed with.[5] We might go further and refer to another principle of Roman as well as modern law. *Quis tacet consentire videtur.* He who keeps quiet is assumed to approve. As a rule anyone who does not challenge a statement is simply assumed to approve of it and is not required to confirm it.

What does this phenomenon of legally valid action or nonaction as opposed to oral or written statement signify? Very simply this. In many spheres, law and, to an even greater degree, social life do not measure the intention and opinion of people by words but by attitudes expressed in action or nonaction. The reasons for action or nonaction, as

5 "Informal juristic acts (and most juristic acts are informal) are those in which the will may be expressed in any form whatever by writing or speaking, by messenger, letter or otherwise, nay, even without any proper act of communication at all (by so called tacit expression of will) where the act is performed in such a way as to clearly imply an intention. All that is required in informal acts is that the will shall be expressed in some manner or other." Rudolf Sohm, *The Institutes: A Textbook of the History and System of Roman Private Law* (transl. from the German) (Oxford, 1901), p. 219. See also Ludwig Mitteis, Leopold Wenger, eds., *Institutionen* (Berlin, 1949), pp. 217-18.

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the case may be, may yet be measured, though written records may have been lost or, what is even more likely, may never have existed.

This procedure is easily applicable and has, in fact, been widely and increasingly applied to public opinion research. To take only one outstanding example: The English public opinion research project Mass Movement has, since 1938, published a series of extremely enlightening studies on public opinion research which were based on observations of attitudes by the staff members of the project to a far greater extent than on questionnaires and interviews.[6]

The reasons for the application of techniques of mass observation [7] in themselves bear little relation to the contingencies which historians must face. They relate not to a lack of records to be obtained by the sample-interview technique but to their possible distortion. In other words, the public opinion researcher is haunted by various uncertain factors, some of which result from the inadequacy of verbal methods, such as loaded questions, the possible bias of the interviewer, the reluctance and probably just as often the lack of ability on the part of the interviewee to express his opinions, and so on. There is further the still controversial "bandwagon

[6] See for instance Charles Madge and Tom Harrisson, *Britain by Mass-Observation* (London, 1939); Mass-Observation, ed., *War Begins at Home* (London, 1940); *Us,* Mass-Observation Weekly, Intelligence Service, London, annual, 1940, a journal that made important contributions to the British war effort; Mass-Observation, ed., *The Pub and the People* (London, 1943); Mass-Observation, *The Press and Its Readers* (London, 1949); Mass-Observation, *The Journey Home* (London, 1944). The two last-mentioned reports were prepared for the Advertising Service Guild.

See, further, D. Willcox, "Mass-Observation", *American Journal of Sociology,* vol. 48, 1943, pp. 445-56; R. Robinson, "Progress in Mass Observation", *International Journal of Opinion and Attitude Research,* vol. 2, 1948, pp. 369-78.

The famous sociographic study, *Middletown,* by Robert S. and Helen M. Lynd (New York, 1929), may likewise be referred to in this context.

The most comprehensive study, as far as the principles of observational methods and the use of available data as source material are concerned, is probably Marie Jahoda, Morton Deutsch, S. W. Cook, *Research Methods in Social Relations with Especial Reference to Prejudice,* vol. I (New York, 1951)—see particularly chapters v and viii.

[7] Mass-Observation, *The Pub and the People,* pp. 10, 11. See also *idem, The Press and Its Readers,* p. 8; *Us,* annual, 1940, pp. 25, 46.

As to an outstanding example for the use of the indirect method, see Jahoda, Deutsch, Cook, *op. cit.*

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effect", that is, the possibility that reports which reveal verbal majority reaction to a controversial question may in themselves influence public opinion. Consideration of these problems had led increasingly to the change from direct to indirect methods of questioning, namely, to the observation of attitudes, particularly in the rapidly expanding field of motivation research. This means that the public opinion researcher may deduce with a high degree of probability from nonverbal or informal verbal reaction to a variety of different problems the attitude of an individual to a certain problem which the same person would be reluctant to reveal under direct questioning. The reseacher may possibly even go further and, through the observation of attitudes, be able to abandon the recording of verbal statements altogether.

Here the historian enters the stage again. If he wants to supplement his findings by methods approximating those of modern public opinion research, he will be bound to do what the public opinion researcher may possibly do. Of course in dealing with the distant past he cannot make use of informal questioning, let alone of a formal questionnaire. He may, however, substitute for this procedure, or preferably combine with it, one of planned observation of group action or conclusive nonaction as found in or deduced from historical records. In this case the records will provide him with some evidence based not on directly or indirectly solicited statements but on concludent actions or nonactions substituted for verbal declarations made as intended response to questioning

One field where this method had to be employed by scientific public opinion research is that of measurement of prejudices against racial, religious or ethnic minority groups which by direct questioning would never come fully into the open.[8] It is clear that the results of this method, in conjunction with the previous observations on the factor of attitudes established by concludent actions, are of particular importance for the historian in the wide problem of nationalism, perhaps beyond that in the history of ideas in general.

[8] Jahoda, Deutsch, Cook, *op. cit.*, and the recent studies of depth interviewing of Hungarian refugees. For instance, H. Gleitman and J. Greenbaum, *Inquiry into Political and Social Attitudes in Hungary*, Free Europe Committee (New York, 1957).

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It is obvious that the historian who has to resort to such a method is at a considerable disadvantage as compared with the modern public opinion researcher who has the questionnaire method at his disposal. It is less obvious that along with the defects of the procedures of approximated public opinion research, as we may call them, there are also their virtues. They are twofold. The indirect method which is bound to encounter much greater difficulties in procuring a reasonably accurate sample is, on the other hand, far less impeded by the problems of semantics and of bias.[9] The historian is, after all, the drafter of the equivalent of the questionnaire, the computer of the sample, the tabulator and analyst of the result of the survey, all in one person. This may, though it will not necessarily, weaken certain control possibilities given to a research team. On the other hand, the concentration of all functions in one person plus the stress on a nonverbal method of approach largely eliminates subconscious and nonconscious ambiguities arising from problems of semantics as well as the frequent danger of interviewer bias in the selection of respondents. Thus, if one turns from the verbal method to that of observation by concludent action, the decisive problem is and remains that of the impartiality of the historian. This, however, is truly germane to the whole realm of historical research.

The very fact that the historian determines his own research problem, and combines in one person so many functions, simplifies the problem in another way as well. In dealing with the past he is free to synchronize the starting point of his investigation, the establishment of the sample and the study of the individual cases. In modern public opinion research, on the other hand, the most experienced expert may be thrown off balance by *imponderabilia*, such as the time lag between, for instance, the publication of a population census and the time of the actual survey, the turnout

[9] The concept of bias in modern public opinion research is frequently not understood in the mere colloquial subjective sense of "a propensity or prepossession; bent; prejudice" (Webster) whether conscious or subconscious, but in the wider meaning of error in general, namely, as "a systematic error in procedure resulting in distortion". Heidingsfield and Blankenship, *op. cit.*, p. 321. The concept of bias as referred to here is to be understood, however, in the general colloquial sense.

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problem in elections and even more so in primaries, and other questions of a similar kind which relate in a way to the unpredictable presence or absence of respondents at a certain time.

IV

In the following an attempt will be made to sketch the various steps to be taken in historical investigation employing methods approximating those of public opinion research.

Of the six main stages listed at the beginning of the second section of this paper the first, the formulation of the research problem itself, may be restated as follows:

To ascertain in a given area, at a given time in the past, the trends of public opinion in regard to general or specific issues. The techniques of historical public opinion research are here merely to be considered (a) as a supplementary tool to control the historian's own judgment and (b) as a means to broaden and possibly deepen the use of source material acquired by other methods.

As to the second step, the planning of the particular techniques to be followed, we must reluctantly confine ourselves to the collection of data on the basis of concludent action by some kind of mass observation rather than through response to specific questions.

The next step then would be to draw up a substitute for the questionnaire. Here a distinction concerning the indirect method must be borne in mind. More often than not, the desired results will in themselves be of an indirect nature. This means that the data to be obtained should merely serve as supporting evidence in deducing a certain trend of public opinion. In other cases, however, the data to be found may be the direct objectives of the investigation. In many cases the research procedure may serve both ends.

A few examples will serve to illustrate the point. An investigation which proposes, for instance, to measure the trend of nationalism in Germany on the eve of the First or Second World War may be concerned with the following questions, among many others:

What kind of books did people read in public libraries?

How many of them were by foreign authors and of what countries?

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What newspapers did readers prefer?

Prices and quality being equal, did people show a marked preference for consumer goods manufactured in Germany?

What kind of associations did they join?

An investigation of the state of national prosperity at that time would concern itself with the obvious data on production with particular regard to consumer goods, internal and external debt, mortgages, stock market movements, national income, foreign and domestic travel, tax arrears, and so on.

The investigation may be undertaken solely for the purpose of obtaining data which would shed light on a national trend, or simply of exploring this particular subject, or it may aim at achieving both objectives. From the few obvious examples selected from a practically endless series it appears that the research methods discussed in this paper lend themselves far more easily to the measurement of social, economic and intellectual trends than to the gauging of attitudes toward specific events, that is, to political history. This is hardly surprising. The prediction of such political events as a change of government, the outbreak of war or revolution, which are determined not only by many spontaneous, unpredictable factors but also quite frequently by a limited number of persons, usually in the higher echelons of government, lies for the most part outside the scope of public opinion research in a scientific sense.[10] The main objective is largely, and for the historian in his retrospective approach exclusively, not the answer to questions which have been answered by past events anyway. It is rather the measuring of gradually changing attitudes within the historical continuum of social life in the past. In this respect, the historian is still at a disadvantage as compared with the public opinion researcher *pro futuro* because of the greater scarcity of data available to him. On the other hand he is in a far

[10] It is assumed here that the answer to such questions as "How many people will vote for candidate X in the presidential elections?" has only a short-living news value—apart from the technical insight to be gained by predicting the answer to a strictly verifiable question—since it will be answered by the elections anyway. While the question, "What type of man is likely to win an election under constantly changing conditions?", is of course not strictly verifiable, it penetrates actually far deeper into the core of the problem of public opinion research.

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better position in that his indirect questions can be geared to events in the past already known to him. The public opinion researcher concerned with the third-term issue in the early spring of 1940 was hardly in a position to foresee the sudden fall of France and the *Blitz* over England which proved to have important bearing on the outcome of the election he was attempting to predict. The historian who measures public opinion from the past is of course able, in the course of his investigation, to take into account the particular effect of these events on specific areas and groups of people.

As to the other items pertaining to the questionnaire, it has been noted that the historian does not have to worry about a number of problems which may haunt the drafter of the questionnaire and his agent, the interviewer. Errors in modern public opinion research arise, for instance, from the difficulty of creating rapport with the interviewee, of avoiding leading questions or a sequence of questions which might inadvertently give a clue to the answers to be expected, and so on. Here it is particularly important to keep in mind that the historian wants to find out not only what the respondent thinks but how he arrives at his conclusions as well.[11] Therefore the question raised—not asked—should be as specific as possible, and the historian, who need not bother with the problem of warming-up questions, the possible resentment when questions are of a personal nature, and so on, is in a good position to conform to the requirements of the modern technique. Likewise by careful planning he can avoid the common error of raising a question composed of "multiple elements",[12] the answer to which may be erroneously interpreted as applying to a single issue when in fact it responds to a variety of more or less hidden issues and thus may throw the results entirely off balance.

11 Heidingsfield and Blankenship, *op. cit.*, pp. 109, 113. In our example, to measure the intent of nationalism qua foreign goods it would be of little use then to establish the volume of English manufactured goods in Germany in general at the time of the Boer War. The pertinent question would be to check, for instance, the sale of a widely known specific English article, say of a certain brand of cigarettes of undoubted previous snob appeal in a German "Middletown".

12 *Ibid.*, pp. 116-17, 159-60.

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One answer to this by no means simple problem is "depth interviewing". This procedure attempts, by a whole chain of follow-up questions which are worked out in detail, to single out a specific issue. Thereby the pitfall of a hidden multiple causation result will be eliminated as far as possible. Thus it may be feasible "to approach the analysis of the individual on a historical basis." [13] It is obviously impossible to discuss here the theoretical and practical devices involved in this complex technique. Neither is it suggested, in view of the character and scantiness of the historian's records, that depth measurement could be applied by him within the full meaning of the concept. On the other hand, in regard to the specification of the question or rather the dissection of one question into several, some commonly admitted impediments—those of time, cost, and the training of special interviewers—do not exist for the historian. His material is restricted but it is not subject to the above limitations. Errors in the handling of the respondent's reaction, for instance, are easily corrected. The historian may well avail himself of these advantages.

The very core of public opinion research is the planning and setting up of the actual representative sample, the cross section of the population from which the pertinent information is to be obtained. Unquestionably it is also the most difficult operation. In very general terms the sample should fill these requirements:

"An adequate sample should be a true miniature of the universe of total population which is to be sampled and should give proportionate representation to all the characteristics found in that universe which may affect the problem." [14] Regarding the relatively modest requirements about the size of the sample, the laws of probability first developed by Bernouilli in the early eighteenth century are still valid. Furthermore, "an adequate sample should be so designed as to meet reliability requirements set up by the sponsor", [15] that is, in our case, the historian. The basic idea of such a sample is its "randomization"—"that sampling process

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 159. See also Parten, *op. cit.*, pp. 74, 183.

[14] Parten, *op. cit.*, pp. 136-37.

[15] Parten, *op. cit.*, pp. 106 *et seq.*, 219 *et seq.*

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which gives every unit of a population an equal chance of being selected." [16] This may refer to the statistical universe of the total population or to the particular stratum of the population with which the survey is concerned. In this latter respect we speak of "stratified sampling", that is, a grouping according to the characteristics of geography, occupation, age, sex, denomination, ecology, and so on. Thus in an election forecast the sample would be stratified in regard to that part of the population eligible to vote; in a survey concerned with the potential sales appeal of dishwashers to housewives the sample would, of course, be stratified on a much narrower basis.

From among a number of important distinctions in the matter of survey sample designs [17] which, however, go beyond the scope of this paper, two basic distinctions must be included: area sampling and purposive sampling. Area sampling may be defined as "a specialized random method of pre-selecting dwelling units for interviewing". Therewith "the areas in which the sampling is to be done are selected at random, usually making use of the principle of stratification." Random selection applies to the selection of households and individuals within the area as well.[18]

"Purposive sampling denotes the method of selecting a number of groups of units in such a way that the selected groups together yield as nearly as possible the same averages or proportions as the totality with respect to those characteristics which are already a matter of statistical knowledge." [19] One variety of purposive sampling is the method in which comparatively small areas are selected as representative of the population in respect to certain criteria and the interviewing of as many potential respondents as possible is done within a rather brief span of time. Here it is not randomization in general but a kind of integral randomization

16 Heidingsfield and Blankenship, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

17 Parten, *op. cit.*, pp. 219 *et seq.*; A. B. Blankenship, ed., *How to Conduct Consumer and Opinion Research* (New York, 1946), pp. 25-26.

18 Heidingsfield and Blankenship, *op. cit.*, p. 321; Gallup, *op. cit.*, pp. 26 *et seq.*

19 Parten, *op. cit.*, pp. 236 *et seq.*, quoted from A. Jensen, "Report on the Representative Method in Statistics", *Bulletin*, Institute Internationale de Statistique, Rome, Pt. 1, 1928, pp. 359 *et seq.*

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on the basis of a particularly representative expression of public opinion about certain issues which is the criterion of selection. As to this method, which, if applied at all, is primarily employed in election forecasts, one may well paraphrase a famous saying of George Orwell: All areas are equally representative but some areas are even more equally representative. Obviously the decisive factor here is the problem of area selection. Another variety of purposive sampling, sometimes called "quota" sampling, is designed "to obtain a total sample similar to the population." This means that, usually on the basis of a preëstablished census, "persons be selected from all major groups in the population in proportion to the numerical size of these groups." [20]

Stated in the simplest terms, sampling is merely a short cut to the polling of the entire population, the statistical universe, a process which if it could be applied ad libitum would make public opinion research superfluous. Yet, if for obvious reasons the single segment of the orange has been chosen instead of the whole fruit,[21] it is necessary in making a random selection to see "that every item in the total population is given an equal chance of being selected in the sample." [22] This is necessary in any general poll pertaining to the population as a whole and it applies as well to polls concerned with what is referred to as "specific population" —women, merchants, car owners, readers, farmers, and so on.

As to the choice of basic methods, public opinion researchers are generally agreed that area sampling circumvents a major source of statistical error and possible interviewer bias, that is, in the composition of the various quotas of population strata within the sample and the subsequent selection of respondents according to quota by the interviewers. Quota sampling, on the other hand, generally operates at lower cost and greater speed since it does not encounter some of the difficulties which arise in the setting up

[20] Heidingsfield and Blankenship, *op. cit.*, p. 322; Gallup, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-28.

[21] Heidingsfield and Blankenship, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 137. For reasons of necessary simplification, the rather technical problem of what constitutes the population as a whole in relation to the problem—for instance, the inclusion of minors, institutionalized people, noncitizens, etc.—must be omitted here.

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of a proper area sample, the frequent need for call backs in interviewing, and the like.[23] Finally, the first-noted variety of purposive sampling (the selection of small representative areas) is used as a rule only for very specific investigations or as experimental control procedure.

What does all this add up to in terms of the problems of the historian? First and foremost, the method of sampling itself is even more of a problem for the historian than for the public opinion researcher concerned with present and future. To modern public opinion research the sample is a miniature model of the statistical universe. The same may be true for the historian, but the sample may also mean something even more vital than the model in miniature. It may have to be considered not only the segment of the orange but the orange itself, that is, the whole available statistical universe. This would hold true whenever comprehensive records of the whole population or of the whole specific population are no longer available. In such cases, the selected area or a quota of the specific population by necessity has to combine the functions of statistical universe and sample, that is, of the model in miniature. It will be readily granted that this is not sampling in the technical sense of the term. However, methods which approximate those of modern techniques can be employed in historical public opinion research.

As to the chief methods of area sampling and purposive sampling, it will be realized that differences in time and cost are not pertinent to the problem of the historian who in general works with documentary records and not with respondents and interviewers scattered over the country. Both methods could be used by him, if otherwise applicable. The emphasis rests clearly on the " if ". The establishment of a proper purposive sample will of course depend upon an essential basic premise, namely, the existence of a population census or its equivalent. Even if we confine our reflections to Western Civilization, it is fair to say that there were few truly workable population surveys prior to the middle of the nineteenth century, that is, if our requirements are a little more technical than those of William the Conqueror in his

[23] Gallup, *op. cit.*, pp. 28 *et seq.*

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Domesday Book. But, granted that we are fortunate enough to be able to consult a general census or its equivalent, we have solved only the initial problem.

The main problem is naturally that of setting up a sample which will represent a true cross section of the whole population or the whole specific population. This is a formidable task, for it means that what must be done is "to divide the total population of the nation or of each state or city into component parts or strata and to make certain that each part is represented in the sample in proportion to its magnitude." [24] This in turn means that we should need not only a kind of general census but a fairly detailed one and, what appears to be even more difficult, fairly accurate regional information of a census character. Such fortunate possibilities cannot be ruled out entirely. A historian, for instance, who proposes to assess the tax morale of the country within, say, the last fifty years might successfully check the files of the collectors of internal revenue across the nation and find out how many people were in arrears, how many penalties were imposed, how many letters to the editors of local newspapers were written on tax problems. Similar procedures might be followed in regard to reading habits, traffic problems and law enforcement problems in general. Information based not on specific statements but on what we have called concludent action may well be found everywhere.

Two reservations must be made, however. It is not likely, in this country, that information of sufficient detail could be found concerning the nation as a whole for a period further back than about two generations. If we go back further we may still be on fairly safe ground in New England and the Mid-Atlantic coastal section, but in the Southwest, West and Deep South institutions tend to be so much out of step with the above-mentioned industrialized areas that it would be difficult if not impossible to find a workable common denominator. In other words, the purposive sample could be successfully used by the historian even under relatively favorable conditions only where such standards of fair comparability—not necessarily equality—in regard to literacy, law and standards of living do exist. Thus the method will be ap-

[24] Gallup, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-28.

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plicable to the United States of the last generations; it might well be used in thoroughly industrialized nations such as the United Kingdom, also Germany, Switzerland or Belgium, or possibly in those of advanced agricultural development like Sweden, Denmark or Holland. It would hardly be applicable to Eastern Europe or Latin America. Either the range of comparable development between the urbanized-commercial-industrialized and the agricultural areas of the nation would be too wide or, if we have to deal with purely agricultural countries, the standards would in most cases be so low that it would be exceedingly difficult if not impossible to collect the necessary data. In the field of the struggle of conflicting nationalisms the methods might be used in the area of nineteenth-century Central Europe but not of Eastern Europe or the Middle East at that time.

How do these observations pertain to the area-sampling method? First and foremost, this method is far less dependent upon a census or its equivalent. Supposing we were to make a nationwide inquiry in some field of consumer taste and set up regional samples, as is indeed frequently done by county or municipality and township. We would still like to have some nationwide information about the number of counties, their population figures, composition of population—that is, roughly speaking a classification according to rural, mixed rural-industrial, and urban sections. Only then would we be able to set up a fair stratification by regions. Yet obviously, if we are concerned with regional samples on, say, the county level, this preliminary information need not be nearly as detailed as the breakdown in the quota sample where an elaborate knowledge of the social stratification of the general population is required. Apart from very backward areas, the historian would face far lesser difficulties. Still he would not be over the hump, since he would require considerable detailed information once he came to the actual investigation of individual households and household members. Here, a thorough knowledge of regional ecology would be necessary. Nevertheless, his task would not be nearly as difficult as that of the purposive sampling historian in a comparable investigation.

To clarify this we will go back to the example of the as-

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sessment of tax morale. The purposive (or quota) sampler would need a detailed statistical breakdown of the whole population by sex, family status, age, occupation, income, and would in addition be confronted with the much harder job of supplementing this with specific parallel information on the local level. Without this he could not check the records of the required quota of bachelors, married couples, couples with one to x children, professional people, farmers, sharecroppers, industrial laborers, merchants. The area-sampling historian, on the other hand, needs only a far more general, preliminary knowledge of the stratification of the area sample as such. All the specific information would come from a scrutiny of the individual household records. Beyond this he would not have to bother about the quota stratification of the population. What he does need, however, is a detailed city, township or county map to be able to check the individual fifth, tenth or xth household as the case may be. This may well be a rather large order, but the point is that if he has such information he will not be as easily and radically thrown off balance by the possible inadequacy of the sample as the quota sampler is. This holds true even for the general public opinion researcher; it is doubly true for the historian, the public opinion researcher concerned with the past, whose quota sample would be naturally far less reliable.

It will be readily admitted that the procuring of adequate nationwide regional ecological information is still not very likely. But it is less unlikely than the establishment of reliable quota samples. We might possibly be able to go somewhat further back into the past in our area-sampling research than in the quota-sampling investigation. Still, we will not be able to go very far in investigations pertaining to the whole nation. If we confine ourselves, however, to problems concerning the specific population in industrial or fully urbanized areas, the prospects are far brighter. Here we are likely to find much more easily the ecological information we need and correspondingly we will be able to extend our research further back into history. It is vital to recognize, however, that we must adjust our research objectives to the data available where we may have a chance of succeeding and not the other way round where in all likelihood we will fail.

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The fact that sufficient ecological information in area sampling is not likely to be available for the distant past on a nationwide level brings us finally to the evaluation of the other kind of purposive sampling previously discussed,[25] that is, interviewing in one or a few most typically representative, carefully selected areas. Here major errors may still result from the selection of the area. The interviewing, however—in our case the search for concludent action—covers such a large section of the population, frequently as much as 25 per cent, that errors regarding questioning or our equivalent, the perusal of available records, will be held to a minimum. The "typicalness" of the area can be established on the basis of information as detailed as that supplied by a modern census. Obviously the difficulty here is that, although for many areas such detailed information is available, this very fact may make such an area appear nontypical in several respects.

The method is of particular interest for the historian, however. Preservation of records in history, particularly those of an archeological nature, may often be accidental. In most cases it is fair to say that this preservation has been due to some highly untypical facts. Troy was not a typical principality in Asia Minor, or Mycenae in Greece. Pompei certainly was not merely a Roman "Middletown". Neither can we consider Carcassonne or Williamsburg as ordinary French or American communities in medieval or early modern history. The very fact of historical preservation or excavation is usually directly related to nontypicality. The examples listed here are all extreme cases but it is probably fair to say that historical preservation is related in a kind of reverse proportion to the typicality of an area. From this it follows that it would be absurd to hope that a typical area from which nontypically detailed information can be obtained could ever form the basis of selected-area public opinion research by the historian.

Must we then conclude that purposive sampling could be disregarded by the historian? To answer in the affirmative is to imply that the very areas of which most has been known in the recent or distant past are to be eliminated from our

[25] See note 19.

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investigation. If we are unwilling to accept this, we will again have to adjust our research objectives to the material at hand.

One thing should be clear from the start. If we make use of the untypical area, we must do so with the full recognition that it is untypical and that, most probably, we are not in a position to select a few distinct areas conspicuous for their typical behavior, such as certain counties in Ohio and Pennsylvania whose voting records for generations have consistently followed the national trend. We may as well face the fact that in all likelihood we simply do not have sufficient information to enable us to find areas which are particularly typical and of which, at the same time, much detailed information has been available through several generations.

Here the historian's task is to attempt to crystallize from the welter of nontypical information a few facts which might be typical. Using again an extreme example, it would be entirely misleading to take the standard of living of Pompei, that is, of a rather fashionable bathing resort at the time of the Flavian emperors, as representative of the standard of living in Roman cities of comparable size. Yet it would be entirely proper to take the proportion between men and women there or—a non-public-opinion example—the standards of engineering, as typical of the Roman civilization of the time. One would probably not be far off either in taking the designs of interior decorating in Pompei as typical of the color preferences of that time. It would be entirely erroneous to take reading habits in sixteenth-century Oxford as evidence of the literary tastes of the time, but it would be very informative in a historical study of general food and drink consumption and preferences in England to ascertain conditions in the town during that age. In all these cases it would be necessary only to look for the typical evidence entailed in an, on the whole, untypical example of general high informative value. The untypical information provided by such examples might be of the highest value in itself though it is beyond the topical limits of this paper.

To be sure, the use of special areas for historical public opinion research of this kind encounters a basic difficulty in so far as the historian is probably bound to select a non-

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typical area and adjust his investigation accordingly, while the modern public opinion researcher may be able—though with difficulty—to draw on a typical area. Still the historian would be bound by other rules of sampling, and some basic problems in the selection of a specific area for penetration in depth would be the same. What it adds up to is the necessity of combining various methods and techniques, including the important task of controlling the results previously ascertained. In this combining of various methods the historian would follow only procedures well established in public opinion research.

The subsequent steps to be taken by the historian differ in detail but not too much in essence from those of the modern public opinion researcher. The collection of data, that is, in public opinion research the process of actual interviewing, has no direct equivalent in the activities of the historian. Its parallel is the historian's perusal of available records. The minus in information resulting from the impossibility of using the direct questioning method is at least partly cancelled in our province by the fact that the subjective factor of bias on the conscious or subconscious level in formulating questions and selecting respondents by interviewers can be held at a minimum.[26]

Because of the relatively modest scope of historical public opinion inquiry by approximation, the subsequent complex and cumbersome process of tabulation of the ascertained data is reduced to a small-scale operation. It remains nonetheless a very important operation. In the first place the limitations of the historian's sources of information must be compensated as far as possible by strict adherence to standards of reasonable accuracy in the classification of data into proper, mutually exclusive categories as the preliminary step to a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the records. Secondly, the extremely important concept of weighted tabulations comes into play.

> When disproportionate sampling has been employed or when the percentage of returns differs among the various groups in the sample population, it is necessary to adjust the tabulations in which the groups are combined, to get a balanced sample. This adjustment usually is made by mul-

[26] Parten, *op. cit.*, pp. 136-37.

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tiplying the raw figures for each of the various groups by figures which will take care of their under- or over-representation in the total.[27]

Again, what may happen in the case of general public opinion sampling, because of the insufficiency and irregular appearance of available records of the past, will probably happen to the historian. His figures will require adjustment. Thus the command of a carefully worked out technique in this respect should prove not only helpful but indispensable.

The final and last step in public opinion research is the interpretation and presentation of the ascertained data. This kind of work constitutes the very core of the historian's professional duty and privileges. The difficulties to be encountered are not to be underestimated but they are thoroughly germane to his work. Here it seems appropriate to make a final comment. From the foregoing it may have appeared that the difference between modern public opinion research and its more or less feeble historical application rests essentially in the fact that the social psychologist or statistician of today operates with dynamic, living material and the historian with static, dead data. This, however, is true in only a literal sense. The more the historian exerts himself in his study of the past, the more genuinely representative primary sources he is capable of transmitting to posterity, and the better he is able to interpret them, the more dynamic, the more alive this past will become. His data are and should be subject to change by the discovery of further records and by more searching interpretation and thus may be made truer to life.

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[27] Parten, *op. cit.*, pp. 483-84.

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PARTIES AND VOTING IN CANADA

A BACKWARD AND FORWARD GLANCE IN THE LIGHT OF THE LAST ELECTION *

THE dethronement of the Canadian Liberal party in the elections of June 1957 and then far more decisively and conclusively in March of the present year has all the earmarks of an electoral revolution. After twenty-three years out of office the Conservative party won in March the largest parliamentary majority in Canadian history and in doing so not only decimated the ranks of the Liberals but crushed the two minor parties, the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation and the Social Credit party, both of which had become apparently permanent fixtures in Canadian politics.

It is, unfortunately, still too soon after the election for any very solid analyses of the whys and wherefores of its outcome to be available. And, in any case, Canada is deficient in political scientists and sociologists ready to scrutinize election results with a technical precision and historical perspective equal to that of the Nuffield College psephologists in England, the *Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques* group in France, and such men as V. O. Key, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Louis H. Bean, the University of Michigan Survey Research team, and, last but far from least, brilliant journalists like Samuel Lubell in the United States.[1]

Moreover, even if a thorough analysis of what happened on March 31 were available, one could do little more than prophesy what the long-range implications of the Conservative victory are likely to be for the Canadian party system and Canadian voting behavior. In spite of the success with

* This is a slightly revised version of an address given at the annual dinner of the New York State Political Science Association at the University of Rochester, Rochester, N. Y., on May 2, 1958.

1 For an able review of the sort of work that needs to be done on Canadian elections, with special reference to the 1957 general election, see John Meisel, "Analysing the Vote", *Queen's Quarterly*, vol. 64 (Winter, 1958), pp. 484-496.

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which students of voting have managed to formulate a number of general propositions about the electoral behavior of various social groups in Western countries, a single general election is obviously an exceedingly complex and ambiguous historical occurrence. As is true of all fundamental historical interpretations, the real significance of the event does not become evident until long afterwards. In the United States it was not until Truman's victory in 1948 that what has come to be called the "Roosevelt Revolution" in American politics was generally recognized, and a fully comprehensive account of it did not appear until 1952 with the publication of Samuel Lubell's *The Future of American Politics* on the very eve of the Eisenhower victory.

Canada has no Samuel Lubell, but a number of political scientists, historians and sociologists—more of them, regrettably, American than should be the case—have in recent years developed an interpretation of the Canadian party system applicable to the experience of the past two or three decades. The Liberal victories in 1949 and 1953 under Louis St. Laurent showed that the long federal ascendancy of the Liberals was due to something more fundamental than the canny political leadership (or sinister machinations) of Mackenzie King, just as Truman's victory in 1948 revealed that the Democratic era in the United States was not merely the product of Franklin D. Roosevelt's personal charisma (or rabble-rousing demagoguery). The Conservative victories of the past year seem to relegate these interpretations to the position of being special applications of what Donald G. Creighton, the biographer of Sir John A. Macdonald, has anathematized as the "Liberal Interpretation of Canadian History." [2]

The tendency of events to outdate interpretations of political behavior almost as soon as they have been advanced is, of course, simply a special case of the tendency of thought always to lag behind historical reality which Hegel expressed in his famous dictum that "the Owl of Minerva takes flight only when the shades of night are falling." But if it is foolish to cling to old theories in the face of realities that are mani-

[2] "Sir John A. Macdonald", in C. T. Bissell (ed.), *Our Living Tradition* (Toronto, 1958), pp. 48-62.

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festly inconsistent with them, it is also rash to discard completely the old theories and start from scratch in building new ones. I should not like to see a "Tory Interpretation of Canadian History" substituted for the Liberal one just because the Conservative party has won a national election after employing a rhetoric and, to some extent, an electoral strategy which are reminiscent of Sir John A. Macdonald's "national policy" during the first thirty years of Canadian nationhood. Marx's modification of another Hegelian dictum may turn out to be more appropriate: "great historical events and personages always occur twice, the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce." So I shall try to salvage some parts of the earlier theory and in addition utilize it as a point of departure to suggest precisely what the Conservative victory may promise in the way of basic changes in the Canadian party system and the behavior of the electorate.

The starting-point for the analysis of Canadian politics must be the nature of the Canadian federal system of government as prescribed by the British North America Act and modified by nearly a century's experience of judicial interpretation of that Act. As is generally known, the fathers of Confederation were greatly influenced, both positively and negatively, by the American example of federalism. The reunion of the states at the end of the Civil War immeasurably strengthened the very impulse to federate. Sir John A. Macdonald constantly asserted that with the restoration of the American Union one of the main barriers to American expansion northward in the pre-war period was now removed: the necessity of preserving the delicate balance between slave states and free states which the acquisition of new territories threatened. The breakdown of American federalism which resulted in the Civil War also led the fathers of Canadian Confederation to conclude that a federal government stronger than that provided by the American Constitution was a prerequisite for a durable and workable Canadian union. Thus the British North America Act reversed the emphasis of the American Constitution by seeming to save residual powers for the federal government. Judicial interpretations of the B.N.A. Act moved in the opposite direction by the 1890's as the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and the Su-

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preme Court of Canada began to restrict the authority of the federal government to the subjects specifically assigned to it by the B.N.A. Act. Much has been written by Canadian political scientists on the constitutional and judicial features of the conflicting claims of centralized government and provincial autonomy. But it has always been obvious even to the most old-fashioned scholars, steeped in the study of constitutional law and comparative jurisprudence, that the workings of Canadian government and the Canadian party system cannot be understood solely, or even primarily, in terms of the design of the fathers of Confederation. The division between a French-speaking people and an English-speaking population, the former concentrated in the province of Quebec and guaranteed the provincial authority to maintain their distinctive language, religion and civil law, makes it impossible to discuss Canadian politics without giving one's primary attention to the social and cultural cleavages that express themselves through the party system.

Canadian political parties, as Frank H. Underhill has been tirelessly pointing out for years,[3] fundamentally resemble American parties in spite of their British names. They are and always have been coalitions of regional, ethnic and economic interest groups, constantly bickering and bargaining with one another in search of a leader and a minimal program on which they can unite to appeal to the electorate. John A. Macdonald's Conservatives were Hamiltonian in their conception of the Canadian union, and the opposing coalition of Ontario Grits and Quebec *Rouges* that became the Liberal party was Jeffersonian, or, more accurately, Jacksonian, in the first decades of Confederation. But on assuming office in 1896 under Wilfrid Laurier, the Liberals "combined Jeffersonian professions with Hamiltonian practices," and the Conservative party became when in opposition the party through which the centrifugal pull of provincial autonomy expressed itself. The nature and workings of the

[3] See, for instance, "The Party System in Canada", *Proceedings of the Canadian Political Science Association*, vol. IV, 1932, pp. 201-212; "The Development of National Political Parties in Canada", *Canadian Historical Review*, vol. XVI, No. 4 (December 1935), pp. 307-387; "The Canadian Party System in Transition", *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, vol. 9, No. 3 (August 1943), pp. 300-313; "Political Parties and Ideas", in George Brown (ed.), *Canada* (Berkely and Los Angeles, 1950), pp. 331-352.

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Canadian party system up until the end of the First World War can be fairly easily understood through analogies with American experience, albeit for the most part American experience of a half-century or so earlier.

Three distinctive features of Canadian politics which emerged after the First World War and more fully during and after the Great Depression have attracted the attention of political analysts, not merely in Canada herself but also in the United States and even in continental Europe.[4] A few interpretations of Canadian politics have attempted to explain all three, seeing them as consequences of the working out of sectional, ethnic and economic cleavages within the framework of the federal political system of a thinly populated continental nation. In the remainder of this paper, I propose to review these interpretations and suggest the implications for them of the recent Conservative sweep.

The three peculiarities of Canadian political life which have cried out for explanation are: first, the overwhelming dominance of a single party at the federal level throughout most of the period from 1926 to 1957; second, the appearance since 1918 of a variety of minor parties, some of them operating only in provincial politics, which have blurred or destroyed the old two-party system that prevailed for the first half-century after Confederation; and third, the tendency, particularly marked in the 1940's and 1950's, for Canadian voters to elect provincial administrations differing in party affiliation from the party in power at Ottawa.

The claim that only one party was a truly national party capable of winning office and that that party was the Liberals has been, of course, the main tenet of the "Liberal Interpretation of Canadian History." It rested on the fact that, although the Liberal party never won majorities of seats or

[4] The following are, in addition to the previously cited articles by F. H. Underhill, recent efforts to take a comprehensive view of the Canadian party system: C. B. Macpherson, *Democracy in Alberta* (Toronto, 1953); Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties* (New York, 1953), p. 223; G. E. Lavau, *Partis politiques et réalités sociales* (Paris, 1953), pp. 52-65; Seymour Martin Lipset, "Democracy in Alberta", *Canadian Forum,* November and December 1954, pp. 175-177, 196-198; Walter Filley, "The Conservative Impasse", *Canadian Forum,* April 1955; Dennis H. Wrong, "The Pattern of Party Voting in Canada", *Public Opinion Quarterly,* vol. XXI, No. 2 (Summer, 1957), pp. 252-264.

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popular votes in all, or even in most, of the provinces during its long period of rule, it was consistently the strongest single party in the four main regions of Canada: the Maritimes, Central Canada (Ontario and Quebec), the Prairie provinces, and the Pacific coastal province of British Columbia. More important, since the election of 1887 the Liberals, until March of the present year, regularly won a majority of the seats in Quebec, very large majorities in all but two of the elections held in the present century. The way to win electoral power and the way to preserve Canadian unity, it was insisted, was to unite French- and English-speaking Canadians in a single party. Macdonald succeeded in doing this in the nineteenth century; after the Conservatives alienated French Canada by suppressing the Riel rebellion in the West in 1885 and by introducing conscription in the First World War, the Liberals assumed his mantle.

The obvious flaw in this view of Canadian politics has always been, especially since Alberta and Saskatchewan became provinces at the beginning of the present century, the fact that a party which could unite all non-French voters could afford to lose every Quebec constituency and every constituency containing large numbers of French Canadians outside of Quebec and still carry Canada. This happened once, in the bitter wartime election of 1917. The prospect, however, of a situation in which party divisions exactly matched ethnic divisions, realized only on this one occasion, has been a specter haunting many Canadians of both French and English origins. It has aided the Liberals immeasurably, especially in the wartime elections of 1940 and 1945 when the conscription issue again came to the fore. But it should not have been forgotten as readily as it was that the breakdown of the two-party system outside of Quebec, by fragmenting the opposition to the Liberals, played as large a rôle—if not larger—in maintaining Liberal dominance as the ethnic compromise on which Canadian nationhood is founded.

The 1957 and 1958 elections have demolished the view that the Liberals alone can function as a nation-wide party. In 1957 the Conservatives abandoned the campaign strategy they had followed under their two previous leaders, George Drew and John Bracken, of tacitly allying with Quebec's nationalist premier, Maurice Duplessis, in order to win

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French-Canadian support. Of the candidates for the Conservative leadership at the party convention held in late 1956, John G. Diefenbaker was the least acceptable to the Quebec delegation and he made few major speeches in the province during the 1957 campaign. Quebec remained solidly Liberal in the 1957 election, arousing in many commentators the conditioned response of voicing alarm over the isolation of Quebec from trends in the rest of Canada, even though the more belligerent forms of French-Canadian nationalism have been more quiescent in the fifties than, perhaps, at any other time in the present century.

Having concentrated on Ontario, the Maritimes and the West in the 1957 campaign, and having succeeded in winning enough seats in these areas to form a government, the Conservatives necessarily devoted more attention in 1958 to Quebec in their quest for a majority in Commons. The Conservative–*Union Nationale* axis was restored and Diefenbaker promised Quebec many more Cabinet posts if the province returned a larger number of Tory MP's. What is surprising about the returns is that so complete was the Conservative sweep in Western Canada that Diefenbaker would have won his majority even if Quebec had remained as solidly Liberal as it did in 1957. Thus the Conservatives have succeeded in becoming the dominant party in Canada by means other than slavish imitation of the Liberal formula of building a party coalition between Quebec and assorted elements in the non-French provinces.

In fact, I think it is precisely an awareness on the part of large numbers of French Canadians that the Conservatives were likely to win a majority without their support that accounts for Quebec's rejection of the Liberals. Much has been made, inevitably, of the contribution of Duplessis' machine to the Conservative victory. But, while roughly three fifths of the newly elected Quebec Tories are identified with the *Union Nationale* in provincial politics, an additional two fifths, about twenty in all, are men who ran as straight Conservatives in constituencies where all observers thought the Liberals were secure. What appears to have happened is that the Liberals have so accustomed French Canadians to participation in the shaping of national decisions at the Cabinet level that, in the face of a probable Conservative victory, they were unwill-

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ing to surrender the opportunity for such participation by remaining faithful to their traditional Liberal allegiance. The very success of the Liberals in giving French Canadians a veto power over federal policy laid the groundwork for the eventual repudiation of the Liberal party in Quebec when it could no longer guarantee this.

Thus the view that the Liberals alone are capable of becoming a national party and that the only way to achieve this is by uniting French and non-French Canadians in an electoral alliance has been refuted by last March's outcome. But the belief that there is something about modern Canada which is conducive to one-party dominance and which works against an effective two-party system still carries plausibility. One can hardly maintain, as many have, that March 31 "restored the two-party system" in view of the overwhelming ascendancy of the Conservatives who now hold 208 of the 265 seats in Commons. Canadian political commentators, both academic and journalistic, are far too given to irresponsible pontificating about the meaning of election results. Already some are claiming that the Liberals are finished as a major party and may be replaced by the CCF and that Conservative dominance is likely to be as long-lived as was the Liberal dominance of the past.[5] To examine this prospect, it is necessary to review the status of the two other distinctive features of Canadian politics which, besides being of interest in their own right, were preconditions for Liberal ascendancy in the King–St. Laurent era: the rôle of minor parties and of provincial administrations opposed to the party in power at Ottawa.

It has been argued by several political analysts, most fully and effectively by Seymour Martin Lipset, an American sociologist now at the University of California who is the author of an excellent study of the CCF in Saskatchewan, that British parliamentary institutions are ill-adapted to a North American federal union such as Canada with its marked sectional, ethnic and economic diversities.[6] Cabinet govern-

[5] For example, H. S. Ferns, "The New Course in Canadian Politics", *The Political Quarterly*, vol. 29, No. 2 (April-June 1958), pp. 114-123.

[6] Lipset, "Democracy in Alberta", *Canadian Forum*, pp. 175-177, 196-198.

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ment requires disciplined political parties which can always be relied upon to support the government in the House of Commons. But a loosely integrated society like Canada produces political parties of the American type: expedient coalitions of groups lacking any common outlook on national policy. The necessity of maintaining firm party lines in Parliament makes it impossible for special groups to promote their particular interests while remaining within one of the major parties. Such groups are compelled to adopt one of two alternatives: they may create a minor party in federal politics, or, when they are sectionally concentrated, they may support a provincial administration that can be counted on to oppose the federal government on issues where the group's interests are jeopardized. They may, of course, do both of these at once, as prairie wheat farmers have done repeatedly since 1918.

Thus Quebec has, except for a wartime interlude, consistently supported Duplessis' *Union Nationale,* while voting just as consistently for the Liberals in federal elections. Ontario returned strong Conservative governments during the years of federal Liberal ascendancy from 1943 to 1955. Alberta farmers elected a United Farmers of Alberta government, which remained in power from 1921 to 1935, and a Social Credit government, which has been in power since 1935. Saskatchewan farmers have elected a CCF government at four provincial elections since 1944. Other examples could be cited.

Canada, Professor Lipset concludes, has, like the United States, a concealed multi-party system. But divergent political tendencies cannot be contained within two loosely organized major parties because of the requirements of party discipline under cabinet government and the absence of the primary system, which in the United States allows local and regional interests to function within the major parties. Moreover, the single-member constituency voting system produces a gross disproportion between party strength as reflected in the winning of legislative seats and in percentages of the popular vote. When voters turn to supporting opposition parties in provincial elections, the same discrepancy between seats and votes gives these parties as secure a lien on

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office in the provincial capitals as the Liberals (and, perhaps, now the Conservatives) have achieved at Ottawa. Professor Lipset suggests that a presidential system, which in effect gives rise to two separate party systems, one in congressional and one in presidential elections, or a system of voting based on proportional representation, would be more suited to giving direct expression in the federal and provincial legislatures to the diverse political tendencies of Canadian life. This suggestion horrifies Canadian political scientists, long accustomed to exalting the "strong" governments provided by the British parliamentary system in contrast to the division of powers under a presidential system. And proportional representation evokes the frightening image of France's multi-party system, which quite irrationally terrifies all three major English-speaking countries.

Professor Lipset's theory has—or perhaps I should say had —broad merits. It tries to explain all three distinctive features of Canadian politics; it is comparative, looking at Canadian parties in the context of American and European experience; and it encompasses the two major explanatory principles which have been used by theorists of party systems, although writers have often sharply differed in the relative stress they have placed on each: the formal electoral system on the one hand, and, on the other, group cleavages arising out of particular national social structures which find their reflection in politics.

Yet, even apart from the obvious necessity of revising the theory in the light of the recent election, it needs to be qualified. It overlooks the frequency with which provincial governments, even when they have shared the same party allegiance as the federal government, have openly and directly opposed the latter. The most recent instance of this is the veritable war waged by Mitchell Hepburn, Liberal Premier of Ontario in the 1930's, on Mackenzie King's federal Liberal government. As early as the 1880's the Conservative Premier of Manitoba, John Norquay, was at odds with John A. Macdonald's government. Premier Norquay even joined with Honoré Mercier, the first Nationalist to win power in Quebec, and with the Liberal Premiers of Ontario and Nova Scotia, in holding an interprovincial conference to assert the claims of provincial autonomy against Ottawa. Lipset also ignores

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Nova Scotia, where sectional loyalties are more deeply rooted and have a longer history than in any other Canadian province except Quebec, anti-Confederation sentiment surviving there to the present day. Yet Nova Scotia is one of the few Canadian provinces which have never deviated from the traditional two-party system and which elected Liberal provincial administrations throughout the King–St. Laurent era. The formal political system evidently does not require that provincial interests be upheld by administrations differing in party affiliation from the Ottawa government.

I have left discussion of the minor parties to the end. All of the minor parties which have arisen in Canada since the First World War, with the exception of the Quebec Nationalist groups, have been spokesmen for the interests of Western wheat farmers—at least at the time of their origin. Their number includes the United Farmers of Ontario, whose strength was centered in the Western, wheat-growing part of that province, the Progressive party of the 1920's, the United Farmers of Alberta, and the two surviving groups, Social Credit and the CCF.

The eclipse of Social Credit and the CCF on the prairies was an even more startling result of the last election than the Conservative victory in Quebec. Never before in their history has either Alberta or Saskatchewan sent a majority of Tory MP's to Ottawa, yet all of Alberta's 19 seats and all but one of Saskatchewan's 18 went Conservative in March. The Conservatives also carried every seat in the older and more urbanized province of Manitoba. In fact, the only remaining opposition members from the provinces west of the Great Lakes are four of the CCF from British Columbia and one from Saskatchewan.

This is a true political revolution, especially in the Prairie provinces. With Alberta becoming more urbanized, with the Western farm population continuing to decline, with the failure of the federal CCF and Social Credit parties to build coalitions with voting groups in the East after twenty years of trying, Western farmers appear to be beginning to realize that they no longer constitute a broad enough population base from which to launch a party with any prospects of winning even the balance-of-power rôle at Ottawa that the Progressives briefly attained in the 1920's. Actually, the CCF

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popular vote in the three Prairie provinces, which, with the exception of a few constituencies in Winnipeg, is predominantly agrarian, did not decline as sharply in 1958 as did the more heterogeneous Liberal and Social Credit votes.[7] Yet, in spite of this relatively favorable showing in the face of the Conservative landslide, the CCF leaders have evidently concluded that the agrarian West can no longer serve as a base for a national party and have made some preliminary moves to reconstitute the party under the new name of Canadian Labor party.

Thus the Canadian Prairies seem to have arrived at a stage of political evolution comparable to that reached by the American Great Plains states a half-century earlier. As Richard Hofstadter has written of the period that witnessed the end of the Populist revolt with the defeat of William Jennings Bryan in 1896: "The attempt to make agrarianism into a mass movement based upon third-party ideological politics . . . had to be supplanted by the modern methods of pressure politics and lobbying within the framework of the existing party system."[8] Hofstadter goes on to point out that the very decline in the farm population which made third parties with an agrarian base increasingly futile enterprises paradoxically increased the political bargaining power of the farmers, for it becomes easier for the major parties to "buy off" the farmers with subsidies when their numbers are fewer and there are many more urban taxpayers, and it is advantageous for them to do so in view of the electoral overrepresentation of the rural population. Hofstadter explains the greater radicalism in this century of the farmers of Western Canada when contrasted with their American counterparts in these terms.[9]

I should like to conclude with a burst of speculation about the possible long-range meaning of the last election. I think its chief significance is that it represents the final emergence

[7] The CCF vote in the three Prairie provinces combined fell by only 4.4 per cent of the total four-party vote between 1957 and 1958 as contrasted with a 12.7 per cent decline in the Social Credit vote and a 10.2 per cent decline in the Liberal vote. However, the CCF vote also declined by 3.4 per cent in 1957 from its vote in 1953, the year of the last great Liberal victory.

[8] *The Age of Reform* (New York, 1955), p. 95.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 120.

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in Canada of what analysts of American voting have called "the nationalization of politics." In the Roosevelt and Eisenhower eras presidential elections have come to resemble national plebiscites. In contrast to earlier periods of American history, few states or regions have shown voting trends running counter to the trend in the nation as a whole. Now for the first time in its history, Canada has given a truly national mandate, comparable to those given Roosevelt and Eisenhower south of the border, to a party dominated by a striking political personality. Let me very cursorily review the evidence in support of this conclusion:

1. The Liberals in 1940 won as large a majority (54 per cent) of the popular vote as the Conservatives won in 1958. Again in 1949, though by a smaller margin than in 1940, the Liberals won a popular majority. But in both of these elections their popular as well as their parliamentary majorities were swelled by their overwhelming margins of victory in Quebec. In neither year did they win popular majorities in every province, or, more important, in every one of the four regions of Canada. In the 1958 election, however, the Conservative party won popular majorities in every region and in every province except Quebec, where they fell short by less than one per cent, and the new province of Newfoundland.

2. John Diefenbaker and his Conservatives evoked a far stronger and more positive response from the electorate than the Liberals were ever able to attract. The Canadian people regularly voted Liberal for twenty-three years because the Liberals were the party which "divided them least", as the standard formula for explaining Canadian politics in the King–St. Laurent era had it. This negative spirit was symbolized by the cautious, even shadowy, figure of the Great Manipulator—or Great Pettifogger as his critics called him—Mackenzie King.

3. Diefenbaker's campaign speeches were full of visionary nationalistic sentiments calculated to arouse the nascent patriotism of all Canadians. Inevitably, anti-Americanism is a central component of this patriotism. Canada, after all, owes her initial existence to rejection of the American Revolution and she became a federal union in response to fears of

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American expansionism. Yet previous elections won by the Conservative party in which anti-Americanism played a rôle, those of 1891 and 1911 for example, were characterized by a reaffirmation of British loyalties which French Canadians and non-British immigrant settlers on the prairies were unable to share. A revival of pro-British sentiments played at best only a minor rôle, if any, in the 1958 election.

American writers who have used the concept of the "nationalization of politics", notably E. E. Schattschneider who has developed it most fully,[10] have meant by it the spread of effective two-party competition to an increasing number of states and regions. How, then, can one meaningfully apply the concept to the last Canadian election which accentuated the trend toward one-party dominance typical of the Liberal era, merely replacing the Liberals with the Conservatives as the dominant party? How, indeed, can one speak of effective two-party competition with reference to recent American presidential elections which have assumed so marked a plebiscitarian character?

The answer requires one to distinguish between two types of electoral landslide. Huge majorities for a single party may result from the overwhelming ascendancy of the winning party in a number of sectional bastions (states, regions or electoral districts) which are more numerous or more populous than similar bastions controlled by the opposition party. Or a landslide may result from a trend toward one party that is uniform throughout the country, reducing the sharp divergences in party allegiance among the different sections. The big Liberal triumphs under King and St. Laurent were close approximations to the first type of landslide, while the Diefenbaker victory in 1958 resembles the second type. Similarly, as Schattschneider demonstrates, the Republican party's presidential majorities from 1896 to 1932 were based on a sectional split giving it control of the most populous sections, while the Democratic victories after 1932 and the Republican victories under Eisenhower have been based on electoral mandates which have tended to break down sectional barriers.

[10] "United States: The Functional Approach to Party Government", in Sigmund Neumann (ed.), *Modern Political Parties* (Chicago, 1956), pp. 194-215.

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Where politics have become nationalized, slight shifts in opinion in the same direction throughout the country may produce huge majorities in parliamentary seats, as in Canada, or in Electoral College votes, as in American presidential elections, but the division of the popular vote between the parties is likely to be much closer. In view of the techniques of "personalization" of the party leaders which have become so striking a feature of modern political campaigns conducted by radio and television, the results of a single election may appear to crush the opposition party under a plebiscitarian mandate which subordinates party labels as such to the appeal of personalities. But with divisions of opinion becoming the same throughout the country, the next election may produce the opposite outcome. "One of the most significant consequences of the nationalization of politics . . . has been the increased likelihood of a relatively frequent alternation of the parties in power." [11]

It is, therefore, along these lines that I think one must seek to interpret the long-range meaning of the Conservative victory in the 1958 Canadian election. Far from being a restoration—following the brief stalemate between the parties created by the 1957 election—of the one-party dominance characteristic of the Liberal era, the Conservative sweep may represent a transition to a fundamentally new kind of party politics in Canada. It may, therefore, possess a significance for Canada analogous to that of the Roosevelt sweep in 1932.

Viewed in these terms, the election of 1957, instead of being a mere transitory stage toward complete Conservative ascendancy, may turn out to be a more accurate guide than the election of 1958 to the relatively stable group and sectional party preferences underlying Canadian voting. Certainly the post-election commentaries of the past few months suggest that many voters had neither the intention nor the desire to give the Conservatives so huge a majority. Now that French Canadians and Western farmers have cut loose from their previous political moorings, they are likely to become volatile elements of the electorate, shifting more freely from party to party in accordance with the bearing of current governmental policies on their group interests and their

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 211.

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views of the national interest. The fact that the Liberals lost Quebec and are led by a man who is not a French Canadian should make it easier for them to avert the fate that so nearly befell the Conservatives of becoming an ethnic and sectional party.

Thus I do not expect the old pattern of Canadian politics to reassert itself with Tory ascendancy replacing Grit ascendancy, with the CCF in a new guise as the Canadian Labor party finding again sufficient substance on which to nourish the dream of replacing one of the two old parties, and with the provinces regularly voting for opposition parties in their own bailiwicks. But this is prophecy. And, except for the last of these forecasts, we shall have to wait five long years to test them.[12]

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12 After the Conservative landslide, the first provincial election took place in Manitoba in June; it resulted in the defeat of the Liberal-Progressive administration which had been in office since the 1920's. The Conservatives won the largest number of seats though falling short of a full majority and have formed a new government.

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JOHN LOCKE AND THE SPIRIT OF '76

JEFFERSON'S familiar words about the framers of the Declaration of Independence were that they proposed "not to find out new principles, or new arguments, never before thought of, not merely to say things which had never been said before; but to place before mankind the common sense of the subject in terms so plain and firm as to command their assent." [1]

Traditionally, the Declaration has been taken as a more radical document than Jefferson implies it was. It stands as a proclamation of a new order of human affairs. The work of the signers is said to embody Locke's individualistic political theory and to anticipate the French Declaration of the Rights of Man. In the words of Carl Becker, "By endowing men with inalienable rights, superior to those of positive law . . . it preached the universal revolution." [2]

As Otto Vossler has suggested, Jefferson himself contributed much to this interpretation of the Declaration.[3] In his first years in France his friends tried to convert him to the view that the Declaration and the American Revolution had been invitations to all men everywhere to defend their rights. By 1789, Jefferson was moving to abandon his earlier defense of the aristocratic cause in France. He would later come to share the hopes of most members of the third estate for

1 *The Works of Thomas Jefferson*, ed. by P. L. Ford (New York, 1892-99), vol. X, p. 343.

2 Carl Becker, *The Declaration of Independence* (reprinted, New York, 1948), p. 257. In chapter vi, "The Philosophy of the Declaration in the Nineteenth Century", Becker asserts that in the Declaration "the foundation of the United States is indissolubly associated with a theory of politics, a philosophy of human rights, which is valid, if at all, not for Americans only, but for all men" (p. 225). The Declaration is also a "higher law" to which "men" appeal when law or custom is "too iniquitous to be longer tolerated" (p. 277). Becker fails, however, to answer the central questions of political theory posed by the Declaration. He moves, as most others do, between interpreting the Declaration as a defense of the right of a people to change an unjust government and as a defense of the right of the individual to resist tyranny.

3 Otto Vossler, *Die amerikanischen Revolutionsideale in ihrem Verhältnis zu den Europäischen* (Munich and Berlin, 1929).

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limited government in France with equality before the law [4] and to see those aspirations as a common bond uniting the French and American revolutions. Together, Jefferson thought, France and America had proclaimed a new age.

It is not my purpose to question the fact that, following Jefferson, the Declaration of Independence has been taken as an ever relevant pledge to universal liberty and "the proposition that all men are created equal." Both what the Declaration was and what it has come to mean are historical facts. No protest about the actual spirit of '76 can change the nature of the momentous political and social effects of any misinterpretation of 1776. It would be as useless to complain against what Magna Carta became in the work of Selden and Coke or what Robespierre did to Rousseau as to argue against later "distortions" of the Declaration by the abolitionists, Lincoln, or American Communists. Politicians or ideologues are not beholden to critical evaluations of classic texts. It is equally fruitless to argue that if the Declaration was not an individualistic or egalitarian statement, somehow the claims of liberty and equality in our time must suffer for it. The whole past does not have to succor today's causes.

In the last few years interpretations of the intentions of the signers of the Declaration and of the results of the Revolutionary War have swung away from an older emphasis on liberal and democratic ideals and achievements. Despite Merrill Jensen's reformulation of the idea that the Declaration was democratic in intention but frustrated in its effects by "conservatives",[5] the weight of evidence now supports a different view of the Declaration. It was predominantly the appeal to the world of a group of solid respectable Colonial leaders moving reluctantly to revolt against their sovereign. These were men fearful in the main of the very "democratic" tendencies that Jensen credits them with honoring. Both the intentions and the achievement of the men of 1776 were to transfer power from a Royalist élite in America into

[4] See the recent article by R. R. Palmer, "The Dubious Democrat: Thomas Jefferson in Bourbon France", POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY (vol. LXXII, Sept. 1957).

[5] Merrill Jensen, *The New Nation* (New York, 1950), *The Articles of Confederation* (Madison, 1948).

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the hands of the "best people" among the rebellious colonists. In fact, the only real bond among the leaders of the revolution was freedom from England.[6]

One additional major feature of the Declaration should be reëxamined before deciding what 1776 signified, and that is the relation of the ideas of government it suggests to the political theory of John Locke.

The Declaration, like its companion piece the Constitution, was not an exercise in abstract political theory. Yet in so far as the ideas of the Declaration belong to what we loosely call a tradition of political thought, it is well known that they point back to the English attacks on divine right in the previous century, particularly to Locke's *Second Treatise*.[7] But if the intentions of the signers of the Declaration were what we would call conservative, what did Locke, the alleged father of liberal individualism, say that was relevant to the situation of 1776 as men then saw it, and in what ways may it be said that the Declaration was a "Lockeian document"? Did the men of 1776 who had actually read Locke and had him in mind understand him or had they misinterpreted him? To resolve any ambiguities about Locke and the Declaration one can invoke alleged "intentions" of Locke and of the signers or the vague "traditions" of liberal or democratic thought to which both Locke and the Declaration supposedly belong. It is initially better to stay as close to the texts of Locke and the Declaration and to analyze what they actually say about problems of government. How the men who drafted the Declaration understood Locke and their own words may then be clearer.

Until Willmoore Kendall published his controversial study of the *Second Treatise*[8] it is fair to say that many scholars

[6] Two summary views of the monographic evidence are: F. B. Tolles, "The American Revolution Considered as a Social Movement: A Reevaluation", *American Historical Review* (vol. LX, October 1954), and R. B. Morris, "The Confederation Period and the American Historian", *William and Mary Quarterly* (vol. 13, April 1956).

[7] Jefferson himself cited ". . . Locke, Sidney, etc.", *Works*, vol. XII, p. 409. See, also, Dumas Malone, *Jefferson, the Virginian* (Boston, 1948), p. 175. Jefferson denied R. H. Lee's claim that he had copied the Declaration from Locke; Jefferson, *Works*, vol. XII, p. 307.

[8] Willmoore Kendall, *John Locke and the Doctrine of Majority Rule*, Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, vol. XXVI (Urbana, 1941).

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accepted Locke's works as a leading philosophic justification for modern liberalism.[9] Locke's writings, his "intentions", his followers, his "influences", are all taken as contributions to the "mainstream" of modern liberal rationalist thought. That his texts are extraordinarily unclear, his real intentions often unknowable to us, and his followers and influences extraordinarily diverse and conflicting is not usually noticed or given sufficient weight. When Perry Miller, for example, demonstrated a few years ago that Jonathan Edwards [10] had based much of his reformulation of Calvin on Locke's *Essay Concerning the Human Understanding*, the scholarly world was stunned, so accustomed was it to associating Locke's psychology entirely with the moral purposes of the Enlightenment. To imply additionally, that neither Locke nor the Declaration argued for the supremacy of individual rights would seem exotic to most students of Locke and the American Revolution.[11] With all the admitted complexities and ambiguities of the evidence it seems that Kendall has made the best case about Locke. In the light of his interpretation of the *Second Treatise* [12] our conventional reading of the Declaration could be altered. Looked at closely, the Declaration of Independence still appears to be a Lockeian statement but, less clearly than Becker claimed, a liberal-individualistic one. Whatever the weaknesses of his study, Kendall has undoubtedly destroyed any certainty about what precisely Locke meant. The meaning of the *Second Treatise* is an open question. So, may I suggest, is the meaning of the Declaration for its own time.

9 The more familiar names include Harold Laski, W. A. Dunning, C. E. Vaughan, F. S. C. Northrup, Louis Hartz, R. B. Perry. At most George Sabine, *A History of Political Theory* (New York, 1950), is equivocal on the matter. He stresses, quite rightly, Locke's "complexity".

10 Perry Miller, *Jonathan Edwards* (New York, 1949).

11 See an early source of the conventional view of the Declaration in the famous work of Richard Price, *Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty, the Principles of Government, and the Justice, and Policy of the War with America* (London, 1776). *Cf.* Benjamin Rush's warning to Price about his mistaken interpretation of the Revolution in William Morgan, *Memoirs of the Life of the Rev. Richard Price* (London, 1815), p. 104.

12 See the attempt to refute Kendall in John W. Gough, *John Locke's Political Philosophy* (Oxford, 1950), chapter ii. The best Gough offers as an alternative interpretation is that Locke was only a "qualified individualist". How qualified remains unclear.

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On the surface Locke's works seem clear and straightforward. Close analysis shows them to be full of twists and turns, imprecisions and contradictions. Locke had an admirable curiosity about alternatives which he failed to control in philosophic argument. Pursuing one line of thought he will suddenly dart off onto a side road. Eventually, he returns to the main line but with a different shading to his ideas. He gives no formal warning about what he has done. He resembles John Stuart Mill in this playing, contradictory quality of his mind. Key words, like right and consent, have several startlingly varied, if not opposite, uses. His arguments halt, regroup, advance, and, in the process, change direction.

The predominant interpretation of Locke's political theory, which in the main ignores these difficulties, runs as follows. Because of man's capacity for a life of justice and rational self-development and by virtue of his creation by God, there exists a universal morality for all men called natural law. If formal governments did not exist or if, as in primitive America, they had to be devised anew, men would still be bound to respect each other by this natural law. These rules of the so-called state of nature give men both rights and duties. The "right to property", for example, whether founded in utility or by "mixing" labor with things,[13] is morally limited by several considerations, among them the claim that use ought to be for the direct sustenance of owners. The moral right to property is not absolute. Other rights are similarly circumscribed by "reason". Generally speaking, when men are secure in their persons and chattels, the usual condition among them is one of peace. Most men live by what becomes a traditional morality dictated by and enshrined in the law of nature. They have little need for formal law or coercive measures. But just the growth of population and the acquisition of various interests, chiefly in property, create conflicts of rights which, even with the best will in the world, may make for inconveniences and antagonisms. It would be morally wrong and impractical for persons in disputes to be judges in their own case and to refuse to submit their differences to a disinterested third

[13] See the discussion of Locke on this and related questions in Elie Halevy, *The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism* (London, 1949), pp. 43-44.

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party. The number of such disputed claims and the potential threat to peace they pose become so large that men come to see the need for formal law and continuous institutions for arbitration. At this point they decide to make an irrevocable agreement to live under *some* system of formal law and government to protect and reconcile their moral rights. This contract among them can never be undone because that would return men to the condition of actual or potential conflict that no person in his right mind would prefer. Through this contract natural rights are to become civil rights and the state of nature ends. The next order of business is to establish the government. Its work is to define rights precisely and to judge the conflicts among men in order to forward and enforce the demands of civilization, that is, the universal law of what is fit for man as a creature of reason made in the image of the Deity. The citizens choose a government or, rather, make a second contract with certain men to act as rulers to judge and protect their rights. Whenever all means of appeal are exhausted and the government violates the rights of the individual, his wishes in choosing a government to protect his life, liberty and property may be said to have been violated. He is no longer bound by his decision to heed the rulers.

The last sentence especially of this brief summary is admittedly based on more than twenty references in the *Second Treatise* to the rights of the individual under government. But did Locke actually grant the individual the right to rebel against the majority? Concentrating on the actual texts, Kendall's interpretation of Locke is very different from the conventional reading.

Ignoring the many other important changes of interpretation that Kendall introduces, as he interprets Locke the rights of the individual to rebel under majority rule do not exist. In so far as a majority of the people supports any decision of the government there are no effective rights against the state. Indeed, the actual definition of rights under government also ultimately comes from and depends on the approval of the majority. The people (that is, the majority) are to define the rules of the game and are final judges of the conflicts under those rules.

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How could such total power be given to the majority or to "the people" by a man who had attacked the divine right of kings? Put another way, however, how could a man who had denied one individual absolute will in government grant irrevocable rights to a private person against society? Locke simply believed that a rational civil or moral order would be unthinkable if we do not presume initially the essential justice and fellow-feeling of men. If most men are irrational in the protection of their vital rights, then the state of nature would become as Hobbes described it, *bellum omnium contra omnes;* men would perhaps agree to submit to the power of government only out of necessity and fear. Civil society itself might then be maintained, as reactionaries have claimed, only by the God-given executioner or by miracle, mystery and authority. If majorities are irrational and omnipotent, then their justice becomes in fact only the will of the stronger, and completely relative; but Locke failed to face these issues squarely. To conclude with Kendall's words,

> Locke can reasonably argue (e.g.) both for individual rights and for an absolute right in the majority to determine the rights of individuals, for the kind of majority he envisages would never withdraw the just rights of individuals. Likewise he can permit the individual to promise unqualified obedience to the will of the majority, for that will, being always in accord with reason and justice, cannot enslave.[14]

What is wrong with Locke is his presumption of the identity of public and private interests and his failure to deal with majority rule as realistically and as fully as he dealt with divine right. What Locke leaves us with is a denial of the right of *individual* rebellion against the majority but not of revolution by *a people* against unjust rulers.

Ignoring for a moment the discomforts of the populistic bias this suggests, the problem of the Declaration as a Lockeian document is clear. Does the Declaration assert fully and unambiguously a doctrine of human rights that amounts to supremacy of the individual conscience or does it establish a doctrine of popular sovereignty?

[14] Willmore Kendall, *Abstract of John Locke and the Doctrine of Majority Rule* (Urbana, 1940), p. 12.

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While we may get greater clarity about these issues, no interpretation of the Declaration can be final, just as no interpretation of Locke, complex as he is, can claim to be more than the best reading possible. To deal with the political theory of the Declaration one has to be sufficiently aware of the potential conflict within it. Ambiguities like those in Becker's interpretation are not easy to avoid. The Declaration's text may invite them. The Declaration does admit the existence of unalienable, pre-governmental rights inhering, self-evidently, in man as man. Yet, although it seems to argue against the abuses of a king in the name of the rights of man, it says nothing about limits on a people itself. On the contrary, it implies that the "securing" (that is, definition and protection) of rights and their enforcement inheres without limitation in the people. In the text:

1. "One people" dissolves the ties with Great Britain and declares the causes of separation.
2. *Men* institute government to protect their rights and it is the right only of the People to alter or abolish government when they will for their own "safety and happiness", guided only by considerations of prudence about minor wounds.
3. The long train of insufferable abuses by the king are against the rights of the people, the lives of the people, the property of the people.
4. The people are the source of the authority for the publication and declaration of the free and independent states.

Aside from the single mention of the rights of men in the famous second paragraph, all the references to the colonists are with collective nouns or plural pronouns. The evidence of the text establishes only the people as the source of political power and political change.

Unlike Locke, however, most of the men who signed the Declaration were not political theorists who accepted the rationality of majorities or the identity of public and private interests. They were always as realistic about "the people" as they finally became about the king. On the face of it, it is difficult to think that men like John Adams, Charles Carroll of Carrollton, Richard Henry Lee, Robert Morris and Elbridge Gerry would use words that could deliver them into

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the hands of "the mob" in whose temperance and wisdom, like the "dubious democrat", Jefferson himself, they had so little confidence. On the other hand, such men also did not intend to lay the basis for the revolutionary individualism, one may even say the philosophic anarchism, that inheres in the interpretation of the Declaration as an assertion of absolute immanent individual rights. It is an unintentional paradox that the men of 1776 provided a rhetoric that would be abused by later demagogues whose ideas would have been anathema to the signers. Indeed, the men of '76 fought the forerunners of such people in their own time. They knew them as intolerant "levellers" believing in "direct action". However, two traditional American rhetorics come from the Declaration. One is the rhetoric of populism,[15] the other a rhetoric of individualism. Abolitionists and suffragettes, as well as populistic movements, could and did draw on the Declaration. Whether one preaches the "higher law" of the individual, or the people's collective power, neither doctrine represents what the signers had in mind when they spoke of "the people".

In the latest close analysis of the Declaration, Edward Dumbauld has suggested that "a people" as used in the text means,

> Any group whose sentiments of "belonging together" and *esprit de corps* are sufficiently strong to cause them to collaborate effectively in the establishment and maintenance of a sovereign and separate politically organized society is undoubtedly "a people." The fact of success in asserting and maintaining independence is the best proof of a people's nationhood and right to be independent.[16]

Aside from the very pragmatic ground for a test of a people this implies, one questions whether the signers meant this when they mentioned "the people". Many signers would have subscribed to Burke's notions of "virtual representation", that the true voices of the people as a whole were the substantial or educated leaders of the community.

[15] I am using the word in the sense of *vox populi est vox dei* rather than in the narrower sense of the Populists of the 1890's.

[16] Edward Dumbauld, *The Declaration of Independence and What It Means Today* (Norman, 1950), p. 50.

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Although Jefferson, the father of the Declaration, did not accept Burke's accompanying sophistry that universal male suffrage was unnecessary because all people without a direct voice in government were "virtually represented", his distrust of direct democracy and his belief in a natural aristocracy hardly need reëmphasis here. For Jefferson, it was not the people but "the wise men of the state" [17] who were to change constitutions. Most of the men of 1776 had similar conceptions of "the people". "The people" were the wealthy, the talented, the leisured—in short, men whose experience and sobriety qualified them to speak, in the long run, for the rights of man.

But what if "the people" by mere counting of heads and the representatives of "the people" by wealth, talent and experience should conflict? What if the factions which Madison, in *Federalist* X, hoped to keep divided through a federal system and checks and balances should coalesce in the form of the most potent faction of all, that is, an actual national majority? In the marginal situation would Jefferson, as the most enlightened of the signers, have accepted any majority decision in the name of the people?

In answering, one runs up against the *ad hoc* quality of Jefferson's thought. He had the mind of a gifted amateur, often given to exaggeration for effect. His was, fundamentally, an unsystematic intelligence. Fellow Virginians like Richard Henry Lee or Madison would also have been more cautious than Jefferson often permitted himself to be when writing about actual majorities. Jefferson was, of course, conservative enough to believe that a responsible exercise of political rights required that men have "a stake in society." To attract men from violence and demagogues to moderation and sobriety, he wanted all voters to possess land in order to be tied to the most solid of "interests". This was also the reason behind his proposal that the problem of propertyless voters in Virginia be solved by a law granting a small holding to all men who had no property. In other words, given a widespread distribution of land, a vote, fair rule by a natural aristocracy, and continuing education, Jefferson hoped that populistic tumults like Shays' Rebellion would

[17] Jefferson, *Works*, vol. V, pp. 469-470.

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not arise. For the most part the fulfillment of these conditions for majority rule would bring him close to Locke's assumptions about the rationality of the majority.

What if a popular majority nevertheless became oppressive either with respect to a narrow definition of civil or political rights or in actions against a minority? If the majority had specifically promised to respect minority or individual rights, could it change its mind or violate its pledges and thus give legitimate cause for rebellion? After all means of legal redress were exhausted did Jefferson justify minority or individual rebellion? Such famous but vague words like those about a little rebellion now and then and refreshing the tree of liberty with blood were hyperbole. Legal redress of grievances was a more constant article of faith as was the theme that "the will of the people . . . is the only legitimate foundation of any government." [18] Majority rule was "the natural law of every society" and, even more significantly, a "fundamental law of nature by which alone self-government can be exercised." [19] When majorities are ignored, "government ends, the law of the strongest takes its place, and life and property are his who can take them." [20] When the majority does rule, "absolute acquiescence" [21] in its decisions is, in the words of his First Inaugural, "the vital principle of republics from which there is no appeal but to force, the vital principle and immediate parent of despotism ".[22]

Jefferson also stated, in his Inaugural address, "that, though the will of the majority is in all cases to prevail, that will, to be rightful, must be reasonable; that the minority possess their equal rights, which equal laws must protect and to violate which would be oppression." [23] Although this suggests a moral standard by which the majority can be judged, it by no means clarifies what actual power an aggrieved minority is entitled to use. Jefferson acknowledges that not all majority actions are morally right. The ma-

[18] *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson,* ed. by A. E. Bergh (Washington, 1905), vol. XVI, p. 44.

[19] Jefferson, *Works,* vol. VI, p. 98.

[20] Jefferson, *Writings,* vol. XVI, p. 337.

[21] Jefferson, *Works,* vol. IX, pp. 106.

[22] *Ibid.,* p. 198.

[23] *Ibid.,* p. 195.

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jority ought to respect the rights of individuals, it ought to be "reasonable"; yet, "in all cases" the majority is to prevail.

The potential conflict between the rights of the individual and the rights of the majority implicit in the Declaration is brought out in the First Inaugural. The problem is solved if we accept unequivocally the statement that "in all cases" the will of the majority is supreme. The other alternative is to say that the relations between majority rule and individual rights remain ambiguous in Jefferson's thought. In either case, we are not entitled to regard his speech of 1801 as asserting a notion of the supremacy of single individual rights. From the point of view of those who believe in inalienable rights, like the Declaration, the First Inaugural is at best inconclusive.

It is noteworthy that Jefferson should believe that force was the only alternative to majority rule and that he thought that the use of force was the principle of despotism. But even a moral case for force in an "appeal to heaven" by a minority that thinks itself oppressed could not deprive a majority of a similar "moral right" to protect itself and to insist on observance of the rules of the game. How, furthermore, would one judge who is right in a conflict in which majority and minority are equally convinced that conscience lies on their side? Although the right of supremacy of conscience is not usually construed this way, if it is wrong to violate any natural right of a minority, is it not equally wrong to enforce the rights of that minority at the cost of an affront to the rights to life, liberty or pursuit of happiness of the majority?

Generally speaking, although the less humane or more skeptical of Jefferson's contemporaries would have suppressed what they took to be offensive minorities, Jefferson himself held back from callous repressive measures. But in the Declaration and elsewhere he never stated a full conception of individual rights that amounted to later American notions of "the higher law" for the individual against the state. As for nullification (by South Carolina), his co-author of the ambiguous Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, Madison, said, "this new fangled theory is attempted to be fathered on

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Mr. Jefferson the apostle of republicanism, and whose own works declare that 'acquiescence in the decision of the majority is the vital principle of it'." [24] Running, however, through Jefferson's writings is the theme that a minority should be permitted to expatriate itself when it could no longer tolerate majority rule.[25] But despite this recurring gesture to individual liberty Jefferson never worked out fully the questions of whether a minority could expatriate itself whenever it saw fit or whether its effective right to do so came from the majority. If expatriation, like other natural rights, exists only in the abstract, it offers small comfort for those who feel oppressed.

The evidence in the theories of Locke, in the text of the Declaration, and in the papers of Jefferson is very far from supporting the radically individualistic political theory said to be implicit in the Declaration. It seems clear that in the Declaration Jefferson, like Locke, did assert a doctrine of popular sovereignty. Although many of the signers lived on to see the terror that an absolutist and ideological use of the doctrine by a French dictatorship would bring, they never settled the issue of the theoretical limits of popular power itself. Indeed the ambiguous relation of popular rule to individual rights still besets liberal political theory. The best that can be said for the Declaration as a political theory inviting world revolution, democracy, individualism, or equal rights must rest upon what weight one wishes to give the single reference to natural rights in the text and to what extent one chooses to ignore the context. Taking the text as a whole, however, and attempting the best reading possible, the claim that, whatever the conservative intentions of the men of 1776, the Declaration did proclaim a theory of human rights effectively superior to the commands of any government seems strongly open to doubt.

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[24] *The Writings of James Madison,* ed. by Gaillard Hunt (New York, 1910), vol. IX, p. 589.

[25] Jefferson, *Works,* vol. I, p. 14; vol. II, p. 64; vol. IX, p. 341; vol. X, p. 273; vol. XII, p. 589.

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THE UNITED NATIONS, THE UNITED STATES OCCUPATION AND THE 1948 ELECTION IN KOREA

KOREA became a concern of the United Nations after more than two tense years which failed to produce any working arrangement between the American forces south of the thirty-eighth parallel and the Soviet Army north of the line. The two armies had entered and divided Korea to take the surrender of Japanese troops and were to stay until an international trusteeship leading to Korean self-government had been established. Although the trusteeship project soon vanished under Korean opposition, by late 1947 no other effective step had been taken to wipe out the division of the country and permit Koreans to govern it independently. The United States then turned to the United Nations General Assembly in the hope of breaking the deadlock in which bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union had ended. The General Assembly sent to Korea a subsidiary organ which, temporarily at least, greatly influenced the preparations for and conduct of the 1948 election from which the present Republic of Korea grew. This subsidiary body, the Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK), operated in a delicate situation where armed conflict was never far from the minds of the ruling soldiers. Yet UNTCOK managed to write a record of unique coöperation between the United Nations and an American Army and to report to the General Assembly that some of its goals had been achieved even if an election for all of Korea and the establishment of a government for a unified Korea proved impossible.

The situation in Korea in 1948 probably will not soon be duplicated either there or in another area. But some elements of the 1948 conditions still exist in Korea, where only recently the Pyongyang régime, as well as the Chinese government in Peking, urged a country-wide election. UNTCOK had been instructed to observe such an election. If one should ever be held in Korea—or perhaps in divided Viet

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Nam or even divided Germany in an unknown future—it might well take place under the scrutiny of the United Nations. The work of UNTCOK then might have importance as a precedent and guide. But even if the UNTCOK record is never put to that use, it retains its intrinsic interest as an example of close coöperation between the United Nations and a major Power in a touchy field situation.

From the American point of view, one important element in the Korean theater was the vulnerability of its military detachment. The rapid post-war demobilization had made it difficult to maintain and replace the troops in Korea, who were in every sense at the end of the supply line. A sizable military incident in Korea not only might result in the loss of these men and their equipment but also could involve the United States in a major war. And while the Korean establishment grew weaker, the cold war increased in intensity. Military planners at the War Department, unable to meet the demands from the Korean establishment for men and matériel, were soon driven to a decision that a withdrawal from Korea would permit a redeployment of the troops there for more efficient use in another cold war setting. This decision to withdraw was a second important element in the Korean situation.

At the same time, the Department of State took the position that a military withdrawal would merely push the southern zone into Soviet hands unless an independent Korean government had been established and had taken over from the military government. In the face of this position, the army postponed withdrawal until some settlement was attempted first through the deadlocked American-Soviet Joint Commission in Korea and then in an exchange of correspondence between the Secretary of State and the Soviet Foreign Minister. Only when the latter effort proved fruitless did the United States put the problem of Korea before the General Assembly.[1]

[1] The letters of both governments are reprinted in Department of State, *Korea: 1945 to 1948*, Publication 3305, Far Eastern Series 28 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1948), pp. 43-47. This publication also gives an official account of the work of the Joint Commission. For a fuller account and a discussion of United States decisions, see Leland M. Goodrich, *Korea: A Study of U.S. Policy in the United Nations* (New York, 1956), pp. 9-30.

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The United States took the lead in suggesting a program to the General Assembly and promptly encountered deep Soviet opposition to consideration of the Korea question there, especially without participation by spokesmen of the Korean people. Meantime, the Soviet government proposed withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea. The American delegation then presented the General Assembly with a plan [2] which fitted the policy determinations of its government and at the same time purported to meet Soviet objections and a Korean desire for unification. An election was to be held in Korea by the end of March. This election would provide the General Assembly with spokesmen for Korea. UNTCOK would observe the election, ensuring that it was not rigged. The elected representatives then could form a government, establish a security force and accept transfer of governmental functions from the military régimes both north and south of the thirty-eighth parallel. This step would answer Korean demands for unification and an independent government. It would also satisfy the State Department's insistence that a Korean government should exist before troop withdrawal was attempted. Finally, the Occupation forces would withdraw. This provision would satisfy the War Department's wish to end its responsibility for Korea and, at the same time, would not leave the country entirely unprotected, because the new government would have a security force. After observing the election, UNTCOK was to consult with the Korean government on forming a security force and receiving the transfer of governmental functions from the Occupation forces. It was also to consult with the government on securing the withdrawal of Occupation troops. These consultations were to involve the international organization with the fate of the new government in Korea, giving the infant régime the prestige of sponsorship and protection by the United Nations.

The General Assembly adopted the American proposal after a debate which touched only sketchily on the precise significance of the program. The discussion did, however, produce clear Soviet warnings that no Russian participation or coöperation whatever could be expected for UNTCOK,

[2] U.N. Document A/C.1/218/Rev.1, Nov. 4, 1947.

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which was called an illegal body.[3] The Soviet opposition no doubt rested on the fear that the larger population and American influence in South Korea would swamp Soviet strength in the North, once Russian soldiers had been withdrawn in favor of an all-Korean government. If retaining influence in Korea were the aim of the Soviet Union, it had little to gain and something to lose from the American plan.

The presence in Korea of UNTCOK, which included the representatives of eight United Nations members, forced upon the United States military establishment the task of working out a political relationship. The membership of the Commission included such states as Australia, Canada, China, France, India and the Philippines, all of which had different interests in the position of the United States in the Far East. With El Salvador and Syria, these countries made up the active membership of the Commission. (The Ukrainian SSR also had been appointed to UNTCOK but refused to join it.) None of the members, perhaps, would have opposed directly and outspokenly the desires of the United States to see a non-Communist government ruling Korea. But with the possible exception of (Nationalist) China, El Salvador and the Philippines, none of them could be depended upon to give extra weight to American wishes in Korea merely because they were American.

Furthermore, the United States retained the legal and effective authority in South Korea. UNTCOK had powers only to consult and observe. To be fully effective, then, UNTCOK necessarily depended on the tolerance, good faith, coöperativeness and intentions of the United States.

UNTCOK had the assignment of operating throughout Korea. The Soviet authorities in the northern zone, however, not only denied access to the Commission but also heaped abuse on it. Therefore, while the United States, one of the Powers occupying Korea, made it plain by its leader-

[3] The proposal was adopted as U.N. General Assembly Resolution 112 (II), Nov. 14, 1947. The most intense debate took place in the First Committee of the General Assembly which, however, spent much time in parliamentary maneuvers to clear the decks of Soviet counter-proposals. See United Nations, *Official Records: General Assembly, Second Session, First Committee,* pp. 248 *et seq.*

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ship in the General Assembly and by its statements of policy on Korea that it hoped to coöperate fully with the United Nations, the other occupying Power followed quite the opposite policy. UNTCOK thus could deal with only one occupying authority and it was the one which had taken an active lead in moving toward liquidation of its establishment in Korea. In such circumstances, the relation between the United Nations body and the American Occupation developed a special closeness, which had a lasting importance in the development of Korean politics and international relations.

II

High-ranking officers of the American Occupation welcomed UNTCOK on its arrival early in January 1948. Their government had already assured the Secretary-General of the United Nations that it would put appropriate facilities at the disposal of the UNTCOK party.[4] During almost all of its life, UNTCOK depended on the American Occupation for a roof, food and transportation, all given willingly and amply.

At first, official contact between Commission and Occupation was linked to the question of the Soviet attitude, for UNTCOK soon began to consider how to approach the two Occupation commanders for their coöperation. It did not want to treat them differently, so as to maintain its claim to a Korea-wide scope of operations. Efforts to reach the Soviet commander soon demonstrated their futility but revealed the Americans as most coöperative.

UNTCOK first moved officially to open relations with the American Occupation with a courtesy call on its commander, Lieutenant General John R. Hodge. Even this noncommital opening move, however, required much deliberation during four meetings. UNTCOK decided by mid-January to write to General Hodge and his Soviet counterpart, asking that its chairman be received for a courtesy call. General Hodge

[4] United Nations, *Official Records: General Assembly, Third Session, Supplement No. 9, First Part of the Report of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea*, vol. I, p. 5. This report will hereafter be referred to as UNTCOK *Report*.

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immediately received K.P.S. Menon, the Indian ambassador who had been elected UNTCOK chairman.[5] After this beginning, General Hodge attached one of his staff officers, Brigadier General John Weckerling, to the Commission as a liaison officer and made every effort to work closely with the UNTCOK delegations and Secretariat. The American commander, however, found little satisfaction in what he considered a chilly attitude on the part of the Commission, which he thought was seeing darkly through a screen of distortion built by Communist-oriented Secretariat members in New York. Nevertheless, the chill dissipated over the following months, during which General Hodge revised his estimate.[6] From the beginning, he and his staff received full information, including copies of Commission documents, and the presence of General Weckerling at Commission headquarters in the Duk Soo Palace made an exchange of views simple and private.

The liaison channel which was opened between UNTCOK and General Hodge carried a lengthy record of a complex debate during February over the problem of how to hold a nationwide election in a Korea in which the northern part was closed to the United Nations. The American attitude had begun to shape up clearly: go ahead with an election in the South alone if the northern authorities denied UNTCOK access. An election law already was on the books.[7] An outstanding problem for the American military government was the attitude of UNTCOK on such an election, for there would have been little sense in proceeding with the balloting under a United Nations resolution unless the Commission was willing to observe it. This projected observation, moreover, was at the core of the American resolution adopted by the General Assembly. The Commission did not resolve the election question directly but decided after much debate to consult the Interim Committee of the General Assembly,

[5] U.N. Document A/AC.19/SR.4, Jan. 16, 1948: and UNTCOK *Report*, vol. I, p. 24.

[6] Letter from General John R. Hodge, dated March 19, 1957.

[7] The English text of this law is reprinted in UNTCOK *Report*, vol. II, pp. 14-20.

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then an untested instrument but already as objectionable to the Russians as the Commission was.

The members of the Commission split widely on the question of consulting the Interim Committee. All the eight members of the Commission who sent representatives to Korea had favored the establishment of an independent government there and the withdrawal of Occupation forces. Now the problem was whether to favor an election in the South alone and to determine what the purpose of the election should be. The members of the Commission most violently antagonistic to Soviet policy favored a decision by UNTCOK itself on what its next move should be. This was the view of China and the Philippines. France joined them on the ground that, in the circumstances, the Commission should limit itself to attempting by every possible means to gain access to the North. The Chinese and Philippine representatives argued that any attempt to get advice from the Interim Committee should be postponed until further efforts had been made to secure election of representatives of the Korean people who might be consulted. The Philippine delegate suggested a legalistic formula by which an election could be scheduled for the whole country but suspended in those districts where observation proved impossible. The Chinese representative proposed a rather similar election for the limited purpose of choosing consultants. Australia, Canada, India and Syria strongly favored consultation with the Interim Committee and they were joined in the end by a vacillating El Salvador. The clear expectation of the majority was that the Interim Committee would instruct UNTCOK not to attempt to observe elections in the southern zone alone. They argued that the lack of coöperation from the authorities in the North made it impossible for UNTCOK to carry out its instructions and that in the new situation new guidance would be required. Several of the delegates holding this view pointed out that to hold elections in the South alone might perpetuate the division of Korea which would be contrary to the intention of the General Assembly. Not all of the representatives backing reference to the Interim Committee opposed the idea of consulting with such representatives of the Korean people as

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could be elected or were available, but they were united in opposing an election which would permit the formation of a government claiming jurisdiction over all of Korea.[8]

The major question UNTCOK asked was whether it was open to it or incumbent upon it to proceed with the General Assembly's program in the southern zone.[9] If, by some chance, a positive answer were returned, the Commission would then want to know whether it should observe, "provided that it has determined that elections can be held in a free atmosphere." The last proviso touched directly on the conduct of government in Korea. It was added, despite sharp objections by some delegates, at the behest of the Syrian representative; he had exhibited distrust of the American régime which he thought was holding large numbers of political prisoners.

The decision by UNTCOK to consult the Interim Committee not only resulted in a split among the Commission members but also touched off riots, led by leftist and Communist elements. These groups saw in the delay occasioned by the consultation an opportunity to exploit the desire of many Koreans for immediate unification of their country and for early elections or other action to provide that unity. The strikers demanded that American troops withdraw and that the Commission cease its activities. By the time the strike was three days old, forty-seven persons had been killed and some one thousand others arrested. United States authorities kept the Commission informed of the disturbance, which continued intermittently throughout the spring months, but UNTCOK took no official cognizance of it.[10]

If the disturbance did nothing else, it made the dependence of the Commission on the American Occupation forces

8 The views of the representatives as expressed in UNTCOK meetings are summarized in U.N. Documents A/AC.19/33, Feb. 10, 1948, and A/AC.19/33/Corr.1, Feb. 12, 1948. An explicit index of the UNTCOK majority's expectation is the statement by the Australian delegate that the advice of the Interim Committee came as a surprise. U.N. Document A/AC.19/SR.19, March 11, 1948.

9 The questions put to the Interim Committee appear in UNTCOK *Report*, vol. I, pp. 25-26.

10 U.N. Document A/AC.19/W.22/Add.3, Feb. 11, 1948; and *New York Times*, Feb. 8-10, 1948.

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painfully obvious, for it was to those forces that the representatives looked for personal protection. While no attempts on their lives were made, the possibility of attacks was never remote. The American forces and their Korean constabulary took their guard duties seriously, too, thus adding bricks to the wall of ignorance, lack of common language and diplomatic reserve which separated UNTCOK from contact with many Korean organizations and individuals.

The Occupation, aiming at withdrawal, could not be content with caution and reserve on the part of the Commission. General Hodge used the strikes as an argument for immediate elections. " It is my considered opinion ", he said, " that if this United Nations group would act aggressively and announce elections, a lot of this would stop." [11] His statement reinforced the growing commitment by the United States to an election in Korea, even if its geographical scope was limited. But there was no indication that American policy foresaw an election without United Nations observation. Thus, if the Commission depended on the Occupation authorities, so the American forces depended on it in carrying out the election policy. American pressure, the highly charged atmosphere, riot and denunciation from the North ensured that UNTCOK would have to proceed to its decisions on the election without the comfort of deliberation in calm circumstances.

III

The United States promptly took the lead in the Interim Committee. It not only presented a plan to answer the questions asked by UNTCOK, but it also was represented by the forceful and persuasive Philip C. Jessup. The American resolution in effect said: " Go ahead with the election." The split in UNTCOK over this course was amply reflected in the Interim Committee, where the Australian and Canadian delegates argued sharply but ineffectually against the American proposal. Chairman Menon saw his own government reject his position and support the United States resolution. The Australian and Canadian representatives cast the only

[11] UNTCOK *Report*, vol. III, p. 138.

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two negative votes, which with the 11 abstentions far from outweighed the 34 favorable votes.[12]

General Hodge and his staff immediately were in touch with the members of the Commission present in Korea, urging them to set an election date on the basis of the Interim Committee resolution. The seven members present met informally at once. Petrus Schmidt, the Principal Secretary, relayed the results of this meeting to Mr. Menon during a telephone call to New York. The verbatim record of this conversation accurately discloses what took place in the informal meeting, for which no record was kept. Mr. Schmidt said:

> It was agreed that, before the return of the Chairman of the Commission, a public announcement should be made with regard to the elections, and particularly the election date.
>
> The two main reasons for making this announcement as soon as possible were, firstly, that it was desirable to avoid further delay concerning a final date for the elections, and, secondly, that a public announcement of some sort would be expected in connection with the celebration of the Korean independence day on the first of March. It was hoped that the public announcement from the Commission might have a quieting effect on threatening riots.

The Commission agreed unanimously—but informally—that Y. W. Liu, the Chinese acting chairman, should read at the Independence Day ceremonies on March 1 a prepared announcement that an election would be held not later than May 20. The Occupation administrators wanted the election not later than that date and General Hodge had indicated that he would accept May 10 or earlier. Mr. Menon thought that May 9, a Sunday, would be best.[13]

Mr. Liu made his statement at an enthusiastic public gathering. General Hodge followed the Commission's announcement with his own declaration that the election would take place on Sunday, May 9.[14] Everything now

[12] U.N. Documents A/AC.18/SR.5, Feb. 20, 1948; A/AC.18/SR.6, Feb. 26, 1948; A/AC.18/SR.7, Feb. 28, 1948; A/AC.18/SR.8, Feb. 28, 1948; and A/AC.18/SR.9, Feb. 28, 1948.

[13] U.N. Document A/AC.19/W.29, March 1, 1948.

[14] U.N. Document A/AC.19/41, March 2, 1948; and *New York Times*, March 2, 1948.

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seemed ready for an election in accordance with United States wishes. The Commission would observe; the military government would organize the election with the help of its Korean appendages; the Koreans would vote; the American force would withdraw; and those who inclined to optimism could hope for Korean unification.

During the first week of March, the Canadian delegate, George Patterson, who had come back from Tokyo, heard out Chairman Menon's report on the Interim Committee deliberations. Probably Mr. Menon's remark that the Interim Committee resolution provided a good deal of room for a discretionary interpretation struck him forcibly, for he spoke of his regret that the Temporary Commission had made a number of public statements to the effect that it had made up its mind. Rumors that Mr. Patterson had doubts about the action taken by the Commission soon reached General Hodge, whose spokesman declared that the military government's decision to schedule an election had been "cleared with the proper authorities". Mr. Liu defended the Commission's action by insisting that he had no doubts of its propriety. Only one other delegate, the Syrian, made any statement at this meeting. Yasin Mughir explained that he still questioned that a free atmosphere existed in Korea and that he would insist on it before assenting to an election.[15]

The Canadian delegate subsequently took the position that the informal decision of the Commission that an election should be held on May 9 was no decision at all and that statements by General Hodge that the election had been set with the approval of UNTCOK were either misleading or based on a misunderstanding. Mr. Patterson called the situation as it stood embarrassing, noting that "his Government had requested him to ask the Commission to make a statement clarifying the Commission's relation to certain public statements made by General Hodge." The discussion which then developed once again reflected a division. Mr. Liu and Rufino Luna, the Philippine delegate, took the stand that the Commission had made a binding decision. S. H. Jackson, the Australian representative, thought that no commit-

[15] U.N. Document A/AC.19/PV.16, March 8, 1948.

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ment had been made but rather that the Commission was responding to an urgent situation. A subsidiary point of conflict grew out of the May 9 date itself. Mr. Menon explained that the choice of dates accorded well with the farmers' calendar, although other members pointed out that military government spokesmen had mentioned that periods of up to six months would be required for pre-election education. The Canadian delegate increased his pressure on the Commission by threatening to withdraw unless a clarification were made. UNTCOK at a subsequent meeting failed to agree on an explanatory press release and Mr. Patterson left. The Commission then voted, despite Philippine and Salvadorian objections, to reconsider and succeeded in adopting a statement drafted by Mr. Menon to the effect that a final decision to observe the election had yet to be made. Before adopting this statement by four votes to none with three abstentions, UNTCOK had to reject a Philippine resolution which noted that seven members had accepted the informal decision which caused the storm.[16]

The argument in the Temporary Commission over the nature of the "decision" made at the informal meeting illuminated the American military government's position. General Hodge and his staff had hoped and worked for nothing more than a quick decision which would allow them to go ahead with the election. The hurried informal meeting and its quick determination to observe the election amounted to acquiescence in or positive endorsement of the fixed American plan. Because General Hodge interpreted it in the latter manner, Mr. Patterson's attempt to reverse the decision ran directly counter to the American course.

Mr. Patterson won a tactical victory by getting the Commission to state that its first reaction to the Interim Committee resolution was not a formal decision. This statement left General Hodge with the full responsibility of ordering the election for early May and also left in question whether the Temporary Commission would observe it. But the Canadian delegate lost the battle, for his argument that the Interim Committee had merely advised the Commission and

[16] U.N. Documents A/AC.19/SR.17, March 9, 1948; and A/AC.19/SR.18, March 9, 1948.

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had not given it an order failed to sway the majority to a policy of leaving the United States with all responsibility. Instead, early in March a divided Commission once more decided to observe the election.

At that time, a resolution, based on a French draft to which a Syrian amendment had been added, put the Commission on record as favoring the election in principle. But the Syrian amendment represented a continued reservation, for it reiterated the earlier proviso that the Commission had to ascertain " that the elections will be held in a free atmosphere wherein the democratic rights of freedom of speech, press and assembly would be recognized and respected." [17] Since the American military government was responsible for the administration of the country, UNTCOK thus provided itself with a means for influencing the Occupation authorities to make changes in policies and arrangements for the election. Yet the American military authorities received some advantage from the resolution, for they could assume the existence of free conditions and claim that they were preparing the election under United Nations supervision and in accordance with their announced policy of coöperation with the world organization.

IV

Since the election was scheduled for May 9, just two months were left for preparations, determination by the Commission as to whether a free atmosphere existed and creation of some device for actual observation. The powers of the Temporary Commission to observe an election in Korea were not at all specifically defined. Some minor guides were provided in the recommendation by the General Assembly that the election be held on the basis of adult suffrage and by secret ballot and that the number of representatives elected be proportionate to the population. The Commission was instructed to facilitate and expedite the election, but the precise means of doing so were left to it to decide.

Since January, UNTCOK had three subcommittees diligently working on preliminary problems relating to the

[17] U.N. Document A/AC.19/SR.22, March 12, 1948.

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election.[18] Their work, which indicated specific changes in the atmosphere and arrangements, had an important bearing on the justification which had to be given for the eventual decision to observe. Because this decision was to be based on a finding that a free atmosphere existed, the Temporary Commission at that moment enjoyed its main power to influence the American Occupation and exacted certain changes in election laws and in administrative practices.

After the decision in principle to observe the election had been made, the Commission moved onto two separate paths which would merge by election time. On the one hand, it began an examination of the work of its subcommittees; on the other, it took steps to prepare itself and its subcommittee structure for work in connection with election observation.

Two of the subcommittees had worked hand in glove with the American authorities, consulting important specialists in the military government before adopting recommendations. While this practice perhaps limited the independence of the subcommittees to draw up far-reaching recommendations, it also ensured their acceptance by the military government. One of these subcommittees, charged with examination of the electoral law, urged that the voting age be reduced from 23 to 20; the Commission later recommended 21 years of age as the minimum. This subcommittee also urged that illiterates be given the vote; that certain classes of "collaborators" with the Japanese be excluded from the criminal classes barred from voting; that eligibility for office be broadened; and that run-offs be provided in case no majority appeared in an election. This last provision was rejected by the Commission which then adopted the others as the subcommittee report. The Occupation authorities accepted the entire report with the exception of the provisions dealing with exclusion of "collaborators" which were believed to be too difficult to administer.[19]

[18] An account of the formation of the three UNTCOK subcommittees appears in UNTCOK *Report*, vol. I, p. 30.

[19] The text of the recommendations as adopted by UNTCOK appears in UNTCOK *Report*, vol. II, pp. 9-13. The American reaction is in *ibid.*, pp. 13-14. Debate by UNTCOK on the subcommittee report is recorded in U.N. Documents A/AC.19/SR.20, March 10, 1948; and A/AC.19/SR.21, March 11, 1948.

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The second subcommittee which had been working closely with the Occupation authorities had the more delicate task. It considered ways and means of ensuring a free election and therefore investigated the "atmosphere" surrounding the election, rather than narrowly-defined legal provisions. On the suggestion of the Secretariat, whose officials had conferred with the United States authorities, the subcommittee centered its work on four titles. These involved laws relating to a free atmosphere, enforcement and police, freedom of information, and political prisoners. Consideration of the first title brought a recommendation of a declaration of rights for Koreans. The police problem was more difficult, because of widespread Korean suspicion of the Japanese-trained force which was directed by a tough chief who reported directly to the Occupation commander. The subcommittee discussed at length a proposal that the National Police should be made responsible to the Korean civil administration which functioned the Occupation umbrella, but in the end the Commission did not adopt such a recommendation. Freedom of information was disposed of with a recommendation that an education program be undertaken before the election, that Korean newspapers be allocated extra newsprint and that radio time be given candidates.[20]

The most delicate discussions grew out of the frequent charges made by Koreans that many political prisoners were in jail. General Hodge contended that no one was in jail because of his political beliefs or actions but that many were held because of criminal actions in the course of riots and strikes and other manifestations.[21] J. F. Engers, the subcommittee's secretary, told it that as of October 31, 1947, some 16,000 prisoners were held and that up to a quarter of them might be called political.[22] General Hodge did say, however, that if the subcommittee could define what it meant by

[20] The subcommittee's report is reprinted in UNTCOK *Report*, vol. II, pp. 46-48. The following pages contain the American reaction, proclamations on civil liberties and communications regarding the release of prisoners. U.N. Document A/AC.19/42, March 7, 1948, contains the recommendation regarding the police chief.

[21] UNTCOK *Report*, vol. III, p. 67.

[22] U.N. Document A/AC.19/SC.1/SR.1, Jan. 21, 1948.

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a political prisoner he would willingly consider an amnesty.[23] The subcommittee did not take a very strong stand but was able to elicit from the American authorities a statement of categories of offenses which it considered as possibly political. These included participation in riots, illegal meetings and distribution of handbills without additional criminal action. More than 700 persons were held on such charges. The subcommittee recognized that such offenses as arson and counterfeiting could not be called political but held that distribution of handbills and participation in illegal meetings were. It recommended that under its definition all political prisoners should be released. The United States authorities responded by releasing under pardons a total of 3,140 persons, who were among some 6,260 selected cases. Among those released were many who had been arrested during the disorders in February and March.[24]

V

Approving reports from its subcommittees did not yet bring UNTCOK to a final decision as to whether it would actually observe the election. Strict logic did not permit a decision immediately after the examination of subcommittee reports, which took place during March, for UNTCOK would have to decide whether the recommended changes had been made. In order to make that decision rationally—or at least on the basis of justifying facts—UNTCOK faced the task of pre-election observation. By the end of March, UNTCOK had reorganized its subcommittee structure, amalgamating its three subsidiaries into one Main Committee, so that it could undertake field observation.[25]

The entire month of April was given to observation tours by small groups organized from the membership of the Main Committee. These groups appeared in all nine provinces and Cheju Island, hoping to attract complaints and information during visits too short for thorough investigation. The United States authorities were unceasingly careful to open every possible door to the observation groups.

[23] UNTCOK *Report*, vol. III, p. 37.

[24] UNTCOK *Report*, vol. I, p. 32.

[25] U.N. Document A/AC.19/SR.27, March 20, 1948.

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The observation tours took on special importance during the period from April 5 to April 10, when voters registered. Some delegates came back with the impression that one reason for the very high registration was a threat by the police to withdraw individual ration cards from Koreans who did not register. Some delegates also feared that "youth organizations" and block leaders or "gun chiefs" were playing too large a share in the election. The impressions were aired in an interview with General William F. Dean, the military governor, on April 17, at which a representative of each member of the Commission was present.[26] The French, Canadian and Syrian delegates took leading parts in the questioning, which elicited from General Dean an affirmation that orders had been given to prevent any pressure involving ration cards, that youth organizations were not to participate in election arrangements and that any misuse of authority by the police brought immediate investigation. Although General Dean appeared not to accept as necessarily accurate the allegations presented by Commission members, he did not fail to maintain a coöperative attitude.

The next series of pre-election observation tours covered the period during which candidates presented petitions for places on the ballot. Under the Korean election law, such petitions were examined and accepted by district election committees from which aggrieved candidates had the right of appeal through provincial committees to the National Election Committee. During five days, beginning April 19, observation groups again toured the nine provinces and Seoul, omitting Cheju Island. The four groups not only heard complaints about the registration of candidates but also learned that personal registration for voting had reached figures "which normally ran over ninety per cent and quite often close to one hundred per cent."[27] The procedure adopted by the Main Committee was an instruction to the Secretariat to bring all complaints, if substantiated by some evidence, to the attention of the military authorities.[28] Of the complaints, perhaps the most important involved the at-

[26] UNTCOK *Report*, vol. III, pp. 223-25.

[27] UNTCOK *Report*, vol. 1, p. 38.

[28] U.N. Document A/AC.19/SC.4/SR.9, May 14, 1948.

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tempt by Daniel Choi, no doubt a brave person, to oppose Syngman Rhee in a Seoul district. Mr. Rhee had picked a safe district but had not counted upon Mr. Choi, who lived there. Mr. Choi presented his qualifying documents to the District Election Commission, which rejected them. The Seoul City Election Committee, however, overruled the District Committee, which resigned. Mr. Choi obtained assurances from General Dean and General Weckerling that he would have the same chance to run as anyone else. This case continued into the post-election period and produced a number of Main Committee discussions. But it was abruptly dropped after the National Election Committee rejected Mr. Choi's complaint.[29]

The National Election Committee itself had been the subject of discussion in the Temporary Commission during the pre-election period. In reviewing the report of its subcommittee on a free atmosphere, the Temporary Commission rejected a Syrian proposal that the National Election Committee be appointed only after consultations with UNTCOK. The National Election Committee had indeed been appointed already, but several Commission members were disturbed by the fact that twelve of the fifteen appointees were members of the Rhee-associated Hankook Democratic Party. The Commission formally declined responsibility for the Committee but did decide to consult the military government authorities informally. Three days later, the matter came up again after the resignations of three National Election Committee members were disclosed. General Weckerling then pressed for some kind of advice concerning new nominees. Mr. Schmidt reacted by proposing in a memorandum that the Commission inform General Weckerling that "the relationship between the Commission and the National Election Committee will be given due consideration." Mr. Luna and Mr. Jackson were appointed by the Commission to consult with General Weckerling on the composition of the National Election Committee. After three

29 U.N. Documents A/AC.19/SC.4/SR.13, June 21, 1948; A/AC.19/SC.4/15/Add.10, June 9, 1948; A/AC.19/SC.4/15/Add.11, June 15, 1948; and A/AC.19/SC.4/15/Add.12, June 21, 1948. Mr. Choi later was arrested on charges of plotting the assassination of Dr. Rhee. *New York Times*, Oct. 5, 1948.

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days more the Temporary Commission, learning of new nominations, once again reiterated its lack of responsibility for the National Election Committee but decided that during the election it would maintain a permanent liaison with it.[30] Thus, the Commission succeeded in having the membership of the National Election Committee changed enough so that it was not obviously one-sided and then decided to maintain relations with it. But it hedged its own position so that if the National Election Committee should discredit the election, the American authorities and not the Commission would bear full responsibility for the appointments.

Immediately before the Temporary Commission embarked on pre-election observation during April, it had undergone a flurry of excitement resulting from an attempt by the National Election Committee and General Hodge to postpone the election. General Weckerling stated as early as February 19 that at least 80 days ought to be used for a pre-election education program. General Hodge announced the May 9 election date on March 1, so that only 70 days were available for all pre-election preparations. This shortage of time impelled Ro Chin Sul, chairman of the National Election Committee, to write to the Temporary Commission, asking its assistance in changing the election date to May 20.[31]

The Temporary Commission did not deal with Mr. Ro's letter immediately but rather referred it to General Hodge who, in the opinion of UNTCOK, was responsible for the election. General Hodge replied on March 29 that he was ordering a change of the election date to May 20, which would make 80 days—the number he said he always had believed was required—available for election preparations.[32] Principal Secretary Schmidt expressed surprise at the order, noting that "there had been an understanding that the period of 80 days was not irrevocably fixed" and that the United States authorities had earlier referred to 60 days as

[30] U.N. Documents A/AC.19/SR.23, March 14, 1948; A/AC.19/SR.26, March 17, 1948; A/AC.19/SR.27, March 20, 1948; and A/AC.19/W.35/Add.2, March 12, 1948.

[31] U.N. Document A/AC.19/58, March 25, 1948.

[32] U.N. Documents A/AC.19/58/Add.1, March 27, 1948; and A/AC.19/58/Add.2, March 29, 1948.

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sufficient. He also recalled that the early date was thought to have been the latest on which the farmers' work schedule in the paddy fields would not interfere with the voting. After a discussion in which most members either opposed any postponement or else hoped that General Hodge could be urged not to postpone the election, the Indian delegate suggested an acceptable formula for a letter to General Hodge. The letter urged that the election not be postponed, advised General Hodge that the Main Committee would study communications dealing with the application of UNTCOK recommendations, and stated that if this technical body found new and urgent difficulties UNTCOK might be led to reconsider its earlier decision. The one member who opposed this formula, although he thought it a good one, was Mr. Patterson, who said that " the decision concerning the date was for General Hodge and [the letter] should refute the implication that the Commission was in any way responsible for any eventual postponement." [33]

General Hodge acceded to the Commission's wishes. He replied on April 2 that he had informed [34] " all agencies concerned with election arrangements of the attitude of the Commission, and that, regardless of difficulties encountered, all plans and efforts on their part shall be directed at the completion of the election by the date previously announced." One alteration, however, was made. Mr. Liu noted during the UNTCOK discussion that May 9 was the date of an eclipse of the sun, regarded by East Asians as a bad omen. General Hodge proposed a one-day postponement. The Temporary Commission concurred without discussion.[35]

Thus, by the end of April, the Temporary Commission had succeeded in making its wishes into Occupation policy in a number of ways. It had recommended changes in the election laws and in administrative practices; it had maintained the date of the election; it had refused any responsibility for the composition and conduct of the National Election Committee but had nevertheless succeeded in changing

[33] U.N. Document A/AC.19/SR.28, March 30, 1948.

[34] U.N. Document A/AC.19/58/Add.4, April 5, 1948.

[35] U.N. Documents A/AC.19/SR.31, April 3, 1948; and A/AC.19/58/ Add.5, April 5, 1948.

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some of its personnel; it had observed, superficially at least, the registration period and the period during which candidates placed their names on the ballot; and strongly dissident Korean groups had exerted notably little effective pressure. As April neared its end, the Temporary Commission could begin to feel that the main events which would condition its final decision to observe the election had taken place.

On April 26, the Temporary Commission went back to the question of whether it could find that a free atmosphere for an election existed. The Syrian delegate remained unsatisfied, having concluded that South Korea was not merely a police state; there was a degree of freedom but also a degree of oppression in which elements supporting the election partially or completely controlled local authorities and coöperated with the police. Thus, Mr. Mughir charged in effect that the election had been stolen in any case, that "an atmosphere favourable to free elections did not exist in South Korea and he would therefore abstain from voting on the question". Mr. Paul-Boncour announced that he would abstain from voting on the resolution which contained Mr. Mughir's proviso. He was joined by Mr. Patterson, who would not in any case favor an election.[36]

Thus, the problem before the Commission became one of designing a formula which would recognize the progress made but not irrevocably commit the Commission to the view that perfectly free conditions existed. Mr. Liu originated the formula. He suggested that the Commission state that "there exists in South Korea a reasonable degree of free atmosphere", and that it confirm that it would observe the election announced by General Hodge for May 10. This resolution fitted the Australian view, which acknowledged difficulties and remaining uncertainties but which also now endorsed an election and an immediate report to the General Assembly. UNTCOK adopted Mr. Liu's resolution by five favorable votes and three abstentions, maintaining formal unanimity.[37] It now had before it the task of observing the election.

[36] U.N. Document A/AC.19/SR.33, April 29, 1948.

[37] *Ibid.*

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The final observation tours straddled the election period. Teams began their work on May 7 and finished four days later. During this time, they saw polling places rising, had some contact with violence and attempted violence, kept an eye out for police and other official behavior, noted the activities of youth groups, watched the actual voting progress, and observed the disposition and counting of ballots. At the same time, similar observation was in progress by officers of the United States Army and by officials of the military government, who had sufficient manpower to put two observers into each of the 200 election districts. This attempt at observation by the military neared saturation far more than anything the United Nations attempted in Korea.[38]

During the day of May 10, some 7,036,750 of the 7,837,504 registered voters cast their ballots. The voters did not hesitate to go to the polling places and in many districts all had voted during the first four hours. UNTCOK called this an indication of "a real enthusiasm on the part of the people, as well as of the election officials." There was a general display of goodwill, in spite of a background of threats.[39]

Yet it would be blindness to overlook a considerable amount of violence and threats of violence in connection with the election. In the ten days before the election, 323 persons, including 32 Korean policemen, were killed in various riots and raids. Pyongyang Radio at no time relented in its exhortations to violence and in its demand for an end to the election. On the day before the election, indeed, it told General Hodge: "Give up your attempt to carry out a separate election. You had better get out of Korea with your clothes packed." It was regarded as by no means impossible that the North Korean Army might attack during the election.[40] Meantime, General Dean and his military government staff insisted that high standards be maintained during the election, voicing determination that Communists should not be permitted to interfere with the orderly progress of the voting. General Hodge recalls:

[38] Reports of the Observation Groups are reprinted in UNTCOK *Report*, vol. III, pp. 267 *et seq.*

[39] UNTCOK *Report*, vol. I, p. 45.

[40] *New York Times*, May 9, May 10 and June 6, 1948.

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> I expected the election would take place in an atmosphere of *relative* calm. Note the emphasis on *relative*. There were many serious disorders prior to the elections, put on by Reds in hope they could dampen the ardor of the over 90% of the Koreans who really wanted to vote. Some of this centered around the registration period. Of course I expected Red efforts to hamper the election, and precautions were taken to keep the peace. Actually the Red goon squads started operations early on election day, but met such opposition from those who wanted to vote that their sabotage efforts soon died out.
>
> In my opinion the presence of UNTCOK represented a quieting influence.[41]

General Hodge's recollection parallels an even more sweeping statement made at the time by Mr. Liu, who "was greatly surprised and absolutely satisfied with the orderly manner in which the elections were conducted." [42]

But other persons who saw the election found less reason for satisfaction. Mr. Mughir, then chairman of UNTCOK, let it be known that he still doubted the freedom of the atmosphere for voting and was uncertain about the efficiency with which the election was conducted. The Syrian delegate, who issued a press release under the UNTCOK imprint, based his doubts on the reports of a large early vote. The result was a discussion in the Main Committee and in the plenary Commission which culminated in an official statement that the view was Mr. Mughir's alone. The bland release masked considerable bitterness, for several delegates feared that sensitive Korean opinion had been hurt by a statement which impugned the honesty of the people.[43]

If Mr. Mughir had little support inside the Commission, he had more outside. "Many unofficial reports were less favorable [than American command claims], some observers maintaining that the elections had been fraudulently conducted in an atmosphere of terrorism. A more moderate

[41] Letter, March 19, 1957.

[42] *New York Times*, May 11, 1948.

[43] U.N. Documents A/AC.19/SC.4/SR.9, May 14, 1948; and A/AC.19/SR.41, May 15, 1948.

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view was that the elections were not in fact a free expression of the Korean will." [44]

Whether peaceful Koreans enthusiastically streamed to the polls or were dragooned into voting by a brutal police force, it was sure that UNTCOK had taken a large part in preparing for the election. The advice which UNTCOK gave the military government, the curiously disengaged collaboration with which it dealt with the National Election Committee, the wide tours it made—all of these affected to some degree the American and Korean authorities who conducted the polling. It would be too much to say that UNTCOK had been an absolutely indispensable participant in the final decision to hold the election, for the Americans clearly intended to do so from the time the Interim Committee gave its advice. But UNTCOK did make it easier for the American military government to justify its decision, for the majority of the Commission representatives had cooperated fully with the United States authorities and had received full coöperation in return.

Yet UNTCOK never acted unanimously in the matter of the election, except in the formal sense that no contrary votes were registered on many important resolutions. Canada, Australia and Syria all continued to hold grave doubts about the activities of UNTCOK in the election. Their delegates no doubt reflected a real concern that the course chosen in Korea would make permanent the division of the country and make worse the relations between the two parts. In this they were perhaps prescient. But their views hardly could prevail against both the United States authorities and the other members of the Commission.

From the time UNTCOK completed its observation of the election, its influence in Korea waned. After the election, it flew off to Shanghai to draft the first part of its report, a task which still was unfinished a month later when it returned to Seoul. During that month, the close contact earlier maintained with the United States authorities was broken off and never resumed. The American Occupation put together a Korean government south of the thirty-eighth parallel. In carrying out its policies, the military govern-

[44] George M. McCune, *Korea Today* (Cambridge, 1950), p. 229.

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ment no longer needed UNTCOK, and even the decision by the Commission that the election had been a valid expression of Korean opinion [45] seemed to do little more than confirm the success of the United States authorities in ridding themselves of governmental functions in Korea. UNTCOK had a most inconspicuous and uninfluential rôle in the construction of the new government and was consulted officially but perfunctorily only twice by the representatives who had been elected in South Korea.[46]

The influence of UNTCOK during the pre-election period, then, was really a product of United States policy; for the United Nations body fitted perfectly into American plans at that time. But UNTCOK after the election no longer had its earlier utility. The main point the United States had wanted to make in Korea had been made: Koreans had gone to the polls under United Nations observation; they now could put together their own government. With American help they did so.

LEON GORDENKER

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[45] See UNTCOK *Report*, vol. I, pp. 46-47.

[46] For a brief account, see United Nations, *Official Records: General Assembly, Supplement No. 9, Second Part of the Report of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea*, vol. I, pp. 5, 7-8.

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REVIEWS

Selected Historical Essays of F. W. Maitland. Chosen and introduced by HELEN M. CAM. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1957.—xxix, 278 pp. $5.00.

After clever reviews and three-decker philosophies, tedious agglomerations and tendentious monographs, one comes back to Frederic William Maitland with the delight that the vista of a mountain across a lake, familiar yet eternally fresh, can give. Here was, or better is, a historian neither sicklied over with the pale cast of thought nor smothered by his materials, but rather one who linked idea with fact and sketched a solution in the very sentence with the challenge. Even when the reader is woefully insensitive to the full variety of detail, he still appreciates so informing, so imaginative, and so modest a guide. Here is knowledge shared, not ignorance rebuked or error smitten hip and thigh. Not that Maitland withheld chastisement from those who needed it. He could expose once and for all him whose facts were suspect or whose manners were boorish. Two examples of this skill are here included—" Canon MacColl's New Convocation " and " Round's ' Commune of London ' ".

Miss Cam chose the thirteen pieces that make up this volume " to render more accessible those shorter writings of Maitland's which have the greatest intrinsic value for students of history and best illustrate his distinctive qualities." To say that her selections will not satisfy all, or indeed to say that they will satisfy none, carries no intent of depreciation. Every man can be allowed his favorites, and I for one could never omit " The Deacon and the Jewess " as illustration of Maitland's quality; but every man must also remember limitations of space and hold his fire until he sees the pages of the promised selection of legal essays. Nonetheless, anyone may question the inclusion of the Introduction to the *Memoranda de Parliamento,* notable though it be. It is available, with excellent editorial comment, in *Selected Essays*

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(1936), wherein the editor (Lapsley) points out, as Miss Cam does not, that what is printed is less than half the original essay.

Let us substitute another Introduction (at the moment far less available), the Introduction to Gierke's *Political Theories of the Middle Age*. Or does this latter fall outside Miss Cam's notion of what will interest students of history? If she intends to distinguish between what will interest them and what will interest students of law, she is making a specious distinction, most of all in the instance of Maitland. That this Introduction, with what it introduces, is history no man can deny; if he does he has a trumpery notion of Clio's sphere. That it is method along with substance even the quickest reading will reveal. Maitland tells us what to look for in medieval history and in the same breath warns us against finding it too quickly—and in modern dress. He suggests the texts and the ways they may be read. He opens a window on the relevance of medieval ideas to other times and places.

Miss Cam's own Introduction is far more modest and restrained than need required, far less informing than her essay on Stubbs a few years back. One would bid her treat Maitland as the immortal she surely feels him to be, not as a series of medieval texts calling for an emendation here, a more careful translation there. One might also bid her to watch her names, her arithmetic, and her associates. J. T. Shotwell is disguised as J. T. Shotall; and even though Maitland died in *December* of 1906 and McIlwain's *High Court of Parliament* appeared in 1910, four would seem preferable to three as measure of the intervening years. I do not know Miss Cam's asociates, but for my part I can only say that among mine, when there is talk of history as literature as well as of history as knowledge, Maitland comes immediately into the conversation. This is not to aver that he is always easy reading, for, as the chapter from *Township and Borough* here testifies, he often demands close attention, but rather that his grace and wit do clothe dry bones in attractive garb. As for his being the historians' historian (if we may go along with a cliché that is as pointless as labeling Bach the musicians' musician), 'tis indeed a rare historian who is more, and in our time he had better be scrutinized carefully. For that matter, 'tis a rare historian who is even the historians' historian, and to be such is the highest honor that any historian can wish. Maitland, we may be sure, would have wished no other.

CHARLES F. MULLETT

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The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology. By Ernst H. Kantorowicz. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957.—xvi, 568 pp. $10.00.

The theme of this richly erudite book is a search for the antecedents of the English doctrine of "the king's two bodies", which had its classic formulation in decisions of Elizabethan and Jacobean courts and a classic commentary in Maitland's essay, "The Crown as Corporation". In the person of the king, according to this doctrine, two bodies were indivisibly conjoined: his "body natural", subject to all human frailties; and his immortal and defeasible "body politic", containing "the office, government, and majesty royal", a "mystic body" in which he and his subjects were "incorporated together as head and members". The "more ample and large" body politic purged royal actions of defects introduced by the natural body. "The king never dies", for the body politic gave royal actions permanent validity and, at the death of the king's natural body, joined that of his successor. The king enjoyed the peculiar legal status of corporation sole.

Professor Kantorowicz shows that each element in these English formulas derived from concepts coöperatively worked out by continental civilists and canonists from a variety of materials. For example, "The king never dies" was an epigrammatic summation of a long process of thought, in which the notion of dynastic succession (supported by Aristotelian biology) was fused with the principle of the immortality of corporations (which owed something to the perpetuity of the *populus Romanus* and something to the Aristotelian view of time as sempiternal) to develop the implications of a papal decretal abstracting an abbot's "dignity which does not die" from an abbot who died—all this issuing (with some help from the phoenix-myth) in a legal construct of deathless "dignities" as "corporations by succession". And so with other elements. What was uniquely English was the final formulation in terms of "two bodies"—rather than the legists' "two persons" or the German personified state—and the incorporation of the king himself as corporation sole. The former seems the result of an English survival, due perhaps to the persistence of Parliament in the body politic, of organological language displaced elsewhere by other terms; the latter, of an English blurring of the Crown incorporating the realm with the king's corporate "dignity".

A significant part of the study is its tracing of the sources of the technical language used to assert and make effective the impersonality or continuity of institutions. The threads some-

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times lead back to Roman law, mythology, Aristotle—often to theology, whose definitions of the undefinable were available at the dawn of medieval legal consciousness. Thus the doctrine of the "two natures" of Christ, Mediator between God and man, was early transmuted to define the position of emperor or king, "man by nature, Christ by grace", and, as "vicar of Christ", both priest and king; again transmuted by thirteenth-century civilists to describe the emperor as "priest of the law", the "animate law" who "mediated" between natural and positive law; again transmuted in the dualities of Bracton's king, above and below the law. The theological imagery did not merely halo kingship; by providing ways of stating its supra-personal aspects, it served—paradoxically—to further a secular construction of authority. Similarly, the phrase "mystic body", originally applied to the eucharistic symbols, became applicable to the church after the twelfth-century insistence on transubstantiation and, as "polity-centered" thought succeeded theocentric, quickly served church, empire and other groups as the imagery through which their corporational character was legally developed. To anyone interested in the way in which borrowings from other realms of discourse become instruments (or determinants?) of political analysis—one thinks of "contract", "general will", "organic", "pressure-group", "model"—Professor Kantorowicz' study of medieval political semantics may be more suggestive than he, perhaps, would wish.

The book is written with lucidity and urbanity and packed with valuable bibliographies. It is, admittedly, incomplete on the successive English reflections of continental concepts, which await further research. But my only serious question is about the interpretation of Bracton's thought as focused in the dialectic notion of a king who derived a general legislative authority from the *lex regia* as "the law that makes the king" and whose Christlike self-submission to "the Law" was reciprocal with a Christlike authority over it. Professor Kantorowicz does not examine the specific rôles of Bracton's king in relation to different kinds of law; his exegesis seems to involve undue emphasis on the *quod principi placuit* sentence as the key to Bractonian kingship and a questionable claim that phrases in the surrounding discussion of the king as judge refer to legislation. However, the interpretation of Bracton is not an essential point.

The extraordinary richness of the book may submerge the author's warning that it does not explore all the medieval origins of "the Myth of the State" but "a single strand of a very complicated structure." Other formulas in which men said other

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things about authority are, properly, omitted or treated only peripherally. Moreover, following the intricate history of metaphors and maxims, one may lose sight of a fact of which Professor Kantorowicz is well aware: that what was going on was, at bottom, no mere interplay of words but the intensely practical effort of lawyers to construct a viable legal system for concrete legal problems. Practical issues and consequences are only lightly suggested here; but an examination of all the multiple dimensions of the ideas that produced "the king's two bodies" would require, perhaps, a two-bodied Professor Kantorowicz and, certainly, a multi-bodied reader.

EWART LEWIS

OBERLIN COLLEGE

King and Commons, 1660-1832. By BETTY KEMP. London, Macmillan & Co Ltd, New York, St Martin's Press, 1957.—vii, 168 pp. $4.50.

This is a study, by a Fellow of St. Hugh's College, Oxford, of the constitutional balance between King, Lords and Commons which was the essence of British government in the eighteenth century. The usual treatment of this period stresses the conflict which arose between King and Parliament. It is the aim of the author to show that, in spite of these, there existed a basic balance respected by both and that this was so conventional by the time Montesquieu visited England in 1729 that the *Esprit des lois* added nothing to it. However, Montesquieu's idea that the English Constitution supported his belief that civil liberty was best preserved in a state where there is a balance between legislative, executive and judicial power was a misinterpretation of the real balance of the Constitution. Although there is a short chapter discussing the development of this balance, and a final chapter dealing with the rise of the cabinet, the main purpose of the book is to show how the balance between King and Commons worked in the eighteenth century. This was made possible by the English racial habit of allowing laws to be interpreted by conventional practice and conventional practice to pass into law.

There are two such incidences which occupy the main attention of the author: the Septennial Act of 1716 and the use of royal placemen. The first established a stable government by giving Commons a regular and reasonably long life of its own; thus reducing its dependency on the King, for by interpretation it came to mean that seven years should be the normal life of Commons. The use of placemen provided the King with a

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needed bridge to Commons. Without this, coöperation between King and Commons could hardly have existed. These two conventions were much discussed in Commons and as this was the heyday of the pampleteers they were as vocal as Commons itself in supporting or condemning them. There are copious quotations from these; however, rarely are exact references given. The relationship of ministers and Commons is treated primarily as an extension of the relationship between King and Commons. To the author the most significant practice in this period is the fact that there was no time connection between the life of ministers and the life of Commons. This preserved the theoretical independence of both King and Commons. The pragmatic character of the Constitution is exemplified in cabinet development. It was because the Commons and the King's ministers were not bound together by the electorate that the balance of King and Commons dominated the whole period between 1660 and 1832. This balance was not upset by the growth of one power at the expense of the other but by the rise of a freer and more independent electorate begun by the great Reform Bill of 1832.

The study is almost exclusively constitutional. The lack of any political, social, religious or economic history will limit the interest of this well-written book to specialists in the constitutional field.

REGINALD E. RABB

THE CITY COLLEGE, NEW YORK

Goldwin Smith: Victorian Liberal. By ELISABETH WALLACE. Toronto, The University of Toronto Press, 1957.—xii, 297 pp. $5.00.

Professor Elisabeth Wallace of the University of Toronto has written an excellent biography of a nineteenth-century publicist whose writings and unpopular ideas are familiar to students of imperial history and politics. The excellence is due in part to the care with which Miss Wallace has studied the sources at Cornell, at Toronto, and in other places, and in part to the clear and readable style in which she writes. But it is even more due to the insight she has displayed in appraising Goldwin Smith's career. She has treated her subject sympathetically yet without overrating his importance or minimizing his faults.

It is easy enough to see where Goldwin Smith failed. Although he was Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford for a few years and later a professor of history at Cornell, for a short time, he wrote no distinguished history. For most of his long life

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(1823–1910) he was a prolific journalist. During the last forty years of it he lived in Toronto. One of his great ambitions was to interpret Canada to the outside world. He failed in this ambition because he never understood the French-Canadian community nor grasped that a growing sense of nationality was the most important fact about Canada as a whole. His chief recommendation for Canada's future was union with the United States, a proposal that demonstrated almost pathological obtuseness regarding the real sentiments of the Canadian people. It is no wonder that Dicey said that Goldwin Smith lacked sound judgment or that Bryce complained about his lack of insight into the springs of politics.

Miss Wallace shows that Goldwin Smith was not, however, a man without insight or influence. He played a part in educational reform in England and America. He raised the level of Canadian journalism and letters. Long before others, he saw how important it was for the future of the world that the British and American peoples had a common inheritance in language, institutions and ideas; and he was an early (perhaps the earliest) advocate of the alliance between the United States and the Commonwealth which is today the bulwark of the Western world.

Yet his achievements never equaled the promise of his great abilities. Therein lies the puzzle of his career. Miss Wallace emphasizes his faults of temperament. He was too much the mentor, she says, too angry, too destructive in his criticism. He was too much given to controversy. And he wrote too much and too easily.

But most of all he suffered from being a Victorian liberal who lived after his time and in the wrong places. His ideas were formed early and they were the ideas of early nineteenth-century radicalism. Thereafter he watched the rise of mass democracy with mixed acceptance and apprehension. After 1868 he lived in the United States and Canada. He was shocked at the cowardice and corruption that were so prevalent in the politics of North America. When he looked back across the Atlantic also, he was worried by the strength of the trend to social democracy even if he did approve of some measures of social reform and talked of himself as a good Labor man. As Miss Wallace puts it, he "oscillated between faith in and despair of democracy." He was, in short, a true representative of Victorian liberalism as the subtitle to this able book indicates.

T. P. PEARDON

BARNARD COLLEGE

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Democracy in England. By DIANA SPEARMAN. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1957.—xviii, 238 pp. $6.00.

Mrs. Spearman writes from the standpoint of an intellectual Conservative. She is distressed by the prevailing misunderstanding of and dangers in democracy. She seeks to remove the misconceptions and show how to avoid the dangers. To this end she gives a historical review of English government since the eighteenth century, preceded by general discussion of its nature and followed by some remarks on its future.

This essay is not itself a contribution to original research but it is based on recent research. To her use of that research, Mrs. Spearman brings acuteness of observation and a gift for succinct exposition. She sees events in a perspective very different from that of the Whig interpretation of history. She is careful to avoid the fallacy of assuming that words and ideas (e.g., revolution) had the same meaning in the past as they do today. In her view the Old Constitution of the eighteenth century was something better than "an engine of class domination." Indeed, she argues, "something approaching equality of opportunity" existed under it. Lack of character, not lack of birth, kept Burke out of Rockingham's Cabinet. "The awe-inspiring Eldon was the son of a coal merchant." She is justly critical of Liberal misjudging of the temper of the working class in the nineteenth century; and perhaps takes pleasure in stating that democracy and reform may have closed more doors of opportunity to workers than they opened. Equally worthy of reflection is her remark that the increase of governmental power over individuals and local authorities has been accompanied by a decline in power over organized groups.

It is Mrs. Spearman's conclusion that the rule of mere numbers has now become the chief characteristic of British democracy. In the reviewer's view, she fails to give attention to the realities of the democratic process, that ceaseless flow of discussion inside and outside Parliament, that give-and-take between Government and Opposition, between leaders and followers, between groups and between individuals by which the "will of the majority" is arrived at on any specific question. More attention, too, ought to have been given to the way in which majority rule is qualified by other factors, such as the conventional rights of minorities.

In a compact and not always lucid concluding chapter, Mrs. Spearman discusses the weaknesses and prospects of democracy. She thinks that it is too obsessed with equality, that it has overloaded government with too many tasks, that it has failed to get efficient administration, and that it has neglected those of its citizens, like the professional middle class, who are unorganized.

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She finds its record especially open to criticism in imperial and foreign affairs; and predicts that there may be a great revulsion against democracy when people come to realize how far British power has declined under its rule.

The great problem in Mrs. Spearman's view is how to make the constitution more balanced so as to prevent the rule of an omnipotent majority. She believes that it is not politically possible to introduce into Britain the American system of constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights. Proportional Representation she rejects because it possesses as many bad as good features. She argues, finally, for a stronger Second Chamber, preferably a reformed House of Lords. Since the Labor party is so opposed to a stronger Second Chamber, Mrs. Spearman seems to pin her hopes on one of the least likely to be adopted of all proposed changes in English government. To recommend it makes a lame conclusion to a book that is otherwise penetrating and readable.

T. P. PEARDON

BARNARD COLLEGE

The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire. By M. ROSTOVTZEFF. Second Edition revised by P. M. Fraser. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, New York, Oxford University Press, 1957.—2 Vols. xxxi, x, 847 pp. 80 plates. £8. 8*s*.; $26.90.

First published in 1926 this great work has not been reviewed in this QUARTERLY. Of course, the book now needs no recommendation. It has become a classic, known, at least by name, to every student of political science. But it is worth while to understand the reasons for Rostovtzeff's success.

The impact of his book is twofold. His encyclopedic notes, now conveniently bound apart, collect and elucidate an immense amount of evidence. Since 1926 these 210 pages of densely printed notes form the lasting basis of any special investigation in the field. It is a pity that the revision has been limited to changes introduced by the author himself in the Italian translation of the work, published in 1933. At least the bibliography should have been brought up to date. It is strange that a "second" and "revised" edition of a scholarly book, published in 1957, has hardly any reference to anything published after 1933. Thus, an indispensable tool of study is, almost perversely, outdated.

The text, of course, is not and should not be changed. Certainly, Rostovtzeff here offers a synthesis of evidence, including archaeological data. Here, he was a pacemaker. An eminent historian of Rome has recently recorded the surprise caused in 1926

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by Rostovtzeff's mastery in writing history with the help of archaeology. (See A. Momigliano, in *History*, vol. XLII, 1958, p. 9.)

But beyond these professional accomplishments, the impact of Rostovtzeff's text is due to the fact that this is a book *à la thèse*. Like Gibbon or Fustel de Coulanges or Mommsen, Rostovtzeff writes to prove some general ideas. He believes that the Roman Empire and its civilization were based on the urban middle class. But, though exploiting the toilers, this *bourgeoisie* became more and more unwilling to open its ranks to the lower classes. The society became divided into the governing minority and the masses. Their antagonism took the form of a struggle between the country and the cities. In other words, Rostovtzeff poses the problem of social mobility which is of such importance in the sociology of today. Note that his answer agrees with the liberal tradition of Athenian, or, if you prefer, Jacksonian, democracy. Yet, at the same time, he stresses the fact that the high civilization of the Empire remained foreign to the masses and was destroyed by them in their onslaught on the cities and the *bourgeosie*. Concluding the book, he asks whether it is possible to extend a higher civilization to masses without "diluting its quality to the vanishing point". Here is the voice of Platonic tradition, and it sounds strangely up-to-date. Newspapers daily complain that in our mass education quality goes by the boards. A third general idea in the book is that the higher industrial and agricultural arts of Italy in course of time were transplanted into the provinces. Thus, for instance, pottery made in France practically killed the Italian import. It is the eternal problem of industrialization of undeveloped countries.

Rostovtzeff did not look for "modern" problems in ancient Rome. He was averse to anachronistic modernization of history. He simply tried to interpret the evidence historically—and yet his book could be debated in the newspapers of today if we still had newspapers of the same intellectual quality as those of old which printed *The Federalist*. To put it otherwise: the secret of Rostovtzeff's book is that it compels the reader to think.

ELIAS J. BICKERMAN
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The Crisis of the Old Order, 1919–1933. By ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957.—xiv, 557 pp. $6.00.

The Crisis of the Old Order, the first of Professor Schlesinger's four volumes on "The Age of Roosevelt", is written with the same verve, the same slashing vigor, that made his Pulitzer-Prize-

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winning *The Age of Jackson* so memorable. Schlesinger has few peers as a writer of political narrative. He writes with a fine eye for the telling episode, for the colorful incident, and many of his sketches of the statesmen of the period are marvellously well done.

He is at his very best in his superb portrait of Franklin Roosevelt. He writes:

> Roosevelt's apparent belief that every story had a happy ending gave him the aspect of a grown-up Boy Scout. He seemed, said Milton MacKaye, all light and no shadow, all bright hope and no black despair. Some found him smug, bland and superficial, without tension and without tragedy. Yet others, who knew him better, confessed a deeper bafflement. The public face, all grin and gusto, had been carefully cultivated from the first years at Groton and Harvard; illness had made it second nature. But behind the cordiality and exuberance there remained an impassable reserve which many reconnoitered but none could penetrate. The relentless buoyancy was less an impulse of the soul than a mask of cheer to the world, in part spontaneous enough, but more a defense against pity without and discouragement within. . . . Underneath there remained the other man—tougher than the public man, harder, more ambitious, more calculating, more petty, more puckish, more selfish, more malicious, more profound, more complex, more interesting. . . . He enjoyed people, but rarely gave himself to them. . . . Noncommitment . . . gave him the inner independence which could free him for idealism as well as cynicism—and it freed him for both. Still, if noncommitment meant public liberation, it meant private sadness. It condemned him to a final loneliness and melancholy, from which he recoiled in others but which he accepted in himself with serenity.

There are countless other passages almost as good, and one marvels at the apparent effortlessness with which Schlesinger writes, his mastery of the material, and the great scope of this ambitious project. Yet, for all of this, one puts down the book with a sense of disappointment. Given Schlesinger's talent and his dedicated research, the book is neither as fresh nor as penetrating as one might have expected. Much of the difficulty lies in the fact that Schlesinger is the captive of a theological interpretation of history which views America as swaying between two traditions—one liberal, one conservative. In attempting to synthesize long stretches of history, this kind of thesis may be useful, but even Parrington, who employed it most successfully, obscured as much as he illuminated. When it is applied to a brief period, the results are much more unfortunate.

Not only does Schlesinger speak for the "liberal" viewpoint, but he sees the liberal tradition as embodied in the institution of the Democratic party. An acute political critic, Schlesinger is

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aware of the party's faults, and at times he points them out. But whenever a Democrat is first introduced in this book, it is as an idealist and an advocate of social justice. He introduces Cordell Hull and Sam Rayburn as members of the "radical wing" of the Southern Democrats, who believed that the Wilson administration had "a positive obligation to the poor." The dull Dan Roper is presented as an idealistic Wilsonian, protesting against the "money madness" of the 1920's. In contrast to the selfish, materialistic Republicans, the Democrats are portrayed as votaries of idealism and morality. "From the start of the decade," Schlesinger writes, "there had been another view of the New Era." "The old Wilsonians" like Franklin K. Lane "watched the New Era in indignation and contempt. They were men who had known the exaltation of idealism." By 1927, Schlesinger argues, the Democrats had become the focus for a new crusade for liberalism, behind Al Smith, the spokesman for social justice, public power and civil liberties.

This is a tortured reading both of the New Freedom and of the political history of the 1920's. In the post-war years, "old Wilsonians" like Tumulty and Baker were working for the private utilities; Franklin Roosevelt was caught up in the speculative fever; and the Davis campaign of 1924 and the Smith campaign of 1928 were carefully designed to win over business interests. Lane himself was linked to Doheny and the oil men and the rape of our natural resources. There were great discontinuities between the New Freedom and the New Deal, as Schlesinger elsewhere recognizes, and this kind of interpretation serves only to blur them.

Since Schlesinger sees the period as a conflict of good (liberal, Democratic) men against bad (conservative, Republican) men, he leaves the reader with little sense of the men of the times as prisoners of historical forces or a particular historical situation. While he is correct in censuring the leaders of the period, his censure is in no way tempered by recognition that these men were expressing the views of their age, views which Democrats and Republicans shared, and that they were mortal men working within human limits. Elsewhere, Schlesinger has written movingly of the tragic and the ironic in history. In this work, he has presented a morality play, in which compassion is too often absent. For an avowed Niebuhrian, he is curiously Manichean.

This liberal-Democratic party synthesis has another and more serious weakness. It imagines culture and society to be almost wholly political, and it views history as a battleground for liberal activists arrayed against the moguls of concentrated financial power. Men like Thoreau, who do not fit the Procrustean bed,

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are treated unsympathetically, or not at all. If literary figures are discussed, they are examined chiefly for their "political" importance. In this book, many of the most important developments of the times—the thrust of ethnic groups, nativism, urban-rural tensions, the revolution in morals, the writings of "non-political" men like Eliot and Faulkner—are largely ignored, although they would help explain both the "crisis of the old order" (which was not narrowly political) and the character of the New Deal.

It is doubly unfortunate that Schlesinger has chosen to politicalize American culture, for he is a historian exceptionally attuned to nonpolitical currents in American society. It is precisely because he is such a gifted historian that it is important to explore the shortcomings of this first volume in some detail. If, in his forthcoming volumes, Schlesinger will permit himself to be disciplined by his material, instead of committing himself to an inhibiting thesis, "The Age of Roosevelt" will be one of the benchmarks of American historical writing in this century.

WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Labor and the New Deal. Edited by MILTON DERBER and EDWIN YOUNG. Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1958. —xi, 393 pp. $6.00.

This remarkably comprehensive survey of labor during the New Deal is proof of the vitality of the school of labor historians that John R. Commons founded at the University of Wisconsin more than a half a century ago. All of the contributors have been associated either with the Department of Economics there, or with the intellectually allied Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations at the University of Illinois.

Within the scope of 370 pages, the authors present ten essays on a broad variety of problems affecting labor during the New Deal, and in most instances demonstrate how the effects of the New Deal have persisted or been modified since. The essays and their authors are: "Growth and Expansion" by Milton Derber; "The Split in the Labor Movement" by Edwin Young; "The Impact of the Political Left" by Bernard Karsh; "The Significance of the Wagner Act" by R. W. Fleming; "New Deal Sensitivity to Labor Interests" by Murray Edelman; "Organized Labor and Protective Labor Legislation" by Elizabeth Brandeis; "Organized Labor and Social Security" by Edwin E. Witte; "Industrial Management's Policies Toward Unionism" by Richard C. Wilcock; "Collective Bargaining Developments" by Doris E.

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Pullman and L. Reed Tripp; and "Labor and the New Deal in Historical Perspective" by Selig Perlman.

Because of the space limitations, not a great deal of the contents or interpretation in these essays will appear new to specialists. The most notable contribution of the authors is in bringing together in available form clear, authoritative surveys of complex problems. Their interpretation, growing largely out of their training in the approach of Commons and Perlman, helps unify the essays into a cohesive whole. Perlman in his teaching and writing has always contrasted the realistic, even pragmatic, nature of the job-conscious American labor movement with the more doctrinaire theoretical approach of European movements. There has, of course, been much pragmatism in the approach of Commons, Perlman, and their students and followers, and it is remarkably effective in explaining the complex evolution of organized labor since the beginning of the New Deal.

In Perlman's brief essay is a theoretical framework which one can detect running through most of the other essays. In part they seem to indicate this:

The older union leaders, concentrating upon job control, had shown little interest in most social welfare legislation, and sought little more than government noninterference in the collective bargaining process. They had little to do with the social welfare or labor legislation of the early New Deal. For that matter, they gained relatively little from the collective bargaining provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act. But it aroused the expectations of many workers, and thus helped prepare the way for the Wagner Act. Then came the explosive rise of the C.I.O. and its race against the reinvigorated A.F.L. to organize the mass-production industries. The war and the prosperity years since have brought little more than a reinforcement of unionism in those areas first organized during the New Deal. Union leaders changed. (Just how is not entirely clear; an essay on the leaders, their backgrounds and attitudes would have been an excellent addition to this collection.) Leaders for some years after the New Deal favored welfare legislation of direct aid to the union members (like unemployment insurance) or which would benefit nonunion workers (like raises in the minimum wage). Many employers more readily accepted unions' demands for comprehensive welfare programs. By the 1950's, as leaders were gaining many of the welfare ends through collective bargaining, their interest in legislation seemed likely to wane. One labor leader remarked privately: "The benefits workers get under the [collectively bargained] health and welfare plans are so much greater than those we have dared to include in health insurance bills that

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it has become an anomaly for us to continue to favor compulsory health insurance [legislation]." Even as in the age of Gompers, job consciousness seemed the primary consideration.

FRANK FREIDEL

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

The Heretic: The Life and Times of Josip Broz-Tito. By SIR FITZROY MACLEAN. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1957.—xii, 436 pp. $5.95.

Titoism: Pattern for International Communism. By CHARLES P. MCVICKER. New York, St Martin's Press; London, Macmillan & Co Ltd, 1957.—xx, 332 pp. $6.00.

The *Heretic* is a smooth-flowing account of Tito's life and the times and events that saw his rise to power. For the most part it is based on three books, two by Western admirers of Tito and one by his official biographer. Here and there Maclean relies on his wartime experiences as Churchill's emissary with Tito's Partisans. Unfortunately, there is little that is new in this largely romantic book, which does not contribute much to an understanding of Yugoslavia. On the contrary, it is sometimes misleading, not so much because of a lack of facts, I believe, as of the author's inability (or failure) to put them together and to draw the conclusions to which they point.

In the case of Tito's successful struggle against Mihailovich, for example, Sir Fitzroy's sympathies are with Tito. He asserts that Mihailovich forfeited Allied support "by his caution and inactivity." Yet, elsewhere he confirms that the British had advised Mihailovich "to lie low in the hope of better times ahead, and husband his resources." Also, he admits that Mihailovich was right when he foretold the terrible Nazi reprisals that would be visited upon the civilian population as a result of guerrilla activities. Moreover, he confirms that Tito's conditions for collaboration with Mihailovich's Chetniks "would have facilitated Communist infiltration of his forces." Mihailovich stands condemned for perceiving Communist plans and being unwilling to facilitate their realization!

On occasion, Sir Fitzroy cites books that are basically pro-Mihailovich, but only those passages that are unfavorable to the Chetniks. Nevertheless, he does not let his government off easy, either: "With the help of their own propaganda, the British had in their imagination built up Mihailovich into something he never seriously claimed to be. They were now dropping him because he had failed to live up to their expectations." And he reveals a good deal about Communist unscrupulousness (e.g., joining the Catholic church, posing as representatives of the

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International Red Cross, and killing German General von Lohr after he had surrendered). Mihailovich simply lacked the ruthless determination of his rival.

The question of how much fighting was done against the Germans by Tito's Partisans must await a more serious and scholarly effort. But a careful reading of Maclean's account does not reveal that the Partisans did much except to fight rear-guard actions to avoid annihilation by Nazi punitive expeditions.

Sir Fitzroy is at his literary best in his vivid portrayals of the Mihailovich and Stepinac trials and in his moving account of the Ustashi massacres of the Serbian population in wartime Croatia.

The major aim of McVicker's book is to present a picture of Yugoslavia's present political, social and economic system, with particular emphasis on the so-called reforms of recent years, and to suggest that perhaps this system was setting a pattern for other Communist states to follow. The author's major contribution is to be found in his orderly and lucid description of the various laws and decrees which have allegedly altered the Yugoslav system. Without minimizing this and other contributions of this book, it has, it seems to me, three basic faults. First of all, before getting down to his principal task, the author spends too much time going over the historical developments of earlier years, a task which has been done better by others and with far fewer factual errors. His treatment of Tito's earlier agricultural collectivization policies and programs, for example, does not square with the facts. The same can be said of his assertions concerning the Red Army's rôle in the liberation of Belgrade, to mention but another example. Secondly, there are an annoying number of minor factual errors (incorrect citation of authors' names, page references, etc.). Finally, and more importantly, the author seems to experience some difficulty in interpreting his facts. In a number of places, he seems confident that Tito's Yugoslavia is moving toward democracy, and this is apparently what he would like to see happen. Despite this seeming wish, however, here and there he sees evidence that this is not really going to happen, or at least that it is not happening *now*. This seems to lead to a kind of ambivalence, and on occasion it is difficult to avoid the unhappy impression that the author is reluctant to make conclusions to which his facts point.

If McVicker had confined his efforts to a more rigorous and thorough analysis of Yugoslav developments since 1953, he would have made, in the opinion of this reviewer at least, a more significant contribution to our understanding of the Titoist experiment.

ALEX N. DRAGNICH

VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

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Poland. Edited by OSCAR HALECKI.—xviii, 601 pp. $10.00.

Czechoslovakia. Edited by VRATISLAV BUSEK and NICOLAS SPULBER.—xvii, 520 pp. $10.00.

Hungary. Edited by ERNEST C. HELMREICH.—xiv, 466 pp. $8.50.

The three volumes are in the Mid-European Studies Center Series: East-Central Europe Under the Communists. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1957.

The Mid-European Studies Center, not unlike its parent organization, the Free Europe Committee, has often been the subject of criticism and controversy since its foundation in 1950. Founded with the intention to assist exiled scholars from Communist lands of East-Central Europe, the Center has been criticized for employing exiles with inadequate scholarly competence. Much of its output, especially its series of mimeographed studies, was dubbed as an outpour of papers that nobody reads. On the whole, however, under more or less competent direction, and with a staff of collaborators whose talents ranged from poor to excellent, the Center performed a creditable job. Moreover, with the publication of its seven-volume series, entitled "East-Central Europe Under the Communists", the Center has certainly permanently inscribed its name in the field of research on East-Central Europe. It is to be hoped, therefore, that this ambitious series will not be the swan song of this useful research institute; for it would be a pity if the Center, under the current pressure of economy measures, should cease to exist.

The series of which the three volumes under review form a part was conceived in 1954 by Stetson S. Holmes, then Director of the Center, Jacob B. Hoptner, then Director of the Center's Research, Stephen Fischer-Galati, then a staff member, and it was completed in 1956 under a new director, Robert F. Byrnes, who has since returned to his earlier teaching post at Indiana University. Professor Byrnes did a praiseworthy job as general editor in supervising the whole series, while the editors of the individual volumes were no less successful in assembling the contributions of so many authors into coherent, smooth and readable units with a minimum of repetition and conflict, which is always a remarkable achievement in a collective work.

The three volumes under review deal with those three countries whose historical ties with the West had been the strongest among the seven Communist countries covered in the series. The status of these three, however, as members of the Soviet colonial empire is very different today. Czechoslovakia is a model satellite, Hun-

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gary a martyred nation, while Poland has a Communist régime which, for the time being, represents a unique example of self-liberation within the Soviet orbit of power. These sharp differences are not brought into focus in the uniformly organized three volumes. Neither the general nor the individual editors nor their co-authors could forsee, of course, the momentous events in Poland and Hungary which took place in the fall of 1956 when the volumes were already completed. Only short summaries could be added to cover the Polish and Hungarian revolutions, the very developments which naturally are of the greatest importance in the history of these two countries under Communist rule.

What could be said by way of criticism of the volumes on Poland and Hungary is, however, that their authors, although doing their pieces during the period of so-called "liberalization" which followed Stalin's death in 1953, failed to prepare the scene for the great eruptions of the fall of 1956. There is much said, to be sure, about discontent, exploitation and oppression. Nevertheless, the forces which produced these eruptions are dealt with rather perfunctorily—mainly, it seems, because the struggle for freedom from within was looked upon by most of the authors with politically colored suspicion going well beyond the necessary dose of scholarly skepticism. As a result, even simple facts of change are often blurred and presented without sufficient emphasis. Thus, for instance, in the volume on Hungary no adequate treatment can be found of the very important "new course" inaugurated by Imre Nagy's ministry in the summer of 1953.

It should be added, however, that political bias was not necessarily the principal cause of what seems to this reviewer as lack of objectivity. The topical organization itself of the volumes is such that it does not lend itself to bringing into proper focus the changes according to periods. Whenever possible, each topic is presented in historical perspective—as a result, quite a number of chapters begin in the Middle Ages. One wonders whether this pedantic stress on historical continuity was necessary, and whether a more basic chronological division into pre- and post-Communist parts would not have been more suitable. These volumes, after all, are supposed to furnish information primarily on East-Central Europe under Communist rule.

Actually, what these books are furnishing is a series of comprehensive studies on many subjects in Communist Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary—the land, the people, the constitutional system, politics and political organization, the government, national security, national income and its distribution, labor, propaganda, agriculture, horticulture, husbandry, forestry and fishing, mining and quarrying, industry and utilities, consumer goods,

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trade, banking and finance, transportation and communication system, education, religion, literature, drama, art and music, health, science and public welfare—with background information preferably reaching back to the beginnings of each nation's history. Furthermore, while the authors' sense of criticism is very sharp concerning the situation under Communist rule, which is all very proper, they are prone to take a somewhat benevolent attitude toward the past, which here and there amounts to an almost uncritical assessment of certain bygone periods.

Thus, in the Polish volume, the favorable comparison drawn between "personal freedoms" in Poland and other countries of East-Central Europe during the inter-war period (p. 75) does not seem to correspond with generally known facts. The book on Czechoslovakia chose to apply the Czech historical interpretation which may well offend even a moderate Slovak nationalist, not to speak of a Hungarian who may wonder why statements repeating the outworn propaganda clichés about thousand years of Slovakia's "subjugation" to Hungarian rule (pp. 179–180) had to be included in a work of scholarly character. In the Hungarian study, the editor (incidentally, alone among the editors of the three volumes not related by birth to his subject) must have had a hard time to make his collaborators, evidently of varied political views, agree on some uniform criticism of Hungary's pre-Communist past. He achieved this goal quite well; nevertheless, one of his anonymous co-workers followed the familiar conservative interpretation of the events after World War I by referring to Count Mihály Károlyi's democratic and Béla Kun's Communist régimes as "two radical governments", after which, by the "election" of Admiral Horthy as Regent, the nation "returned to its thousand-year-old constitution" (p. 76).

In general, these volumes do not rank very high as works of interpretation and analysis. This fact is recognized by the general editor with commendable candor in his foreword to each book, except the one on Poland (a deletion with which this reviewer cannot quite concur), by saying that "each volume contains quantities of useful information, but lacks the kind of analysis one would find in studies of areas where American research has had a longer and richer tradition" (p. vi). Indeed, these books offer an amazing quantity of useful information on East-Central Europe under Communist rule. The series is an indispensable reference work for scholars as well as for anyone interested in the problems of the Communist half of Europe.

STEPHEN BORSODY

CHATHAM COLLEGE

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Imre Nagy on Communism: In Defense of the New Course. New York, FREDERICK A. PRAEGER, 1957.—xlvi, 306 pp. $5.50.

Under the most favorable circumstances, the student of East European affairs has always been confronted with difficulties in securing adequate and reliable data. With the advent of Communist régimes in this area and the injection of the inherent problems of research on the history of communism, the difficulties have become compounded. The appearance, therefore, of a publication purporting to be "the complete text" of a secret "dissertation" written by former Hungarian Premier Imre Nagy, defending his term in office from 1953 to 1955 and circulated clandestinely among his followers after his fall from power, should be greeted with anticipation, but also with caution. For, although the publisher of the book explains in his prefatory note that a copy of Nagy's essay was smuggled out of Hungary during the spring of 1957, he fails to indicate in any way how this manuscript came into his own hands or how he can be so certain that it is "unquestionably authentic".

Some weight is lent to the publisher's assertion by the fact that so astute a scholar as Hugh Seton-Watson apparently accepts the manuscript as genuine, for he has written a useful introduction to the book. And yet the reader must pause to wonder why the name of the translator of the original document was not given and how accurate the translation actually is. For there are many typographical errors, errors in spelling and syntax, and curious terms such as "Lefticism" and "voluntaryism" to be found in the pages of this book.

Once these discrepancies can be discounted, however, Nagy's essay in defense of his acts as premier during the period of the "New Course" following Stalin's death in 1953 is of considerable interest and importance. Apart from the light it sheds on events behind the scenes in Hungary during the last five years, and particularly during the past eighteen months, Nagy's views provide valuable insight into the thought and attitudes underlying the general phenomenon of "national communism" in Eastern Europe. For Nagy's dissertation goes far beyond a simple apologia for his policies as head of the Hungarian government from 1953 to 1955. In his efforts to justify and rationalize his reversal of the Stalinist policies of his arch rival, Mátyás Rákosi, Nagy in effect reformulated and developed further a distinctive and persistent strain of communist theory and practice that has struggled for years and still struggles today in the satellite countries for coexistence with the Stalinist brand of Marxism. Essentially, Nagy rejected the practice of Soviet tutelage over the "People's

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Democracies" begun by Stalin and supported by Rákosi before 1953 and after 1955, and he came out boldly (considering that he wrote his work before Khrushchev's attack on Stalinism at the Twentieth Congress of the Russian Communist party) for an independent path of "socialist" development for Hungary and the other satellite states. Spelling out in detail the policies he attempted to follow, Nagy called for independence in foreign relations, liberalization of the political régime both within the Hungarian Communist party and with respect to relations between the party and the masses, and gradual, organic development toward "socialism" rather than rapid, enforced industrialization and collectivization.

These policies and the rationalizations underlying them are not, by any means, unprecedented in the Communist world, for they represent something of a cross between Titoism and Bukharinism, with which the world is already familiar. However, rarely is the non-Communist afforded such an intimate glimpse into the minds of the Communist leaders in Eastern Europe, or at least one group of them, and into the bitter life-and-death struggles taking place behind the scenes over competing ideas and aspirations, for we now know, as was not known when Nagy's essay was published, that he paid with his life for his ideas.

Nagy's book is important for yet another reason. Notwithstanding his repudiation of much that has come to be known as Stalinism, his dissertation should dispel any illusions, so hopefully and misguidedly harbored in the West today, that national communism represents a wholesale rejection of Soviet communism or that it provides some sort of half-way house between Western social democracy and Soviet totalitarianism. For, however much Nagy took Stalinist theory and practice to task in many respects, he emerged at the end of the book no less a dedicated revolutionary in the Leninist tradition than those against whom his polemics were directed. If he found fault with the policies and actions of the Stalinists in Hungary and in the Soviet Union, his disagreements with them were essentially differences of degree rather than kind. For him the basic tenets of "Marxism-Leninism" remained valid and incontrovertible. Their application in specific instances might be subject to dispute, but never their timeless validity.

SIDNEY HEITMAN

COLORADO STATE UNIVERSITY

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Defense of the Middle East: Problems of American Policy. By JOHN C. CAMPBELL. New York, Harper & Brothers for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1958.—xiv, 392 pp. $5.00.

This is an eminently judicious and comprehensive appraisal of the manifold problems which the contemporary Middle East presents not merely to American policy, but to the West in general. Frequent in it are the calls for "a bold and firm American policy", and there is an admission that "in the past the United States has shown no remarkable capacity for success in such a task" (pp. 304, 359). "Playing a lone hand and holding the British and French at arm's length . . . is not a permanent basis for policy; it could be a formula for losing the West without saving the Middle East" (p. 344).

Dr. Campbell directs a clear rebuke at "enthusiasts for winning new Middle Eastern friends at the cost of losing old European allies" (p. 334) and, to turn from the general to the particular, he shows a healthy realization that

> the Arab states have made more noise and caused more trouble, but in the total balance they are probably of less importance than Turkey and Iran . . . [to whom] everything possible should be done to give strength and confidence. . . . At the moment Baghdad cannot displace Cairo as a center of attraction, but it should be given every opportunity to show all Arabs the real rewards of the wise use of natural wealth combined with a practical cooperation with the West, especially as the hollowness of leadership of the demagogic type becomes ever more apparent (pp. 349-50).

Down to the Iraqi revolution of July 14, this could not have been better put; and there is even a rare acknowledgement of the merits of the British protectorates in the coastlands of eastern and southern Arabia (pp. 283–86).

Now and again, however, the author relapses into one of those (dare a British reviewer say it?) American pseudo-democratic generalizations which fail to define their terms adequately: "the United States can successfully defend the Middle East against Soviet imperialism only if it can find a basis of common interest and common understanding with the peoples of the Middle East" (p. 357). Admirable; but who are "the peoples" in this context? What have the illiterate or barely literate millions of the Middle East to do, except passively, with international policy today? In the Arab world particularly, the United States or any other government has to deal, not with "the people", but with a relative handful of men who in each country exercise a more-or-less authoritarian control, directing or coercing the largely passive and pliable "public opinion" of the masses toward the secular

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qibla of Arab Unity, but also to the preservation of their own authority. The nationalism of these ruling groups is doubtless sincere, but with it goes a healthy respect for power (hence the present prestige of the USSR, almost wholly divorced from Marxist ideology) and nothing but contempt for the weakness which is the only explanation such men, innocent of liberal notions, can find for successive Western concessions (usually at some third party's expense) to the will-o'-the-wisp of " common interest and understanding ".

Dr. Campbell's preface is dated December 1957, when United States policy had again betrayed uncertainty in its fumbling of the vamped-up Syrian " war-scare " (pp. 196 and 348 n.). This review is written under the shadow of the Lebanese civil war which, on the more restricted Levantine stage, is just as much an international power contest as the Spanish civil war of twenty years ago. Mr. Dulles' press interview of June 10, 1958 seemed to indicate a departure from " the policy of the fence " (as Lord Salisbury had called it a month earlier); and not before time, for, as a diplomat was reported to have asked the United Nations correspondent of the *Christian Science Monitor* on May 23, " If Washington cannot save Chamoun and Charles Malik, who will dare to side with the United States? "

GEORGE KIRK

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Party Politics in India: The Development of a Multi-Party System. By MYRON WEINER. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957.—xiii, 319 pp. $5.00.

In the study of the new nations of Asia and Africa, political scientists have an unusual opportunity to witness the formative stages of political systems and to investigate the factors which give initial shape to governmental institutions, political parties, voting behavior, interest-group organization, and other aspects of the systems. The opportunity may well be greatest in the Republic of India, which is probably the most accessible as well as the most important of these countries, and which is of special interest because of the attempt to implant British-style parliamentary institutions in a distinctive setting. Professor Weiner, who conducted his research under the auspices of the Center of International Studies at Princeton University and who now teaches in the South Asia program at the University of Chicago, has seized this opportunity vigorously for an investigation of certain elements of India's party system.

Because of the extraordinary diversity of the Indian national

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movement before 1947, observers commonly anticipated a grievous fragmentation of political forces following the attainment of independence. The fear of centrifugal tendencies, since that time, has frequently been a decisive influence on India's leaders. In part through conscious effort and in part through fortuitous circumstances, the Indian National Congress has remained fairly intact in its transformation from an anti-imperialist movement to a governing party. However, a wide variety of political groups formerly within the Congress or at its periphery have gone into opposition, and it is with the formation of some of these opposition parties that Mr. Weiner is concerned. His method is to select case studies involving splits and mergers by which certain parties came into existence, and to investigate the internal factors influencing these events. The first case study covers the formation of the Socialist party and the Kisan Mazdoor Praja party, both of which split from the Congress, and their subsequent merger into the Praja Socialist party. The second study considers the proliferation of tiny Marxist parties based in Bengal State. The third covers splits and attempted mergers among communal parties: the Hindu Mahasabha, Jan Sangh, and Ram Rajya Parishad. These intricate party histories are traced in rich and fascinating detail, with emphasis upon the attitudes of leaders and rank-and-file members.

The richness of Mr. Weiner's narrative is traceable in large part to his extensive use of interviews, and his book is a valuable demonstration of the utility of this research technique. It should be remarked, however, that data procured from participants in the events under consideration seem on occasion to be used uncritically; the reader may wish for more explanatory comment by the author, either in footnotes or in an appendix. In any event, an appendix in which the author described and evaluated his experience with this technique would have been welcome.

In his closing chapters Mr. Weiner turns to a consideration of some of the external factors influencing party formation in India. He deals briefly with the effects of the electoral system (and, indirectly, the parliamentary order), the traditional social order, and the Indian ideological heritage. In this section of the book there is an abundance of provocative ideas, but these external factors are treated superficially and impressionistically.

Mr. Weiner's method involves several risks. One is a tendency to overemphasize internal causes in party behavior. He concludes that internal factors are more important, without having given equal attention to external factors. He seems, for example, to attach too little significance to the effects of the electoral system; it has not played, he says, "any major role" in the forma-

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tion of the Indian party system (p. 229). Yet he has earlier attributed mergers among opposition parties primarily to the calculation of electoral advantage on the part of realistic leaders who are committed to the parliamentary order.

Another more general risk is the possibility of generalizing from unrepresentative cases. The parties which Mr. Weiner has selected are, with the exception of the Praja Socialist party, decidedly minor parties; moreover, it may be argued that they represent political and social forces which will decline with the further maturation of Indian society. Conclusions drawn from the behavior of these parties can be projected to the party system as a whole, or into the future, only with the greatest caution. They should be correlated with the results of equally intensive studies of the Congress and Communist parties.

But if these risks are kept in mind, Mr. Weiner's book remains an exceedingly effective incursion into the realities of Indian politics. His conclusions should challenge and contribute to further study of political systems in underdeveloped countries.

GENE D. OVERSTREET

SWARTHMORE COLLEGE

The Smaller Dragon: A Political History of Vietnam. By JOSEPH BUTTINGER. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1958.—535 pp. $6.00.

Mr. Buttinger started to write a book about modern Vietnam, where he spent some time as representative of the International Rescue Committee. He realized that present events cannot be understood without some knowledge of the past. In his search, he found that no general history of Vietnam existed in the English language. In large measure he has filled that gap, but *The Smaller Dragon* still leaves much to be desired.

It would be unfair not to mention that Mr. Buttinger does not hesitate to disclose many of his own shortcomings, least of which seems to be that he is not a professional historian, for his material is well organized and written with lucidity. But he does not seem to realize the seriousness of some of his other shortcomings. We should perhaps forgive him his ignorance of Chinese and Vietnamese if he were aware of the limitations this puts on the value of his work; yet he assures us (p. 13) that "Nothing of consequence has been written in Vietnamese that has not also been published in French", although he has already said (p. 7) that French works are "unreliable because of their author's [*sic*] willingness to compromise with the demands of French colonial policy and propaganda." If by Vietnamese

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works he means those written in *quoc-ngu*, we may heartily agree; but Mr. Buttinger fails to mention, perhaps to realize, that down to the twentieth century (the period covered by this work) all Vietnamese histories, and most of the other documentary material with which the historian must work, were written in classical Chinese, and that for the period anterior to the thirteenth century we are dependent entirely on Chinese works. Very little of this material has been touched by Western historians. Mr. Buttinger's failure to use it has led to numerous omissions and errors of fact and judgment. Thus, too much space is devoted to the expansion of the Western Powers in the Far East from the sixteenth century on—an area of history comparatively familiar to the Westerner—and very little to developments within Vietnam and to relations with the Chinese Empire during this period.

Mr. Buttinger shows considerable present-mindedness in attributing modern ideas of nationalism to Vietnamese under Chinese rule (111 B.C.-965 A.D.), and in his constant reference to the traditional hatred of China and the Chinese. This hatred is all too evident among educated Vietnamese today, and was most certainly fostered by the French in their attempt to cut off Vietnam from China, culturally as well as politically. But it is very dangerous to read this nationalist feeling into events of the first millennium A.D. The author has apparently fallen into this trap partly from listening to too many ardent young Vietnamese, partly from depending too heavily on French sources, and partly because he has an axe to grind: he wants to prove to us that Vietnam, which has held out (with one exception) against conquest from the north since the tenth century, is our surest bet against the southward expansion of Communist China (p. 38). But he has failed to note that during nine hundred years of independence from China, Vietnam became even more thoroughly dominated by Chinese political and social institutions. This hardly bodes well for the checking of Chinese Communist influence.

Attention should be called to the fact that no attempt is made to standardize the spelling of Chinese words. The confusion of French and Vietnamese romanizations is most annoying to anyone accustomed to the generally used Wade-Giles system: thus we find Che Sie for Shih Hsieh and Trieu Da for Chao T'o. Much of this confusion could have been avoided had a conversion table listing the original characters been included.

An extensive bibliography is appended, but one could wish for more critical comments. There are copious footnotes, but too much is placed there which should be in the body of the

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text, and many questionable assertions are left without any documentation.

Chapter VI is a chronology of events since 1900 which is to form the basis of a second volume. Although it will be harder to obtain many of the Japanese and Chinese materials necessary to make such a history well balanced, it is to be hoped that Mr. Buttinger will try to use what may be available from these sources.

DAVID N. GIDMAN

CARNEGIE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

The Political Process and Foreign Policy: The Making of the Japanese Peace Settlement. By BERNARD C. COHEN. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957.—xi, 293 pp. $6.00.

The conversion of Japan from America's enemy to America's ally is one of the most significant and dramatic diplomatic revolutions of our time. How has it been possible? In this volume Professor Cohen, who is a Research Associate at the Center of International Studies of Princeton University and Managing Editor of *World Politics,* attempts to answer one part of this quesion, namely, why was it so easy to secure agreement in the United States on the Japanese peace settlement?

He begins by presenting a brief historical account of the settlement from Mr. Dulles' appointment in May 1950 to the Senate's ratification in March 1952. He then analyzes the rôles played by what he conceives to be the major elements which participated in the making of American policy in this case: the "public factors", which include the "climate of opinion" as revealed in public opinion polls, and the views of individuals, special interest groups, and the press; and what he might have termed the official factors, that is, the Executive and the Senate. He concludes with a brief contrasting analysis of how the North Pacific Fisheries Convention was formulated and approved.

The reasons for the ease with which the Japanese peace settlement was agreed upon in the United States, he finds, were multiple and interrelated, but he emphasizes two in particular: the indifference of the public and the skill of Mr. Dulles. The evidence for the first of these reasons is overwhelming; and Professor Cohen makes a good case for his view that the processes by which our foreign policies are formed are deeply affected in each instance by the strength and kind of public interest shown. In the case of the Japanese peace settlement, for example, he shows that the interest was so slight that the executive branch of the government had unusual freedom of action. He makes a very effective contrast between this situation and that which the Fisheries Con-

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vention experienced, in which the Pacific Coast fisherymen were so strongly interested and presented their case so effectively that the executive agencies felt forced in large part to respond to their wishes.

On the other hand the skill of Mr. Dulles is not so convincingly proved. We are informed that "he substantially ignored the mountains of treaty clauses previously drafted in the State Department, and the pits of involvement in inter-office committees, carving out instead a wholly new path toward his target of a peace treaty" (p. 127). But it is clear that in the course of his world-wide peregrinations and his consultations in Washington Mr. Dulles was forced several times to change his path. One wishes these changes had been more fully explored. One misses particularly any discussion of the processes within the executive branch of the government by which the policy was hammered out. This would lead undoubtedly to a discussion of the evolution of the "substance" of the settlement, which Professor Cohen consciously avoided, but without that, the rôle of Mr. Dulles would seem to be difficult to evaluate.

Of course, the information concerning these and other questions relating to policy formulation may be unavailable at present or it may well have been reserved for separate treatment. This volume is but one of what the Center of International Affairs has promised will be a series of studies of the Japanese peace settlement.

As an analysis of the kinds of activities which were involved in securing United States approval for the settlement, Professor Cohen's book is fascinating. It deserves a wide reading by political scientists interested in developing theories about policy-making, by historians concerned with American-Japanese relations, and by the many officials and private citizens who would like to know how to make their influence more effective in America's foreign policy.

JAMES WILLIAM MORLEY

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Small Town in Mass Society: Class, Power and Religion in a Rural Community. By ARTHUR J. VIDICH and JOSEPH BENSMAN. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1958.—xvi, 329 pp. $6.00.

This volume is a case study of the relationships between a small New York community, called Springdale, and the institutions of American mass society, and of the significant issues growing out of this relationship as illustrated chiefly in politics, edu-

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cation and religion. The bases of the class structure as influenced by internal and external processes, the relations between the individual's behavior in public situations and his private actions, and the mechanisms of community integration and personal adjustments in the face of various cleavages "which continuously threaten social and cultural values" are deemed central by the authors.

The community thus examined is representative of rural America and even of New York State only to the degree that national and state policies impinge upon it and subtract from the power such communities used to have for a more complete control of their simpler affairs at the turn of the century or before. While the conventional social data of census and survey type are not given, it is possible inferentially to see that Springdale differs from the norm. It is, for instance, static, whereas villages and the rural nonfarm population typically have been growing. It appears to have a relatively high proportion of tenant farmers whereas less than 5 per cent of New York's farmers fall in this class. Moreover at one point these tenant farmers are credited with behavior highly atypical in comparison with the results of scores of detailed studies of living standards of farm owner and tenant operator. Further, if, in fact, many of the successful farmers of today emerged from the despised "shack dwellers" in the last fifteen years, it is, to say the least, an unusual situation.

The volume is interesting, intriguing and irritating. It is interesting because the authors are skilled observers of human behavior and their descriptions of the foibles and rationalizations of our fellow humans which clothe what on the lower levels would be gossip with the garments of scientific objectivity by perceptive analysis are satisfying. It is intriguing because in some particulars the authors probe more deeply than others have done and hence are able to challenge some theories. The analysis of the intricate picture of rural politics is excellent and indicates that theories of politics based on class and interest groups alone "are, at best, preliminary steps in the process of understanding the detailed dynamics of the political situation." Space forbids a summary of the authors' convincing development of the political processes as they see them. This seems to this reviewer the best section of the book.

The volume is irritating because of the Olympian dogmatism of many of the explanations of the behavior the authors observed and of the values inherent in these behaviors. How can one be convinced in the absence of any data that, for the professional group, industrial workers and some of the middle class,

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"disenchantment with the American Dream has led them into the pursuit of stylized leisure and consumption"? One wonders about the unrevealed leisure and consumption habits of the rest of the "middle class". We are told that the continuous emphasis on social and organizational activities by the professional groups can be accounted for "in terms of their rejection of economic mobility" and "as a substitute therapy for the externalization of personality by work." Reading what some of these groups accomplished through the community organization suggests that the values they held motivated them in some at least of their efforts in behalf of worthy community projects.

The discussion of the religious situation is also irritating at points. One thesis of the book appears to be that the Springdales of America are sinking into a slough of dependence upon the decisions of the mass society. At only one point is the reciprocal or interdependent aspect of our society explicitly noted. Where Springdale resists the mass society other explanations are given. Thus Springdale's failure to accept certain declarations and policies of national church bodies and the cautious attitude of the ministers in mentioning them are interpreted as compromise and timidity on the part of the clergy, not as resistance to mass society nor as a phase in the process of changing religious conceptions. Social processes, frequently noted in the discussions of politics, seem underplayed in dealing with religion.

Springdale, to the authors, is a defeated community. "Because they do not recognize their defeat, they are not defeated." The reader, it seems to this reviewer, is left with two alternatives. Either he can say, "Where ignorance is bliss 'tis folly to be wise", or he can discount the conclusion by whatever percentage he wishes on the grounds that the defeat is announced solely in terms of the unstated values the authors hold.

EDMUND DES. BRUNNER

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

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

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

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. . . Announcement . . .

To the Members of the Academy:

In accordance with the provisions of the By-laws, notice is hereby given that the Board of Directors has fixed the date, Monday, January 19, 1959, on which the Annual Corporate Meeting of the Academy will be held in the office of the Academy of Political Science, Room 411, Fayerweather Hall, Columbia University, New York City, at 4 P.M. promptly.

This is the annual meeting for the transaction of all business of the Academy. The President's Annual Report will be presented at this time.

Members are reminded that the officers of the Academy will always be appreciative of suggestions for possible topics for our spring and fall meetings.

JOHN A. KROUT, *Secretary*

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

Ohio and California Defeat 'Work' Plan

By A. H. RASKIN

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Simjlar proposals to make it illegal to force workers to join



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

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